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US grand strategy and
Central Asia
Merging geopolitics and ideology
After the demise of the Cold War, US strategic planning gradually adjusted to
the new security environment, aiming to maintain its dominant global posi-
tion while increasingly emphasizing regional security, governance issues and
threats from non-state actors. The George W. Bush administration greatly ac-
celerated these trends. US grand strategy today is one of global primacy,
characterized by a dual focus on preventing the rise of any regional hege-
monic powers while addressing regional security issues stemming from
transnational and non-state threats.
Current US grand strategy exhibits, as it has for decades, two fundamental
components: geopolitical reasoning and ideological interests. The geo-
graphical focus of US strategy has gradually shifted to a broad arc stretching
from Western Africa to Southeast Asia, an area rich in vital strategic resources
and widespread political and social instability.
Located at the center of this unstable arc, Central Asia contains many of the
global challenges facing the US: regional powers, unstable and authoritarian
states, energy resources, terrorism, proliferation threats and international
criminal networks. With its regional strategy, the US seeks to shift the political
center of gravity away from Russia and China by encouraging economic and
political linkages between Central Asia and the region's southerly neighbors.
This study reveals that the geopolitical and ideological elements in US strat-
egy create both surprising synergies as well as classic conflicts of interest for
policymakers. The challenges facing the US in Central Asia offer lessons for US
strategy in other regions around the globe.
KEYWORDS:  US grand strategy, Central Asia, geopolitics

Chapter 1
Introduction
The fundamental character of regimes now matters more than
the international distribution of power. In this world it is
impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security inter-
ests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, January 2006
In his classic 1997 treatise The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski
proffered a sweeping strategic analysis grounded in classic geopolitical
reasoning.1 The historical key to extending America’s unipolar mo-
ment in the post-Cold War world was to prevent the rise of a peer com-
petitor on the Eurasian continent. By far the largest, most populous
and most economically productive continent on earth, Eurasia con-
tained the necessary ingredients for generating global power, accord-
ing to Brzezinski. A particularly vital region stretched from the
Caucasus to the easternmost fringes of Central Asia, an area Brzezinski
termed the Eurasian Balkans. With Russian, Chinese, Iranian and
Turkish interests in the region, Brzezinski argued that “America’s pri-
mary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control
this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered
financial and economic access to it.”2 
Brzezinski claimed that traditional geopolitical thinking focused
on controlling sections of the Eurasian continent, but that in these
modern times of global geopolitics, “preponderance over the entire
1 The author would like to thank Olof Kronvall for his thoughtful and extremely valu-
able comments on an earlier draft. A note of thanks also to Svein Melby and Ingerid
Opdahl. As always, all errors and omissions in this paper are my own.
2 Zbigenew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 148.
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Eurasian continent” was essential for global primacy, but that Central
Asia was a crucial piece of the puzzle.3 A decade later, Stephen Blank
summarized US interests in Central Asia in a similar fashion, stating
that “America’s policy of defending the independence, integrity, and
security of these states serves to extend the vital geostrategic interests
of the United States in forestalling the possible rise of a Eurasian em-
pire on either continent.”4 According to Blank, the commonly held
view that US interests in Central Asia are based on access to resources
and promoting democracy is “utterly misplaced.”5
Control over the Eurasian continent – and Central Asia in partic-
ular – as the vital geopolitical prize for those states concerned with
global power is an idea rooted in early twentieth-century strategic
thinking, most notably associated with Sir Halford Mackinder. Over a
century later, does this strategic mindset continue to have relevance?
How might we consider the “geopolitical” importance of Central Asia,
given America’s wide-ranging and evolving interests in an increasing-
ly globalized world? These questions are best approached by placing
the region within a broader context. What are, in fact, the overarching
strategic interests and plans of the United States, how do its region-
specific policies in Central Asia mesh with these global plans, and
what conclusions might be drawn from Washington’s regional strate-
gy that have relevance for its global one ? 
The answer, which this study will demonstrate, is that Central
Asia indeed remains an important region for the United States. The
reasoning behind this, however, has shifted in some fundamental ways.
The United States today pursues a strategy of global primacy, whereby
it actively strives to maintain its global power position by conducting
a twofold strategy: hinder the rise of any regional powers that may
challenge it, and confront a host of transnational and non-state threats
to its security. The US seeks to accomplish both of these overarching
tasks by maintaining a preponderance of military force throughout the
world, securing strategic access to vital regions, using political and
diplomatic efforts to ensure its ability to act independently and unim-
peded when its vital interests are threatened, and increasingly adopt-
ing measures that focus on preventing the development of threats
within other states. Finally, US grand strategy during the Bush ad-
3 Ibid, p. 39.
4 Stephen Blank, “The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View,”
Parameters (spring 2008) (US Army War College [online 13 Nov 08]): 77–87.
5 Ibid.
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ministration has emphasized ideology to such a degree that it has be-
come a strategic interest in itself, whereby the promotion of liberal
values such as democracy and individual freedom are building blocks
in US efforts to counteract terrorism and regional instability. 
The combination of interests, threats, geographic focus, ideology
and evolving strategic thinking since the Cold War has resulted in the
continued relevance of Central Asia, but from an altered geopolitical
perspective. While Eurasia remains a geopolitically important region,
it no longer constitutes the sole focus of US grand strategy, which now
includes a broad geographic arc of unstable and authoritarian states.
This “new” geopolitical reality in Central Asia – and the US responses
to it – has implications for Washington’s global strategic planning and
its implementation. Central Asia may be an early indication of how an
eventual multi-polar system might look. The US competes for political
and economic influence with actors such as Russia and China in the re-
gion, while at the same time attempting to address structural security
interests and promote its ideological agenda of freedom and democratic
ideals. In Central Asia, the two main elements of US grand strategy
(hindering regional hegemonic powers and countering the threat posed
by non-state actors) are in direct geographic proximity: Russia to the
north, China to the east, Afghanistan to the south. The two strategic
elements therefore interact in both complementary and conflicting
ways in the region. In short, the new geopolitics of Central Asia reflects a far
greater complexity than traditional great power politics alone, and integrating
both strategic elements presents serious challenges to policymakers.
Grand strategy and competing interests
Colin Dueck defines grand strategy as the “self-conscious identifica-
tion and prioritization of foreign policy goals; an identification of ex-
isting and potential resources; and a selection of a plan which uses
those resources to meet those goals.”6 Similarly, Colin Gray writes that
“the crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capac-
ity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both
military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the
nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests.”7
Policymakers develop grand strategy, according to Christopher Layne,
6 Colin Dueck, “Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000–2004,”
Review of International Studies, vol. 30 (2004): 512.
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through a three-step process of “determining a state’s vital security in-
terests; identifying the threats to those interests; and deciding how
best to employ the state’s political, military, and economic resources to
protect those interests.”8 
All of these conceptualizations of grand strategy describe a com-
prehensive and broad-reaching plan that involves all aspects of foreign
policy in an organized pursuit of the country’s “vital” or “best” inter-
ests. Defining these interests for the United States, however, has led to
a well-known and fundamental conflict between realism and idealism.
Policy formation has long entailed a struggle to reconcile the norma-
tive goals upon which the United States was founded, and the de-
mands of political pragmatism upon which a state with global
interests depends.9 Two recent attempts to weave together these two
enduring strands in foreign policy are particularly noteworthy. In July
2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice presented a realism-ideal-
ism amalgamation as the core of what she called “American Realism.”
According to Rice, America’s moral ideas and principles should dic-
tate the nation’s foreign policy as much as material interests: “Ameri-
can Realism deals with the world as it is, but strives to make the world
better than it is. More free. More just. More peaceful. More prosperous.
And ultimately safer. Not perfect. Just better.”10 Her colleague at the
Department of Defense, Robert Gates, had a similar message later that
year, stating that “the spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and
protects our interests – in making the world ‘safe for democracy,’ we
are also the ‘champion and vindicator’ of our own. In reality, Wilson
and Adams must coexist.”11 
In his analysis of US grand strategy, Colin Dueck sees the primary
theoretical lens used by American policymakers as a realist one, with
an emphasis on core assumptions of that perspective: the importance
of power, material wealth, the explanatory power of international
structures, and the state as the primary actor in the system. On top of
7 Colin Gray, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition” in
Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Colin Gray (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1991), p. 5 [original emphasis].
8 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” in America’s Strategic
Choices, eds. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E.
Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 246.
9 One of many classic works on this is Robert E. Osgood’s Ideals and Self-interest in
America’s Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
10 Condoleezza Rice, “The Power and Promise of American Realism,” remarks to the
Economic Club of New York, Real Clear Politics, 7 June 2007 [online 17 Nov 2008].
11 Robert Gates, speech at the World Forum on the future of Democracy, Williamsburg,
VA, 17 September 2007 (U.S. Department of Defense [17 Nov 2008]).
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this, he adds a cultural lens that takes into account domestic factors
that precipitate adjustments to the “default” realist analysis.12 But for
Dueck this cultural lens is not only important for understanding
Washington’s liberal rhetoric. Ideology plays more than an instru-
mental role in US foreign policy. He argues that the rhetoric of democ-
racy, human rights and open markets concretely influences US policy.
Inclusion of liberal ideas in US foreign policy forces policymakers to
tailor their policies to match their rhetoric to some extent, in order to
maintain public support. Leaders can find themselves constrained by
their own rhetoric simply to maintain their credibility. Further, in
many cases US officials come to believe in the liberal rhetoric used in-
itially to justify a policy action. As Robert Jervis also observes, “there
is a tendency for people to act in accord with the explanations they
have given for their own behavior, which means that the [Bush] doc-
trine could guide behavior even if it were originally a rationaliza-
tion.”13 
The discussion and debate over elements of realism and idealism
in US foreign policy has long historical roots. The analytical usefulness
of these terms, however, is questionable. Realism might easily be sub-
stituted with pragmatism, thereby emphasizing expedient policies
that exclusively serve the national interest. Such actions may not al-
ways be in alignment with a foreign policy based on the International
Relations theory of Realism, which prioritizes balancing and the accu-
mulation of national power. Analytical confusion may arise when ob-
serving ostensibly idealistically inspired actions carried out in a
pragmatic nature, such as the Iraq war. Therefore, this study argues
that the implementation of a “realist” grand strategy will involve first
and foremost a strategy guided by geopolitical reasoning, combining
the “where” (the location of strategic interest) with the “why” (the mo-
tivations behind it). It will be demonstrated that geopolitically in-
spired policies may generally be thought of as the real-world
application of realist theory.
Similarly, the term idealism, while commonly used, also becomes
analytically clumsy upon closer inspection. According to the Web-
ster’s dictionary entry, idealists are guided by specific standards or
goals of perfection, often without regard to practical considerations.
12 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp.
18–20.
13 Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.
118, no. 3 (2003): 365.
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Idealism also carries an altruistic connotation of pursuing noble aims.
While many policies termed “idealistic” may fall under such a defini-
tion, the motives behind US policy are much more complex. Idealisti-
cally inspired policies have often had instrumental and practical
aspects as well. This study will utilize the term “ideology” as a more
neutral term for US historical and philosophical interests in democracy
promotion and human rights. Together, geopolitics and ideology rep-
resent two major and reoccurring themes in post World War II US
grand strategy, and are two themes that have shaped the strategic
thinking of US policymakers in the twenty-first century.
Method: finding a grand strategy
The study of grand strategy, especially in the later part of the Bush ad-
ministration, has included offerings from many renowned scholars.
Some have based their analyses of US grand strategy on theoretical as-
sumptions garnered from a particular International Relations perspec-
tive. In this way, US interests, threats, and strategic goals can be
extrapolated from a set of “givens.” This approach solves some meth-
odological issues, such as evaluating rhetoric and strategic documents
to separate instrumental speech from accurate statements of strategic
direction. In the end, however, an analysis of US strategy based exclu-
sively on theoretical assumptions relies more on the theory’s compati-
bility with US policy than its accuracy in identifying US goals and the
logic employed in creating a strategic framework to achieve them. 
In addition, many of the works dealing with American grand
strategy are less a thorough analysis of existing strategic policy than an
argument for a particular strategic course advocated by the author.14
While such books are extremely valuable and impressive in their
depth, detail and argumentation, an analysis and comparison of ad-
ministration statements and implemented policies might lead to nu-
ances not seen in such sweeping works.15 This study seeks to explore
14 Recent works include Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2006); Stephen Walt, Taming American Power (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 2005); Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound (Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohl-
forth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August
2002): 20–33.
15 Studies of implemented strategy include Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy
After 9/11: An Assessment (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005) and Nathan
Freier, “Primacy without a Plan,” Parameters (autumn 2006) (US Army War College
[online 17 Nov 2008]): 5–21.
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US grand strategy objectively in order to highlight its internal strate-
gic logic rather than pass judgment upon it. Some elements of US
strategy have been analyzed in this way, but few studies attempt to
connect the dots, as it were, to sketch the broad lines of US strategic
planning and implementation.16 This study seeks to fill that void.
One legitimate criticism of analyzing any overarching grand strat-
egy is the real possibility that such a broad plan simply does not exist
– that the cumulative sum of US military, economic, and political pol-
icies overseas are not planned in an orderly and conscious manner.
Rather, it may be argued that these policies evolve in a haphazard and
somewhat random fashion, dictated by short-term objectives, bureau-
cratic maneuvering, and the accumulation of reactive policies to un-
folding events on the ground. Several distinguished scholars and
strategists have argued that US strategy exhibits such incoherence and
disorganization as to suggest the absence of a grand strategy.17 Some
strategists also point to tenets of chaos theory to illustrate how world
events do not necessarily follow a linear progression, but can be affect-
ed by spontaneous and unpredictable random elements. Strategic
planners must not assume that policies enacted today will produce the
exact future results desired.18 Dueck responds that 
whether or not a strategic plan literally exists, nations must
make difficult choices on matters of defense spending, alliance
diplomacy, and military intervention. Decisions regarding
trade-offs between ends and means are inevitable, even if they
are neither coherent nor coordinated.”19 
It therefore becomes necessary to differentiate between a formalized
grand strategic plan such as a national security strategy, and the grand
strategy as implemented – the actual distribution of a nation’s resourc-
es. While nations are usually reluctant to reveal the totality of their
strategic plans, the strategy’s implementation is more difficult to con-
16 Works that analyse strategic statements and their internal logic include for example:
John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2004); John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,”
Foreign Policy (1 December 2002) [online 20 Nov 2008]; and to some extent: Andrew
Bacevich, American Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
17 See Freier, “Primacy without a Plan” or Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11.
18 For more on this point, see Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The
Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), especially chap-
ter 3.
19 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.
11.
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ceal and therefore easier to observe. The grand strategy “as implement-
ed,” the most relevant for analyses of “real world” policies, provides a
means of corroborating the strategic thinking presented in defense
documents.
This study therefore intends to utilize a two-pronged approach for
identifying US grand strategy by first observing stated US policy and
then supplementing it with observations of US policy as implemented.
The first set of observations will make use of key national security doc-
uments (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Quad-
rennial Defense Review, etc), congressional testimony by State and
Defense Department officials, and speeches by administration officials
regarding the broad lines of US strategy. The other set of observations
are those that show the implementation of strategy and will include
two levels of governmental action. One source will be mid-level policy
planning documents and initiatives crafted to carry out the adminis-
tration’s strategy, such as the National Military Strategy and the State
Department’s Transformational Diplomacy initiative. In addition,
concrete policy actions taken by the United States will be taken into
account, such as budgetary decisions and funding levels, military to
military cooperation, congressional legislation, and diplomatic efforts
on various levels. 
Sweeping policy objectives and declarations of US intentions often
included in strategy documents and foreign policy speeches are in many
respects detached from the daily compromises that define US foreign re-
lations. While these examples may simply represent necessary excep-
tions to an overall strategy that cannot possibly be rigidly adhered to in
every instance, they do symbolize the importance of integrating state-
ments of strategic intent with actual policy positions and concrete ac-
tions such as defense spending. As grand strategy refers to the
allocation, distribution, or prioritization of a nation’s resources, it may
be most accurately observed through a synthesis of stated US interests,
strategies and policies: seeing strategy as a sum of its many parts.
This approach hopes to provide as complete an overview of US
grand strategy as possible from unclassified sources. The unwieldy na-
ture of American bureaucracy and the lack of coordination between its
many parts prohibit the perfect execution of a single strategic plan.
However, US military, economic and political resources must be allo-
cated in some fashion or another, forcing some type of strategic deci-
sion-making to occur. The prioritization shown in the distribution of
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limited resources in those three areas, combined with declared strate-
gic interests and goals, should provide a picture of US grand strategy,
insofar as one can be seen.
While the combination of strategic planning and practical imple-
mentation creates a much more accurate picture of US grand strategy,
a better understanding of the operational aspects and consequences of
strategic decision-making can be gained through an examination of a
particular region. US grand strategy assumes a global focus that nec-
essarily must be carried out on a regional basis, and few regions encap-
sulate the entirety of US strategy better than Central Asia. Exploring
the relationship between Washington’s global strategy and its region-
al strategy in Central Asia offers an opportunity to substantiate the
relevance and accuracy of the strategy extrapolated by this study, as
well as the chance to observe deviations from, and challenges to, such
a strategy. 
Structure
This study is divided into two main sections, one dealing with US
grand strategy and the second with US policy in Central Asia. In sec-
tion one, the concept of geopolitics will be examined and a typology of
the term offered. A brief historical overview of US grand strategy will
then show the particular relevance of geopolitical thinking for US Cold
War containment strategy, as well as the consistent inclusion of ideo-
logical elements in US strategic thinking. Next, a thorough analysis of
current US grand strategy will show that while the US has made sub-
stantial adjustments since the end of the Cold War, geopolitical rea-
soning and ideological elements remain common threads. Further,
current grand strategy contains a geopolitical focus that has shifted
from the traditional emphasis on Eurasia, a shift that gives rise to a new
geopolitics in Central Asia while retaining its relevance to US strategic
thinking. An analysis of US strategic policy as implemented provides
converging evidence of this new focus, the emerging threats, and the
new capabilities currently being developed to address them. 
In section two, background on Central Asian politics provides
some context for the presentation of US strategy for that region. This
background material is crucial for understanding not only US motiva-
tions and hindrances in the region, but also the interests of other ac-
tors. The next chapter presents the regional strategy pursued by the
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US, divided by policymakers into categories corresponding to those of
grand strategy: military, political and economic. Its implementation
reveals the challenges faced by the US in furthering its interests in
such regions. Central Asia contains many of the elements – and the
conflicts – of the global strategy, themes which will then be expanded
upon in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 2
Geopolitics and ideology in US
grand strategy
Conceptualizing geopolitics
“Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as
romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a
third world war as the theory of ‘geopolitics,’” complained Charles
Clover in a 1999 Foreign Affairs article.20 Throughout the century-long
history of the term, geopolitics has been used and misused to the point
where its utility as a meaningful concept has been significantly
reduced. The original conceptualization of geopolitics, developed by
Rudolf Kjellan and later adapted by Nazi Germany’s Karl Haushofer,
saw the state in Darwinian terms as a biological organism. Superior
organisms (states) would naturally expand and absorb weaker ones as
part of the natural evolutionary process.21 Geopolitics has generally not
been used or understood in this manner since that time, though some
still associate the term with its historical lineage. Purveyors and
practitioners of geopolitics in recent years also have in many instances
failed to specify what exactly is meant when using some variation of
the word. For the concept of geopolitics to have any analytical value,
its meaning must first be clarified and more narrowly defined. A
typology of geopolitics may be said to encompass three aspects.
First, geopolitics contains a descriptive component explaining the
realities of the geographical landscape as it relates to international po-
litical and strategic matters. International borders are but one example
in which geography plays a crucial role in political matters, from the
20 Charles Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopoli-
tics,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (1999): 9.
21 G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy 1890–1987 (Brighton: Wheat-
sheaf Books, 1988), p. 6.
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discussions among states over their demarcation, the rivers that
transect them, the mountain ranges that hinder the movement of both
merchants and armies across them, and the minerals and energy re-
sources found within or even straddling them. Another might be mar-
itime choke points such as the Malacca Straits, the Suez Canal, and the
Straits of Hormuz. Describing the political and strategic realities of
international relations in objective terms cannot be accomplished
without acknowledging the physical realities of geographical position.
Colin S. Gray argues that “all politics is geopolitics” due to the fact
that “all political matters occur within a particular geographical con-
text.”22
A second use of the term geopolitics is the prescriptive element
that entails a global strategy to secure a nation’s interests and offers
policymakers a plan of action given the realities of the descriptive
component. Geopolitical reasoning here implies a process by which
policymakers view and divide the world according to preconceptions
based on theoretical assumptions, political realities, and ideological
convictions. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, taking a more critical look at geopol-
itics, views it as:
a problem-solving theory for the conceptualization and practice
of statecraft. A convenient label for a variety of traditions and
cultures of theory and practice, geopolitics sees itself as an
instrumental form of knowledge and rationality. It takes the
existing power structures for granted and works within these to
provide conceptualization and advice to foreign policy decision-
makers. Its dominant modes are declarative (“This is how the
world is”) and then imperative (“this is what we must do.”)23
This prescriptive element might also be termed geostrategy, defined by
Brzezinski as the “strategic management of geopolitical interests.”24
Colin Gray makes the more general argument that “all strategy is ge-
ostrategy” because “strategy is always ‘done’ tactically by what Carl
von Clausewitz called war’s ‘grammar,’ in specific geographical con-
texts.”25 Ó Tuathail argues that geostrategy is “a form of geopolitical
22 Colin S. Gray, “Inescapable Geopolitics” in Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, eds.
Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 164 [original
emphasis].
23 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Soci-
ety,” in Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, eds. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 109.
24 Brzezinski, Grand Chessboard, p. 31.
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discourse that makes explicit strategic claims about the material na-
tional security interests of the state across a world map characterized
by state competition, threats and dangers.26” In The White House Years,
Henry Kissinger frequently refers to “geopolitics” and the “geopoliti-
cal” aspects of particular issues, which he defined as “an approach that
pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium27.” These statements
highlight the close relationship between prescriptive geopolitics and
the International Relations theory of Realism, where power, state sur-
vival, and an anarchical international system are fundamental assump-
tions. The overriding aim of a realist-based foreign policy is the pursuit
of materialistic military and economic capabilities (the means of wield-
ing power in the international system according to realists) as well as
balancing against the capabilities of those states that threaten the in-
terests, and therefore the survival, of the state. Geopolitical reasoning
embraces many of these same assumptions.28
Finally, the third way in which geopolitics is used refers to a spe-
cific theoretical perspective entailing a global strategy based on an al-
most unavoidable confrontation between maritime- and continental-
based powers vying for global dominance. Reflected in the writings of
theoreticians such as Sir Halford MacKinder and Nicholas Spykman,
the prescriptive theory of geopolitics asserts that control over the Eur-
asian continent in some manner (either by controlling its heart or its
boundaries) is the key to global power, a theory to which the aforemen-
tioned Brzezinski subscribes. The similarities between this view and
the US Cold War strategy of containment will be expanded upon in
the following section, while Russian strategists supporting this theory
are represented in a school of thought known as Eurasianism.29 
US foreign policy has consistently been interlaced at various times
with all three types of geopolitical thinking. The Monroe Doctrine in
1823 set out to establish the Western Hemisphere as solely within the
25 Gray, “Inescapable Geopolitics”, p. 164.
26 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Toward Conceptual Clar-
ity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics,” in Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional
Concerns, Bison Paper, no. 4 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies,
2002), pp. 75–99.
27 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nickelsen, 1979), p.
914.
28 Adherents of critical geopolitics find it troubling that this linkage is simply accepted
without reflection. Their view is that geopolitical theory, argumentation, and the
very use of the word presuppose a set of underlying assumptions biased toward Great
Powers and Great Power politics. Geopolitics therefore cannot hope to be an objective
portrayal of political factors that are geographically based. See Ó Tuathail, “Under-
standing Critical Geopolitics.”
29  Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland.”
18 Defence and Security Studies 2-2008
US sphere of influence. In the mid-1800s, the concept of Manifest
Destiny reflected a belief held by American leaders that it was their
country’s fate to expand its borders to the Pacific Ocean. President
Theodore Roosevelt strengthened the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 by
proclaiming American willingness to employ military might to en-
force the spirit of European non-intervention in the hemisphere. These
actions reflect geopolitical thinking that couples geographical realities
together with political interests in order to form strategy and policy.
Three prominent geopolitical thinkers have influenced US strategic
thinking on a global scale over the past century: Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Sir Halford MacKinder and Nicholas Spykman.
Alfred Thayer Mahan
One of the more prominent geopolitical theorists, writing just before
the term “geopolitics” was actually coined, was the American naval
strategist Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. His seminal work, The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, became an instant
global success and made a lasting impact in the field of geopolitics. At
the end of the nineteenth century, railroads and steam engines were
revolutionizing the transport sector. Mahan argued that while rail
stood for the majority of a country’s internal trade, the bulk of inter-
national trade relied (and would continue to rely) on shipping, as
waterborne transport remained easier and cheaper than land trans-
port.30 The wealthiest countries, active in maritime economic activities
such as production, shipping, and colonial endeavors, required sub-
stantial naval capabilities to protect these interests.31 Mahan’s argu-
ment for the importance of naval supremacy was grounded in the belief
that sea power was crucial to the economic and security interests of the
state. Scholar John Gooch described the impact of Mahan’s work on US
policy as immediate and substantial:
Mahan’s message to Americans was that they must now play an
international role upon the world scene. To do this, the United
States must cease to be an insular continental power and instead
become a global force by building up her maritime power. The
first step in this process had already been taken: a naval appro-
30 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works
of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 1997). The oceans remain vital to international trade; ships transport nearly
90% of the world’s goods.
31 Ibid.
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priations bill in 1883 had authorized the construction of four
steel battleships in American yards, and they had been com-
pleted four years later. Mahan’s ideas gave this policy a new
impetus. Six weeks after the publication of his book, Congress
agreed to the construction of three “seagoing, coast-line battle-
ships.” With this decision, the United States set out on the path
to sea power as Mahan understood, explained, and preached it.32
Another of Mahan’s works, The Problem of Asia (1900), predicted that
the conflict between Russian land power and the maritime powers (at
that time Britain) would continue, focused around a “Debated and De-
batable Middle Strip” in Asia, from China to the Mediterranean Sea be-
tween 30 and 40 degrees north latitudes.33 Historically, Russia had
sought to gain access to warm water ports, and Mahan therefore saw
Russian expansion as inevitable. This almost-preordained conflict be-
tween land and sea powers would occur around the “Debated Middle
Strip” in Asia – an area that included the southern half of present-day
Central Asia. 
Sir Halford Mackinder
Just over a decade after the publication of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea
Power upon History, Sir Halford Mackinder stood before the Royal Geo-
graphical Society in London and presented quite a different analysis en-
titled “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Mackinder declared the
end to a 400-year long age of exploration and discovery he termed the
“Columbian epoch,” and that the world could from then on be de-
scribed as a “closed political system” where events on one side of the
globe would have an effect on the other.34 This transition entailed a
shift from the dominance of sea power in the Columbian epoch to the
rise of land power in the post-Columbian age, brought about by tech-
nological changes such as the railroad.
Much of the broad expanses of Eurasia, rich in natural resources,
are inaccessible by ship and therefore impenetrable to sea power. The
advent of the railroad enhanced transportation in this region, stretch-
ing from Siberia to the edge of modern-day Europe and encompassing
the whole of Central Asia, and caused Mackinder to wonder “Is not the
32 John Gooch, “Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett,” in Seapower and Strategy, eds.
Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (London: Tri-service Press, 1994), p. 31.
33 Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, p. 91.
34 Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal, vol.
23 (1904): 422.
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pivot region of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which
is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding
nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of rail-
ways?”35 Strategic and well protected, the state controlling this region
had an obvious advantage in challenging the traditional maritime
powers on its periphery. “In the present condition of the balance of
power, the pivot state, Russia, is not equivalent to the peripheral
states,” wrote Mackinder, but “the oversetting of the balance of power
in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal
lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources
for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in
sight.”36 Mackinder developed and refined his “heartland” concept in
later versions, and came to view Eastern Europe as the focal point in
the struggle between sea and land power. This belief was embodied in
Mackinder’s often-repeated phrase: “Who rules East Europe controls
the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the World-Island
[the entirety of Eurasia]; Who rules the World-Island commands the
world.”37
Nicholas Spykman
Although harboring similar theoretical assumptions as Mackinder
about the coming conflict between maritime and continental power,
Nicholas Spykman, writing during the Second World War – but al-
ready thinking of the post-war geopolitical landscape – argued that the
heartland theory was flawed. The heartland itself posed no threat to
maritime powers; the area of most concern was in fact the buffer zone
(called the “Rimland”) between the two where control over the mari-
time routes encircling the Eurasian land mass would be crucial.38
Spykman, echoing Mahan, wrote that “one of the basic patterns in the
politics of the Old World during the last century was the opposition
between the British naval power operating along the circumferential
sea route and Russian land-power trying to smash an opening through
the encircling ring” to gain access to a warm water port, a goal Russia
had pursued unsuccessfully for several centuries, thwarted by “geogra-
phy and sea power.”39 
35 Ibid: 434–5.
36 Ibid: 436.
37 Quoted in Geoffrey Sloan, “Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then
and Now,” in Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy, eds. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 27.
38 Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, p. 63.
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Echoing the sentiments of Mackinder and Mahan, Spykman recog-
nized that with the USSR’s landmass, the “full application of western
technology to the resources of the vast territory could develop an econ-
omy strong enough to support one of the Great War machines of the
twentieth century.”40 Spykman fully intended his ideas to be applied
by decision-makers in Washington. The task of US policymakers,
then, was to maintain control over the Rimland to prevent the Soviet
Union from gaining access to the maritime routes. As Spykman put it,
“The Mackinder dictum … is false. If there is to be a slogan for the
power politics of the Old World, it must be ‘Who controls the Rim-
land rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the
world.’”41
Cold War containment: 
mixing geopolitics and ideology
World War Two affected American geopolitical assumptions on two
levels. First, the attack on Pearl Harbor changed many Americans’ ge-
opolitical beliefs by demonstrating the limitations of oceans as natural
defensive barriers. Second, the United States had again been drawn
into a war on the Eurasian continent. As Geoffrey Sloan wrote 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the Second World War
resulted in Roosevelt’s perception of the political importance of
the Eurasian continent to the security of the United States tak-
ing a form which had many similarities with one of the central
concepts of Mackinder’s heartland theory.
With the strengthened post-war position of the Soviet Union, a con-
frontation between American sea power and Soviet land power ap-
peared to be in the offing.
It was under these circumstances that George Kennan, a State De-
partment diplomat stationed in Moscow, sent the now famous “Long
Telegram” in February 1946, published in article form in the journal
Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym X in July 1947. In the key pas-
39 Nickolas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York:Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1942), p. 182.
40 Ibid.
41 Quoted in Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics,” Naval
War College Review, vol. LII, no. 4 (autumn 1999).
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sage that was to become the framework for US strategy for decades,
Kennan wrote: “it is clear that the main element of any United States
policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”42
More specifically, “the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of
the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and
vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points.”43 This idea of confronting the So-
viets at specific strategic points around the globe, a “strongpoint”
rather than a “perimeter” defense, allowed the US to pick its battles
and use its limited resources most effectively.
Basic containment strategy echoed the concerns of Mahan and
Mackinder about the dangers presented by a country controlling the
heartland of Eurasia, and paralleled Spykman’s insistence on confront-
ing the Soviets in the buffer zones of the Rimland. Defense of this stra-
tegic area was best achieved through a “strongpoint” defense, argued
Kennan. In 1949, two hugely significant events – the establishment
of Communist China and the development by the Soviets of atomic
weapons – led President Truman to authorize a study of how contain-
ment could be systematically implemented. A group of State and De-
fense Department officials drafted what came to be known as NSC-68,
what the historian John Lewis Gaddis described as a “single, compre-
hensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable
of being communicated throughout the bureaucracy.”44 The resulting
document deviated substantially from the “Long Telegram.” NSC-
68’s authors concluded that Kennan’s “strongpoint” defense of the
Rimland was insufficient and argued for a “perimeter” defense where
all geographic areas had equal strategic value. It was impossible for the
US to project an image of confidence and strength when the “strong-
point” defense strategy of picking one’s battles implied a lack of re-
sources to defend the entire perimeter, especially when, according to
Gaddis, “world order, and with it American security, had come to de-
pend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that
balance actually was.”45
42 George Kennan (X), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947
[online 17 Nov 2008].
43 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
44 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 90.
45 Ibid, p. 92.
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Throughout the next two decades, US security policy stuck to the
basic strategic framework staked out by NSC-68: confronting and con-
taining, by any and all means necessary, the Soviet Union, which sig-
nified an existential threat to the United States. The next three
administrations, those of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, each
varied in their approaches and strategic solutions, but the main struc-
tures in their foreign policies corresponded roughly to those of NSC-
68. President Eisenhower introduced the geopolitical concept of fall-
ing dominoes, an expansion of the Truman Doctrine (that the US
would provide assistance to countries under threat from communist
expansionism), whereby the fall of one country to communist influ-
ence would lead to a similar occurrence in neighboring countries like
falling dominoes. For the US, international communism was indistin-
guishable from the Soviet threat, and conflicts in the Rimland coun-
tries of Korea and Vietnam therefore became crucial to US security. At
the same time, the Eisenhower administration employed rhetoric es-
pousing freedom and liberty, conflating the geopolitical contest be-
tween the US and the USSR as an ideological battle, thereby shifting
the focus away from the actual means by which the conflict was
waged.46
During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, containment
was pursued more vigorously and less attention was paid to cost/
benefit analyses. According to Sloan, “maintaining a line along the
entire length of the Eurasian Rimland regardless of the cost of actual
political achievements” became the principle strategic goal; contain-
ment was “increasingly dictating policy objectives instead of the other
way around.”47 The ideological battle between the two superpowers
escalated and became nearly inseparable from the strategic conflict.
The United States pursued projects that satisfied not only the
idealistic sentiment among Americans, but that also served a strategic
purpose. When President Kennedy founded the Peace Corps in 1961,
his intention was not only to channel American idealism into
improving the living standards in developing countries, but also to
counter communist influence. As one scholar has argued,
the Peace Corps represented, in part, an attempt to reorient US
foreign policy in the Third World toward economic develop-
ment … US political leaders at the time recognized that under-
46 Sloan, Geopolitics in US Strategic Policy, p. 143–145.
47 Ibid, p. 150–152.
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developed, newly independent, and highly nationalistic nations
were more susceptible to communist influence than were more
prosperous nations.48 
The partnership of President Richard Nixon and his National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1969 began moving US foreign policy
away from the economic development and democracy promotion of the
Kennedy and Johnson years. Alone, such goals would not necessarily
enhance US security, and their value depended upon the geopolitical
context.49 These adjustments led some to criticize the Nixon and Ford
administrations for lacking morality in their foreign policy with its
preference for geopolitics and balancing over human rights and democ-
racy.50 Demonstrating that US grand strategy does not stray far from
its ideological component, these two administrations’ attempts to pur-
sue a more pragmatic strategy created a sort of domestic backlash. 
Indeed, the incoming Carter administration promised another
course adjustment from Kissinger’s foreign policy of geopolitics to an
approach that took more normative concerns into consideration.51 The
human rights aspect of Carter’s foreign policy ultimately became more
rhetorical in nature as these normative considerations became integrat-
ed into the existing geopolitical framework of containment.52 Just as
the grand strategy of the US could not sustain a continued realist-
oriented policy, neither could the pendulum swing too far towards a
pure ideology-based policy. In 1979, an Islamic revolution in Iran top-
pled the US-friendly government there and then, later in the year, the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; the Rimland seemed more vulner-
able than ever to Soviet dominance. The brief 1973 oil embargo by
OPEC provided a poignant reminder of US dependence on petroleum
exports from the Middle East, and President Carter responded to the
events of 1979 by issuing what came to be known as the Carter Doc-
trine. 
Carter announced the policy in his 1980 State of the Union Ad-
dress, the text of which was written by National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An at-
tempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
48 Michael R. Hall, “Impact of the US Peace Corps at Home and Abroad,” Journal of
Third World Studies, (spring 2007) (BNET Research Center [online 1 Nov 2007]).
49 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 278.
50 Ibid, pp. 336–7.
51 Ibid.
52 Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, p. 191.
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will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States
of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means neces-
sary, including military force.”53 To this end, the administration es-
tablished a Rapid Deployment Force based in the US but ready for
deployment to the Middle East. In addition, as the Soviets’ actions in
Afghanistan were perceived to be a threat to Persian Gulf oil, the US
conducted covert operations to fund and support the Afghan mujahe-
deen.54 The battle for the Rimland and the defense of American oil
supplies combined during the Carter years with ramifications that are
still felt today, exemplified by repeated US interventions in the Per-
sian Gulf.
With the Reagan administration came the return of ideological
rhetoric. Ironically, Reagan criticized the Carter administration’s hu-
man rights focus during the 1980 campaign and initially conducted a
pragmatic foreign policy once in office. In 1983, a combination of fac-
tors led to the “rediscovery” of human rights issues, but unlike Carter’s
focus on government repression and economic disenfranchisement,
Reagan emphasized political rights and democratic processes.55 In ad-
dition, Reagan’s support of insurgencies that were fighting commu-
nist/Soviet-oriented governments in the developing world combined
with strong, consistent rhetoric reflecting the administration’s belief
that the battle was an ideological one.56 This was encapsulated in the
Reagan Doctrine of assisting anti-communist insurgencies in an effort
to confront the Soviet Union in the Rimland in an attempt to “roll
back” the influence of global communism.57 It entailed a revival of
containment theory’s perimeter defense and added as a priority of US
policy “to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism,” with a
particular focus on the developing world.58 
The US had toned down its aggressive containment policies by
Reagan’s second term, argued Sloan, whereby the administration
showed “a continuity with the Nixon era, and maintained that geo-
politics was an approach that paid attention to the requirements of
53 Jimmy Carter, 1980 State of the Union Address, The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum
[online 10 May 2008].
54 Michael Klare, “The Geopolitics of War,” Nation, 5 November 2001 [online 10 May
2008].
55 Farheed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly,
vol. 105, no. 3 (1990): 372–395.
56 Ibid.
57 US State Department, “Timeline of US Diplomatic History: Reagan Doctrine”
[online 4 Mar 2008].
58 Ibid.
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equilibrium.”59 This change may have come about due to a reassess-
ment of the Soviet threat by the Reagan administration, brought on
by a number of factors: recognition of its initial overestimation of the
USSR’s military capabilities, a favorable strategic balance due to the
US military build-up, and the conciliatory tone of Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev.60
Conceptualizing post-Cold War grand strategy
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union during the presidency of George
H.W. Bush marked the end of the Cold War and of containment pol-
icy, although its premises and ideological foundations continue to re-
verberate in the present. The patterns of American foreign policy
during the Cold War were marked by a combined emphasis on geopo-
litical and ideological considerations that shaped the perspectives of
US policymakers. While each component’s influence on policymakers
varied considerably from one administration to the next, the “loss” of
the Soviet Union as a framework for policy formulation represented a
huge challenge to the United States as it struggled to fill the concep-
tual and organizational gap left by Cold War policy planning. In addi-
tion, the collapse of one of the two superpowers left the United States
in a position of unrivaled military and political power. These early at-
tempts at formulating a new strategic concept are crucial to under-
standing the evolution of US strategic thinking from the end of the
Cold War through to the George W. Bush administration.
In late 1989, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, together with
Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Colin Powell, organized a
project tasked with developing a post-Cold War US grand strategy.61
President Bush delivered the preliminary results in a speech on 2 Au-
gust 1990 in Aspen, Colorado that was largely overshadowed by the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that same day. In his speech, President Bush
emphasized the more regionalized and less predictable threats likely to
face the US in the future, and argued that the US military should not
be reduced beyond what was needed “to guard our enduring interests
– the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effec-
tively to crisis, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces
59 Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, p. 197.
60 Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment.”
61 Ibid.
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should this be needed.”62 A month later, President Bush addressed a
joint session of Congress and presented his case for the coming conflict
with Iraq. While Bush acknowledged the importance of protecting the
supply of oil from the Middle East, he also noted that the crisis in the
Persian Gulf offered “a rare opportunity to move toward an historic pe-
riod of cooperation. Out of these troubled times … a new world order
can emerge.” 
This new world order was one in which “the rule of law supplants
the rule of the jungle,” “nations recognize the shared responsibility for
freedom and justice,” and in which “the strong respect the rights of the
weak.” While Bush claimed that “recent events have surely proven
that there is no substitute for American leadership,” his vision clearly
involved some type of multilateral framework grounded in interna-
tional law. Bush welcomed the United Nations’ actions with regard to
Kuwait, saying “we’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs
as envisioned by its founders … The United Nations is backing up its
words with action.”63
Bush’s speech seemed at odds with the results of Cheney and
Wolfowitz’s grand strategy group. In March 1992, less than a month
before the publication of the group’s findings as the “Defense Planning
Guidance for the fiscal years 1994–1999” (DPG), a draft copy of the
report was provided to the New York Times.64 According to the Times,
the new strategy had as its fundamental principle that of US primacy:
“our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival.”65 A
second objective was to address regional threats and conflicts, especial-
ly in areas involving US interests such as oil, nuclear proliferation, or
narcotics trafficking. This regional focus was designed to increase re-
spect for international law, limit conflicts, and “encourage the spread
of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.” The
DPG considered it “improbable that a global conventional challenge
to US and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland
for many years to come.” Further, the draft strategy shunned collective
action through the United Nations in favor of objective-focused “ad-
hoc assemblies,” but also refused to rule out unilateral action – that the
62 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen Colorado,
2 August 1990,” The American Presidency Project (University of California [online 12
Feb 2007]).
63 Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s."
64 Patrick E. Tyler, “US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-
Superpower World,” New York Times, 8 March 1992.
65 Quoted in Tyler, “US Strategic Plan ....”
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US “should be postured to act independently when collective action
cannot be orchestrated.”66
The leaked DPG draft was poorly received and widely criticized
from all sides. A reworked and softened version of the DPG again re-
surfaced in the final days of the Bush administration, after an unex-
pected defeat to Bill Clinton. Despite the fact that it would never
become official policy, Defense Secretary Cheney released “Defense
Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy” in January
1993. Cheney’s Regional Defense proposal stated clearly the author’s
intention of instituting a new grand strategic concept: “Our national
strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional
challenges and opportunities. We have moved from Containment to
the new Regional Defense Strategy.”67 The alliance of democratic na-
tions developed during the Cold War, referred to repeatedly in the
document as the “democratic zone of peace,” provided the US with
strategic depth and would play a key role in US strategy.68 Within this
regional security framework, hostile non-democratic nations must be
prevented from dominating regions deemed critical to US interests
and a clear military presence must be established in some regions to
accomplish this goal. 
Also similar to the DPG, the Regional Defense proposal expressed
hope that collective action might solve future security issues, but rec-
ognized that a “collective effort will not always be timely and, in the
absence of US leadership, may not gel. Where the stakes so merit, we
must have forces ready to protect our critical interests.”69 This strategy
and the concepts and proposals it contained would be, in effect, placed
on a shelf and reopened when President Bush’s son was elected presi-
dent. The strategic thinking expressed during the final months of the
Bush administration contributes much to understanding the strategic
direction and underlying logic of the George W. Bush administration.
Bill Clinton’s election victory in 1992 ushered in a period of
strong rhetorical support for multilateralism and economic issues.
During the election campaign, Clinton had outlined three main for-
eign policy goals: restructuring the US military, increasing the role of
economics in world affairs, and promoting democracy.70 In August
66 Ibid.
67 Dick Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy,” Janu-
ary 1993, Information Clearing House [online 14 Feb 2007].
68 The document defined this “democratic zone of peace” as “a community of demo-
cratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties.”
69 Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s.".
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1993, Clinton tasked National Security Advisor Anthony Lake with
creating a group to generate a word or slogan similar to “containment”
that encompassed the three foreign policy goals from the campaign.
Lake set to work to find an image and a strategy that would “merge
strands of neo-Wilsonian idealism with hardcore Morgenthauian real-
ism.”71 A month later, Lake announced a new grand strategy based on
the concept of enlargement: “The successor to a doctrine of contain-
ment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world’s
free community of market democracies.”72 He identified four compo-
nents of the new strategy: “strengthen the community of major market
economies,” “foster and consolidate new democracies,” “counter the
aggression … of states hostile to democracy and markets,” and “pursue
our humanitarian agenda.”73
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1995, “A National Secu-
rity Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” exemplified Clinton’s
three-pronged strategy of enhancing US security, encouraging US eco-
nomic prosperity and promoting democracy.74 Notably, successive
NSS documents also emphasized economic issues and argued that ex-
ternal threats to national security were increasingly linked to those
from within the US, that “domestic and foreign policies are increas-
ingly blurred.”75 Within this framework, economic issues and democ-
racy promotion were elevated to a level on a par with the more
“traditional” areas of security policy encompassing mostly military is-
sues. 
Some analysts categorize US grand strategy under the early post-
Cold War administrations of Bill Clinton and his predecessor, George
H.W. Bush, as generally multilateral yet geared towards primacy.76
According to Stephen Walt, both administrations “sought to enhance
the US position in the world while preserving the alliances, institu-
tional commitments, and broad multilateralist approaches that had
70 Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” Foreign Policy,
no. 106 (spring 1997) [online 3 Apr 2008]: 110–127.
71 Ibid, p. 115. This project became known as the “Kennan Sweepstakes.” 
72 Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” speech at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, 27 September 1993 (Mount Holyoke College [18 Nov 2008]).
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won the Cold War.”77 Both administrations maintained a preponder-
ance of US forces throughout the world with a focus on reacting quick-
ly to preserve regional security, both also supported a strong North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An explicit strategic policy of
hindering the rise of a peer competitor, like that of the DPG leaked in
1992, was never enunciated, though both the multilateral focus and
attention to regional issues were designed to prevent the rise of any
global threats.78 
Barry Posen and Andrew Ross saw conflicting pressures in the
Clinton administration’s agenda. It was ambitious and activist, but
could not be achieved without exercising US leadership and power.
The Clinton strategy, according to Posen and Ross, blended elements
of cooperative security, selective engagement, and primacy grand
strategies. They presciently observed that “this ad hoc approach is
probably inevitable until a crisis impels a choice. And a failure to de-
velop a clearer consensus on grand strategy may hasten the arrival of
that crisis.”79 Without the overarching strategic framework of Cold
War containment, the new security environment allowed the US to
begin adapting to changing realities. The continued integration of –
and increasing emphasis on – ideology as a component of US grand
strategy was evident after the end of the Cold War. This thinking
would be strongly amplified during the George W. Bush administra-
tion.
After their victory in the 2000 election, the Bush Administration
assembled a formidable foreign policy team including Rice, Donald
Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Armitage.
These and other key administration officials held starkly differing
views on US foreign policy and grand strategy. Some backed the prag-
matic and selective engagement course advocated by Bush and
Condoleezza Rice during the 2000 election campaign, while others
supported an expansionist, primacy-oriented and ideologically driven
strategy seen in the 1993 Defense Planning Guidance, Cheney’s 1993
defense document, and the policy papers published by the Project for a
New American Century (PNAC).80 As Svein Melby observed, this funda-
77 Walt, Taming American Power, p. 57.
78 For the Bush Administration, see Svein Melby, “Tendenser i amerikansk forsvarsde-
batt” [Trends in American defense debate], Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, no. 10
(1992): 13; For Clinton, see Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for
US Grand Strategy” in America’s Strategic Choices, eds. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
79 Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” p. 49.
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mental disagreement over policy caused a tension within the adminis-
tration that could not last. Many commentators predicted that
President Bush would be most influenced by the realists and follow the
course laid out by his father.81
The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 caused a reshuffling of
grand strategic priorities within the White House, opening the door
for the more expansionist-minded figures in the administration such
as Cheney, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld to steer US policy.82 Advocates of
an aggressive response that entailed the revamping of US grand strat-
egy from the selective global engagement of US forces to one of prima-
cy clearly succeeded, and the resulting course adjustment was
profound. This is not to say that these figures, with their links to ne-
oconservative policy institutes, “hijacked” US foreign policy. None of
the themes in the 1992 DPG, the 1993 defense document, or the 2000
PNAC proposal contained wholly new and radical concepts; American
primacy, promotion of democratic principles, and even pre-emptive
war were elements of previous US grand strategies. Instead, the new
direction taken by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 simply
collected these strands of policy together and forcefully pursued them
in a new and aggressive manner, and in a way that resonated with the
American public. The shock of sustaining such a significant attack on
US soil, along with the generally uncertain nature of the terrorist
threat, allowed a much more proactive strategy to be adopted with
broad support from the general public.
80 This think tank, politically oriented toward what is known as a neoconservative ide-
ology, kept alive the spirit and tradition of the leaked Wolfowitz 1992 DPG, and its
Rebuilding America’s Defenses (2000) specifically endorsed the document. Many key
Bush administration officials had signed under PNAC’s report, including Rumsfeld,
Cheney, Wolfowitz, Armitage, Douglas Feith, John Bolton, Elliot Abrams, and Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, see Dueck, “Ideas and alternatives,” p. 526.
81 Svein Melby, Bush-revolusjonen i amerikansk utenrikspolitikk [The Bush revolution in US
foreign policy] (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004), pp. 62–3. Dueck outlines a similar division
in foreign policy thinking in “Ideas and alternatives,” p. 525.
82 Melby, Bush-revolusjonen, pp. 129–137; Dueck “Ideas and alternatives,” p. 525.

Chapter 3
Grand strategy under the
Bush administration
Enduring interests and threats 
A notable feature of the post-Cold War era is the continuity in the US
national interests stated in the various strategic documents since
1991.83 In many regards, these core national interests have not changed
substantially since 1945. Beyond the primary interest of ensuring the
survival of the country and its institutions, the interests upon which US
grand strategy have been built may be grouped into four categories.
First and most basic is the protection of the US and its citizens from
physical threats of aggression from other states and non-state entities
such as terrorist groups. Second, the US must ensure the country’s con-
tinued economic strength by promoting international trade and US ac-
cess to global markets as well as strategic resources. Third, relations
with allies and other friendly nations must be maintained. Finally, the
US has an enduring interest in spreading democracy and liberal ideals.84
Just as the set of core US interests has remained constant, so too
has the set of perceived threats to those interests. In a recent analysis
of US grand strategy, Stephen Biddle compared the threat perceptions
contained in security documents from both the Clinton and George
83 Portions of this chapter on US grand strategy, as well as parts of the next chapter
detailing its implementation, have been published in an earlier work. See Michael
Mayer, Forecasting Risk: Climate Change and US Security, Oslo Files on Defence and
Security, no. 6 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007).
84 Compiled from: George H.W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States,
August 1991, Federation of American Scientists [online 18 Nov]; Les Aspin, “Report on
the Bottom-up Review,” October 1993, Federation of American Scientists [online 13
May 2008]; Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century; Rumsfeld, Don-
ald: Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, Department of Defense, September 2001,
(Commonwealth Institute [online 18 Nov 2008]); George W. Bush, The National
Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, GlobalSecurity.org [online 2 April
2008]. The final two documents will hereafter be referred to as QDR 2001 and NSS
2002, respectively.
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W. Bush administrations. The lists were remarkably similar, and
Biddle found that “few truly new threats … have appeared in the last
decade, and few have disappeared. Their relative severity has changed
… but the list has not.”85 Threats included a potential peer competi-
tor, rogue states, proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, and re-
gional crises or state failure. While the interests and threats may
exhibit a reasonable degree of consistency, however, the grand strate-
gic plan to combat these threats and secure US national interests un-
derwent an adjustment after 9/11. Rather than Clinton’s “selective/
cooperative primacy,” the new Bush administration dispelled any illu-
sions about the willingness of the US to wield its massive military
power, and began to pursue a strategy of global primacy.
Overarching strategic thinking
The first formal strategy document issued by the Bush administration
after 9/11 was the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS).86 In an in-
terview just prior to its release, National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice stated her belief that 9/11 had redefined the role of the United
States and compared the months after the attacks to the post-World
War Two period when the strategy of containment was conceived.87
Rice stressed the importance of the document, saying it would be “a
real statement of what the Bush Administration sees as the strategic di-
rection that it’s going.”88 In the eyes of many analysts, the 2002 NSS
represented a small revolution in strategic thinking and laid the foun-
dation for the new direction in US grand strategy. Later documents, in-
cluding the 2004 National Military Strategy, the 2005 and 2008
National Defense Strategy, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), and the 2006 National Security Strategy have made adjust-
ments and refinements to the strategy.89 In its final form, the grand
85 Biddle, “American Grand Strategy,” p. 4.
86 The documents referred to in this section include the National Security Strategy
(NSS), issued by the White House and authored by the National Security Council,
which lays out the nation’s security challenges. The National Defense Strategy (NDS)
operationalizes the security strategy, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) then
identifies the specific military means to meet the challenges laid out in the NSS. The
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) lays out how the US military will address the
nation’s security challenges 20 years in the future. For more information on the insti-
tutional structure regarding these documents, see J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., ed., US
Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition (Carslile: US
Army War College, 2006) (Strategic Studies Institute [online 7 Nov 2008]).
87 Nicholas Lemann, “The Next World Order,” New Yorker, 1 April 2002.
88 Quoted in Lemann, “The Next World Order.”
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strategy developed under President Bush combines elements from pre-
vious strategic concepts in a new and all-encompassing manner that is
highly ambitious in scope. The following sketch of US grand strategy
will provide a general overview; an examination of the military, polit-
ical, and economic components of grand strategy as implemented will
be covered in the next chapter. 
The strategic environment
Understanding the contours of the international system, within which
US political, economic and military policies must function, is a funda-
mental component of strategic decision making. Decisions must be
made based upon expectations of future developments and how specific
policies should be tailored to create the desired political result. Among
the most prominent institutes and government agencies actively in-
volved in analyzing international trends with strategic relevance, sub-
stantial convergence can be seen on a number of fronts. These reports
outline a future characterized by interrelated economic, social, cultur-
al, political and climactic trends that combine in undesirable and un-
predictable ways.
The 2004 report from the National Intelligence Council, Mapping
the Global Future, painted a generally disorganized picture of the
world. It predicted the continued economic and political rise of re-
gional powers such as China and India, “pervasive insecurity” marked
by instability across southern Asia, the Middle East and Africa, where
“weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and
youth bulges will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflict,”
and the continued prevalence of the underlying factors motivating in-
ternational terrorism. International institutions such as the United
Nations and global financial institutions are in danger of being over-
whelmed and risk becoming irrelevant if they fail to adapt to new chal-
lenges, while nation-states will struggle to cope with economic,
demographic and cultural trends.
The latest version of the report sees a marked decline in American
political and economic dominance; continued US military superiority
“will be the least significant asset in the increasingly competitive
89 This analysis of the current grand strategy will take into account all of these docu-
ments, which range in scope from general concepts to the specific operationalizations
derived from them, and incorporates budget priorities, base reorientation, military
restructuring and diplomatic initiatives as supporting evidence. 
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world of the future.”90 As Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, Dr. Thomas Fingar stated that “we’re probably going to be
playing with fewer cards. The face value of the cards will be dimin-
ished. There will be more players in the game.”91 At the same time,
adverse weather conditions induced by climate change and shortages
of food and fresh water could prove devastating for already weakened
governments in the most affected regions.92
Military analyses, such as the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Oper-
ating Environment white paper, reach similar conclusions about the
trends outlined above.93 The latest National Defense Strategy pub-
lished in June 2008 predicted that the continued existence of violent
extremist groups operating in weak or failing states can destabilize key
regions. The document acknowledges that “over the next twenty years
physical pressures – population, resources, energy, climatic and envi-
ronment – could combine with rapid social, cultural, technological
and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty.” It warned that
population growth in the developing world and an ageing population
in the developed world, interacting with “existing and future resource,
environmental, and climate pressures may generate new security chal-
lenges.” The rough outlines of a preliminary response to these chal-
lenges can already be seen in US strategic thinking, combining the
maintenance of US military superiority with an increased awareness of
the asymmetrical and irregular threats it faces. 
A grand strategy of primacy
The most fundamental aspect of US grand strategy has been the Bush
administration’s clear intention to pursue a strategy of global primacy.
Whereas the two previous administrations sought to retain some as-
pects of multilateralism or internationalism in their policies while rec-
ognizing and utilizing America’s unique position as the world’s
remaining superpower, the Bush White House proclaimed openly and
clearly its intention to reinforce and enhance US superiority and retain
90 Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, “Reduced dominance is Predicted for US,” Wash-
ington Post, 10 September 2008 [online 18 Nov 2008].
91 Thomas Fingar, “Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Analysis & Chairman National Intelligence Council,” 2008 INSA Analytic and
Transformation Conference, Orlando Florida, 4 September 2008 (Office of the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence [online 2 Nov 2008]).
92 Warrick and Pincus, “Reduced Dominance.”
93 United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment: Trends and Chal-
lenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030, December 2007 [online 21 Nov 2008]. 
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its freedom of strategic action. The 2002 and 2006 security strategies
used nearly identical language in claiming that “our forces will be
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a mili-
tary build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
United States.”94 The 2004 NMS stated that “the goal is full spectrum
dominance (FSD) – the ability to control any situation or defeat any ad-
versary across the range of military operations.”95 The 2006 QDR con-
firmed the continued relevance of this strategy, proclaiming that the
US will “seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of
regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any military
competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could
enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States
or other friendly countries.”96
While the grand strategy of primacy has a global focus, its imple-
mentation follows the regional approaches first voiced in the 1990s.
The US seeks not only to pursue its objectives in important strategic
regions, but also to retain the freedom to pursue its interests in every
region. As noted in the 2004 NDS, the US military “must work to se-
cure strategic access to key regions, lines of communication and the
“global commons” of international waters, airspace, space and cyber-
space.”97 The 2006 QDR added that “The United States will continue
to adapt its global posture to promote constructive bilateral relations,
mitigate anti-access threats and offset potential political coercion de-
signed to limit US access to any region.”98 While the utility of insti-
tutional frameworks such as NATO is repeatedly acknowledged, the
more ambiguous term “allies and partners” punctuated the 2006
QDR. This may signal a reliance on bilateral relationships and coali-
tions of the willing rather than a desire to pursue US interests through
a multilateral framework. In this way, Washington’s freedom of action
is assured, unencumbered by institutional commitments and re-
straints.
94 NSS 2002, p. 30.
95 Richard Myers, “The National Military Strategy of the United States 2004,” Glo-
balSecurity.org [online 2 Apr 2008], p. 23. Hereafter NMS 2004
96 Donald Rumsfeld, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2006,” Department of Defense,
February 2006, GlobalSecurity.org [online 18 Nov 2008], p. 30. Hereafter QDR 2006.
97 Ibid, p. 1.
98 QDR 2006, p. 30.
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Dual focus: peer competitors and unstable regions
This expanded focus illustrates the dualistic nature of a grand strategy
that views the greatest short term and immediate threats as emanat-
ing from weak and failing states, while remaining vigilant against fu-
ture great power threats from a rising China and a resurgent Russia.
The US seeks to shape the strategic course of China through political
engagement as well as a conventional containment strategy that incor-
porates a loose cooperative alliance with Asian actors such as India,
Australia and Japan. The strategic relationship with China is viewed
as “long-term and multi-dimensional,” and as seeking cooperation
while investing resources in ways that “favor key enduring US strate-
gic advantages.”99 
The US military establishment continues to anticipate future con-
flict scenarios with China and Russia, and military weapons systems
acquisitions reflect a continued emphasis on large-scale conventional
warfare.100 The conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008
served as yet another sign of Moscow’s renewed assertiveness, while US
policymakers remain skeptical of Russia’s ability to challenge Ameri-
can military and economic power. As Secretary Gates suggested, “The
images of Russian tanks rolling into the Republic of Georgia last
month was a reminder that nation states and their militaries do still
matter,” but that “the Russian conventional military … remains a
shadow of its Soviet predecessor. And Russian demographics will like-
ly impede its numbers getting much larger.”101 While no immediate
challenge to US military superiority can be seen over the next several
decades, the US remains committed to retaining its advantage in wag-
ing traditional maneuver warfare.
At the same time, the Bush administration has presided over a
massive reorientation within the State Department and the Pentagon
towards threats emerging from within states. The challenges in ad-
dressing such threats have led to a substantial shift in strategic think-
ing that goes well beyond the war on terror to include a range of
threats such as proliferation, international narcotics trafficking, organ-
ized criminal networks, and general instability and insecurity in re-
99 Donald Rumsfeld, “The National Defense Strategy of the United States,” March
2005, GlobalSecurity.org [online 18 Nov 2008], p. 3, 10. Hereafter referred to as NDS
2005.
100 The details of this strategy will be discussed in the following section on implemented
strategy.
101 Robert Gates, “The Future of American Military Power,” speech at National Defense
University, Washington DC, 29 September 2008, RealClearWorld.com [online 18
Nov].
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gions considered vital to US interests. As President Bush stated in his
introduction of the 2002 NSS, “The events of September 11, 2001,
taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger
to our national interests as strong states.” The first page of the strategy
itself further developed this thinking: “America is now threatened less
by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less
by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of
the embittered few.”102
Four years after the NSS was issued, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice reconfirmed this new strategic outlook in a January 2006 speech
at Georgetown University:
Since its creation more than 350 years ago, the modern state sys-
tem has rested on the concept of sovereignty. It was always
assumed that every state could control and direct the threats
emerging from its territory. It was also assumed that weak and
poorly governed states were merely a burden to their people, or
at most, an international humanitarian concern but never a true
security threat. 
Today, however, these old assumptions no longer hold. Tech-
nology is collapsing the distance that once clearly separated
right here from over there. And the greatest threats now emerge
more within states than between them. The fundamental char-
acter of regimes now matters more than the international distri-
bution of power. In this world it is impossible to draw neat,
clear lines between our security interests, our development
efforts and our democratic ideals.103
In congressional testimony on 10 May 2007, Secretary Rice elucidated
this point by arguing that:
The defining feature of our world today is its interdependence.
The security of the American people depends on the stability
and the success of foreign societies. If governments cannot, or
choose not, to meet their responsibilities as sovereign states,
nations around the globe are threatened by the resulting chaos
and disorder. The President believes that the defense of our
102 NSS 2002, p. 1.
103 Condoleezza Rice, “Transformational Diplomacy,” speech at Georgetown University,
Washington DC, 16 January 2006 (US State Department [18 Nov 2008]).
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country depends on the close integration of our multilateral
diplomacy, our development efforts, and our support for human
rights and democratic institutions.104
The administration’s rhetoric relating to rogue states and the “Ax-
is of Evil” is in line with this view of interdependence and regime char-
acter. Although a substantial amount of attention is given to emerging
or re-emerging powers such as China and Russia, equal attention is
also given to threats originating from inside other sovereign states,
thereby legitimizing an active US role in the internal affairs of other
nations. While these adjustments to US strategic posture are most
closely identified with the Bush administration’s war on terror, trends
in strategic thinking among policymakers and military strategists re-
flect an evolving US threat perception, one that continues to be insti-
tutionally solidified within the Defense and State departments.
Terrorism and failed states
In the 2002 NSS, President Bush acknowledged the country’s “unpar-
alleled military strength and great economic and political influence,”
and announced that the US will seek to 
create a balance of power that favors human freedom … we will
defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will pre-
serve the peace by building good relations among the great
powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open
societies on every continent.105 
Written in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the document is punctuated
by the threat from international terrorism and “rogue states” that sup-
port it; combating these threats is recognized as the primary security
challenge facing the United States. This focus on violent Islamic ex-
tremism, more than anything else, defined the Bush administration’s
strategic thinking. The United States, as the Bush administration has
often emphasized, takes an offensive posture in the war on terror,
choosing to fight the threat abroad in order to avoid attacks on the
homeland. In this context, the US emphasizing mobility and rapid re-
sponse in its overseas deployments to areas where terror organizations
104 Condoleezza Rice, “Resources for Transformational Diplomacy,” statement before the
Senate Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations, 10 May 2007 (US State
Department [online 19 Feb 2008]).
105 NSS 2002, Introduction.
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are based has become prevalent, and the US has engaged in active mil-
itary operations attacking countries with links to terrorism as well as
suspected camps and terror cells.
US officials argue that this type of conflict, pitting a state against
a global network of non-state actors, forces the United States to act
quickly and in ways not necessarily coordinated with allies or others in
the international community. The 2002 NSS echoed the 1992 DPG
and the 1993 Regional Security Strategy by claiming the necessity of
unilateral action: “while the United States will constantly strive to en-
list the support of the international community, we will not hesitate
to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting
preemptively against such terrorists.”106 In a controversial tactical re-
sponse to this threat, the Bush administration stated its intention to
include preventative war as part of its strategic posture, arguing that
“traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist en-
emy.”107 The 2003 war in Iraq demonstrated the Bush administra-
tion’s commitment to this principle, as concerns about WMDs
combined with the “character” of the Hussein regime, as Rice would
have phrased it, and a set of other strategic interests ultimately led to
the US-led invasion. In a similar vein, the US renewed its commitment
to constructing a ballistic missile defense system against terrorist
groups and rogue states. In addition to providing “in-depth” home-
land defense, missile defense may counteract any eventuality in which
US strategic options were limited due to the deterrent value of these
weapons if wielded by “rogue” states such as Iran.
Policymakers have learned that military action alone cannot ade-
quately address the threat posed by violent extremism. In this way, the
tactical military response in the war on terror has shifted, as noted by
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2008:
In the campaign against terrorist networks and other extremists,
we know that direct military force will continue to have a role.
But over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to
victory. What the Pentagon calls “kinetic” operations should be
106 Ibid, p. 6.
107 Ibid, p. 15. The Bush administration here conflates preemptive war with preventative
war. While international law supports action against an imminent threat, the secrecy
involved in terrorist plots prevents any certain knowledge of an attack before it is car-
ried out. In this way, the US sees preventative war as a justifiable response to this
dilemma. For more on this, see Johannes Rø, Hva er rettferdig krig i et asymmetrisk trus-
selbilde? [What is just war in an asymmetrical threat environment?], IFS Info, no. 4
(Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2006).
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subordinate to measures to promote participation in govern-
ment, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to
address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.
Echoing the reports on the future strategic environment mentioned
earlier, Secretary Gates continued by observing that
We also know that over the next 20 years and more certain pres-
sures – population, resource, energy, climate, economic and
environmental – could combine with rapid cultural, social, and
technological change to produce new sources of deprivation,
rage, and instability. We face now, and will inevitably face in
the future, rising powers discontented with the international
status quo, possessing new wealth and ambition, and seeking
new and more powerful weapons. But overall, looking ahead, I
believe the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come
less from ambitious states, than failing ones that cannot meet the basic
needs – much less the aspirations – of their people.108
The ideological component: 
democracy and good governance
The Bush administration has demonstrated an active rhetorical and
diplomatic commitment to this reoccurring theme in US strategic
thinking of expanding the zone of democracy and good governance. In
the US conceptualization of the global war on terror, the ideological
component that has consistently accompanied US grand strategy plays
an active role in addressing some of the root causes of terrorism. In this
perspective, aspects of the war in Iraq, far from being a diversion in the
war on terror as many argue, can be seen as consistent with US grand
strategy. The rise of al-Qaeda stemmed from autocratic leaders in the
Middle East who generated frustration among the disaffected classes.
These groups then vented their anger toward foreign targets, a redirec-
tion that was less threatening to, and therefore encouraged by, the
Middle Eastern autocrats. 
Thus, one long-term solution to this problem lies in spreading de-
mocracy in the Middle East. The Bush administration, believing in a
domino-like spread of democratic values, chose Iraq as the first step in
108 Robert Gates, speech to the US Global Leadership Campaign, 15 July 2008,
Defenselink (US Department of Defense [online 18 Nov 2008]), italics mine.
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a process of changing the political dynamics of the region.109 This wave
of freedom, with implications beyond the Middle East, is seen by this
administration, as have previous ones, as a global strategic interest
based partly on the tenets of the democratic peace theory and partly on
the grounds that liberal political institutions are linked with open
markets that benefit the US economically. Such reasoning is not lim-
ited to the Bush administration, though the rhetoric from the White
House has been heavily laced with democratic idealism. 
In a much less conspicuous manner, President Bush gradually be-
gan to follow the precedent of earlier administrations by focusing in
many countries on the fundamental building blocks of a democratic
society and good governance practices. Non-governmental organiza-
tions have been funded to address economic inequality, community or-
ganizing at local levels, the independence of media outlets, and the
strengthening of the rule of law. Support for such grassroots efforts
within the target countries has, however, been weakened due to a
backlash against the more aggressive efforts to bring about democratic
change in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union (the so-called
Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan). Neverthe-
less, a return to this type of capacity-building work is evident in US
policy.
The idea of American exceptionalism impacts on this ideological as-
pect of US policy in several ways, one of them being the belief that US
power will only be used for the benefit of the international system. As
the 2006 QDR states, the US military is a “force for good” in the
world, echoing Colin Powell’s 1991 testimony before Congress in
which he argued that allies would not fear US military power because
it was “power that could be trusted.”110 Jonathan Monten, tracing
grand strategic beliefs and the logic of primacy, notes that “Bush be-
lieves that US power is inherently benign and virtuous.”111 Because the
Bush administration sees its political values as universal, there is a ten-
dency to “conflate US national interests with what they assert to be
common, public interests,” and that since the exercise of US power
promotes international order and stability, “primacy requires the
United States to both set rules and be above them.”112 
109 Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11, p. 22–23; Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of
Transformation.”
110 QDR 2006, p. 9; quoted in David Armstrong, “Dick Cheney’s Song of America,”
Harper’s Magazine, October 2002 [online 10 Feb 2007].
111 Jonathan Monten, “Primacy and Grand Strategic Beliefs in US Unilateralism,” Global
Governance, no. 13 (2007): 119–138.
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As Robert Jervis writes, “in the Bush doctrine, there are no uni-
versal norms or rules governing all states. On the contrary, order can
be maintained only if the dominant power behaves quite differently
from the others … American security, world stability, and the spread
of liberalism require the United States to act in ways others cannot and
must not. This is not a double standard, but is what world order re-
quires.”113 This attitude necessarily affects diplomatic policy positions
as well as attitudes toward international laws and institutions. US of-
ficials seem genuinely convinced – as do a sizeable portion of the
American public – that the US has a special role to play in the world:
one grounded in ideology, assuming the universality of its values, and
accepting American unilateral action to promote them. In many re-
spects, the US sees itself as the international security guarantor of last
resort. As Barack Obama noted during his presidential campaign, “I
still believe that America is the last, best hope of Earth. We just have
to show the world why this is so.”114
The geopolitical component: 
shifting focus to the arc of instability
The US military’s overseas presence, a holdover from its global Cold
War posture, has played a crucial role in American grand strategy. Not
only do the hundreds of military installations located in nearly every
region of the world allow the US to respond quickly to crises, their
presence assists in shaping the strategic situation in those regions
deemed especially vital to US interests. As a 2005 review of the Penta-
gon’s basing strategy noted, “We cannot hope for much influence
without presence – the degree of influence often correlates to the level
of permanent presence that we maintain forward.”115 This global for-
ward posture assists the US in shaping the strategic environment and
preventing the rise of a peer or near-peer competitor.
As Wolfowitz wrote in the leaked 1992 DPG, the US must “pre-
vent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources
would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global
power.”116 Wolfowitz, echoing Mackinder and Spykman, listed these
112 Ibid.
113 Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine”: 276.
114 Barack Obama, “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Glo-
bal Affairs,” 24 April 2007.[online 20 Nov 2008]
115 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structures of the United States,
Final Report to Congress, 15 August 2005 [online 21 Nov 2008], p. 8. 
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regions as Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former
Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. As late as the 2005 NDS, these four
regions were deemed key, but the 2006 QDR called for an adjustment:
U.S. forces must continue to operate in forward areas, but opera-
tional demands over the past four years demonstrate the need to
operate around the globe and not only in and from the four
regions called out in the 2001 QDR (Europe, the Middle East,
the Asian Littoral, and Northeast Asia).117
The strategic requirement of unfettered global access, combined with
increased attention to non-state actors, rogue states, and the instru-
mental use of ideology to address these threats, necessitated a shift in
worldwide US military posture and strategic focus. In this regard, the
idea of “exporting security” espoused by strategist Thomas Barnett is
particularly relevant. Barnett argued that the US, as the hegemonic
leader of the “functioning core” countries integrated through political
and economic liberalization, should seek to provide security and order
in those regions that are disconnected from the liberalizing effects of
globalization, called the “non-integrating gap,” and strive to integrate
these countries into the “core.”
Barnett created his map delineating the “core” and the “gap” based
on a database of US military operations from 1990–2003, finding that
most of the Pentagon’s “business” lay in an area stretching from north-
ern South America, across Africa, to the Middle East, Central Asia, and
most of southeast Asia.118 This bears a striking resemblance to the arc
of instability, a term that surfaced in Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s
2002 annual report to Congress in which he stated that:
Along a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle
East to Northeast Asia, there exists a volatile mix of rising and
declining regional powers. The governments of some of these
states are vulnerable to radical or extremist internal political
forces or movements. Many of these states field large militaries
and already have or possess the potential to acquire nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical weapons. Analyses of regimes continue to
116 Tyler, “US Strategic Plan …”
117  QDR 2006, p. 36.
118 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), pp.
144–150.
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support global terrorist organizations and to terrorize their own
people.119
The arc of instability appeared again in the 2004 NMS, having expand-
ed to its current usage as referring to an area more along the lines of
Barnett’s gap: 
There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western
Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending
to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding
grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue
states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from sur-
veillance and attack.120 
Several characteristics of this area are worth noting. First, the geo-
graphic range of Islam stretches across nearly the entirety of the arc; Is-
lamic terrorist groups and countries that may harbor them will
undoubtedly be found primarily within this region. Second, the over-
whelming majority of states located within the arc are either autocra-
cies or weak/failed states. Washington’s focus on regional instability
and internal threats combines naturally with the spreading of liberal
values and democracy in this region. Notably, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres warned in 2008 that the
worst refugee crises will be found within an “arc of crisis” that
stretched from the Horn of Africa across the Middle East and into
Southwest Asia.121 
Third, the likely effects of climate change will affect countries
within the arc in a much more negative way. The DCDC Global Stra-
tegic Trends Programme recently released a report containing a map of
likely “stress zones” in which instability would be greatest.122 It is in
these areas that the environmental impact of climate change will be
most acutely felt. In a 2007 report, retired general Anthony Zinni ar-
gued that climate change and terror are closely linked: 
119 Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and to Congress, 2002 (Nuclear
Threat Initiative [online 18 Nov 2008]).
120 NMS 2004, p. 5.
121 Sarah Garland, “As if the Economic News is Not Bad Enough, War is Up too,” News-
week, 3 November 2008 [online 18 Nov 2008]. 
122 UK Ministry of Defense, Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, “Global Stra-
tegic Trends Program 2007–2036 Third Edition,” December 2006, DCDC Strategic
Trends [online 18 Nov 2008], p. 5.
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You may also have a population that is traumatized by an event
or a change in conditions triggered by climate change. If the
government there is not able to cope with the effects … then
you can be faced with a collapsing state. And these end up as
breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for warlords.
You start to see real extremism. These places act like Petri
dishes for extremism and for terrorist networks.123
Fourth, a substantial portion of the world’s energy resources is found
in arc regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and
Western Africa. Also located in the arc are the major geopolitical
choke points for the transportation of these raw materials, including
pipelines across Central Asia and Africa as well as maritime routes in
the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, and the Malacca Straits
in Southeast Asia. According to the 2006 NSS, “the key to ensuring
our energy security is diversity in the regions from which energy re-
sources come and in the types of energy resources on which we rely.”124
Economic strength in no small part translates into strategic influence
and military power, and the raw materials needed to fuel both military
machinery and economic growth are therefore strategic goods. In re-
gions lacking liberal institutions – and in which energy resources are
nationalized – political and military influence may be the tools neces-
sary to secure export agreements, and competition for limited resources
may arise. 
A clear sign of Washington’s focus on the arc is in the reorientation
of US military posture toward these regions. The 2002 NSS recognized
that “to contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security chal-
lenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within
and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary
access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”125
Principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry re-
ported that a main finding of the Global Defense Posture Review com-
pleted in 2004 was “developing the operational flexibility and diversity
in options needed to contend with uncertainty in the ‘arc of instabili-
ty.’”126 The State Department has followed suit, reprogramming hun-
dreds of diplomats from, as Secretary Rice described, “the front lines of
123 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria:
CNA Corporation, 2007) (CNA [online 18 Nov 2008]), p. 31. See also Michael
Mayer, Forecasting Risk.
124 NSS 2006, p. 28.
125 NSS 2002, p. 29.
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the last century, in the capitals of Europe and here in Washington, and
into the critical posts of this century – in Asia, in Africa, in the Middle
East, and here in the Americas.”127
Summary of overarching themes in 
US grand strategy
The United States, with its overwhelming military and economic su-
periority, has followed a proactive grand strategy of global primacy,
defined by Dueck as “acting aggressively to maintain America’s polit-
ical and military predominance in the world, while pre-empting any
conceivable challenges to a US-led international order.”128 The US has
pursued a dual approach of preparing the groundwork for and hedging
against potential great power rivals such as China and Russia, while
also addressing immediate threats such as terrorism, proliferation,
drugs and weapons trafficking, and general instability emanating from
regions containing weak and failed states. 
This strategic outlook has led the US to adopt policies that seek to
integrate military and diplomatic efforts in a comprehensive and coor-
dinated manner to address challenges that are seen to depend on both
types of engagement. In addition, this threat perception justifies US
involvement in the internal affairs of other states perceived as allowing
or sheltering threats against the US. The United States during the
Bush administration has shifted its geopolitical focus. The arc of insta-
bility represents those regions from which threats to US security will
arise as well as the regions in which strategic resources are found, re-
gions in which American ideology is most notably absent and the re-
gions within which the US will increasingly compete with other great
powers for influence. This arc of instability represents the new strate-
gic focus of the US, a fact illustrated by US military and diplomatic
realignments to those regions. Notably, the region situated at the very
apex of this arc is none other than Central Asia.
126 Ryan Henry, “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture,” in Reposturing the Force:
US Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century (Newport: Naval War College Press,
2006) (Naval War College [online 18 Nov]), p. 38.
127 Condoleezza Rice, “Resources for Transformational Diplomacy.”
128 Dueck, “Ideas and alternatives,” p. 515.

Chapter 4
Current US grand strategy:
implementation
If sweeping statements of grand strategic intentions are not translated
into actual policies with concrete effects, they remain highly theoreti-
cal and can be easily altered or forgotten in future strategic documents
by other administrations. The degree to which strategic intentions are
implemented provides a measurement of a strategy’s longevity and se-
riousness; most substantial adjustments to US strategic posture and
military readiness involve significant financial, structural and bureau-
cratic investments that are not embarked upon lightly. Military plan-
ning that includes likely threats, battlefield environments and
requirements of force projection, necessary hardware and armaments,
and military force composition are all good indicators of long-term
strategic planning. The direction of American diplomacy – in style,
substance and geographic focus – is also a good indicator of grand stra-
tegic priorities. The United States follows a diplomatic course consist-
ent with the strategic picture presented in the previous chapter.
Finally, a good rule to follow for any investigation is to “follow the
money.” While this aspect of strategy implementation is most suscep-
tible to domestic and political pressures, the fact remains that any
strategy’s implementation is dependent on the financial resources at its
disposal.
The implementation of US grand strategy discussed here high-
lights mid-level implementation consisting of program planning rath-
er than operational details, and adds detail and nuance to the broad
lines of grand strategy offered in the previous chapter. The geopolitical
focus of US grand strategy seen in military basing and diplomatic
postings is unmistakable, as is the integration of these strategic inter-
ests with ideological elements in US diplomatic efforts. This chapter
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deals with US policies on a global level and within the arc of instabil-
ity, thereby including – but not principally focusing on – Central
Asia. However, as one of the regions exhibiting highly relevant struc-
tural factors (energy resources, potentially unstable authoritarian
states, extremism, and Great Power politics) these implemented poli-
cies are highly relevant for Central Asia.
Grand strategy implementation: military
Military planning
The thinking presented in US military planning documents reinforces
the main points of US grand strategy as outlined above. These strategy-
implementation documents clearly illustrate the increased attention
given to non-state threats, stability operations, and the emphasis on re-
taining strategic access. The 2005 NDS identifies four general types of
threats for which military forces are structured: traditional state-based
threats, irregular threats by terrorists or insurgencies that employ un-
conventional methods, catastrophic threats involving the use of weap-
ons of mass effect, and disruptive threats such as cyber warfare or space-
based weaponry that are specially designed to “negate current US ad-
vantages in key operational domains.”129 Based on these threats, the US
has four strategic objectives: to secure the United States from direct at-
tack, secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action,
strengthen alliances and partnerships, and establish favorable security
conditions.130
The 2006 QDR authors then evaluated the types of capabilities
needed for addressing these threats, and arrived at four groups of capa-
bilities upon which the US force structure is based: 
• defeating terrorist networks 
• defending the homeland in depth
• shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
• preventing hostile states from acquiring or using WMD.
129 NDS 2005, p. 2.
130 Ibid, p. 6–7. The latest Defense Strategy lists its objectives as defending the home-
land, winning the Long War, promoting security, deterring conflict and winning our
nation’s wars (Robert Gates, “National Defense Strategy,” June 2008, Defenselink
[online 18 Nov 2008], p. 6).
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Figure 2: This diagram from the 2006 QDR depicts four groups of threats facing the 
US (traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges) and four main 
strategic objectives based on these threats. The document’s authors advocate shifting US 
capabilities to counter these newer challenges while retaining traditional warfighting 
capabilities. 
Due to the perceived strategic uncertainty of the post-Cold War envi-
ronment, the new Force Planning Construct has moved away from its
traditional warfare-oriented and scenario-based formulation towards
one that is more generalized and capabilities-oriented.131 Prior to the
2006 QDR, US forces had been structured so that the military could
“defend the US homeland; operate in and from four forward regions;
‘swiftly defeat’ adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns
while preserving for the President the option of ‘winning decisively’
one of those campaigns; and conduct a limited number of lesser mili-
tary and humanitarian contingencies,” the so-called 1-4-2-1 formula-
tion.132 This transition from scenario-based to capabilities-based
planning is a substantial shift, and a shift to a concept that some ana-
lysts criticize as dangerously vague.133
Military forces and hardware
The 2006 QDR stated very clearly which types of military operations
the Pentagon expects to be confronted with in the foreseeable future:
131 QDR 2006, p. 19.
132 QDR 2006, p. 36.
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In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged
as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States,
its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account
for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconven-
tional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction opera-
tions.134
Plans for US military capabilities follow these expectations: to contin-
ue transforming US forces toward greater flexibility and mobility, ex-
tend US technological superiority through continued acquisition of
advanced weapons and surveillance systems, and invest in research and
development programs to ensure the US retains its superiority and
moves toward its goal of full spectrum dominance. 
In terms of force structure, the Defense Department has priori-
tized a modular approach that features self-sufficient military units ca-
pable of “long-duration irregular operations.” The US Army, for
example, is reorganizing from a division-based structure into smaller
brigade-based units, with brigade combat teams (BCT) and support
brigades. These brigades will assume many of the roles now performed
by Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, which will then be free to
undertake more complex and specialized tasks.135 The “three block
war” concept introduced in 1999 by the then commandant of the US
Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, described the type of “irreg-
ular operations” referred to in the 2006 QDR, in which military per-
sonnel would be required to engage in humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping and traditional warfighting within “the span of a few
hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.”136 
The application of military force under the guise of the global war
on terror has brought about a renewed focus on counterinsurgency op-
erations (COIN). General David Petraeus, one of its best known pro-
133 In a persuasive analysis, Michael Fitzsimmons argues that by moving away from
future scenario-based planning and an emphasis on uncertainty, the Bush administra-
tion and the Pentagon in fact locked themselves into a more restricted strategic pos-
ture: “where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers
fill the void … A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more
than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront
the choices before him.” Michael Fitzsimmons, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Stra-
tegic Planning,” Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 (winter 2006–07): 134.
134 QDR 2006, p. 36.
135 Ibid, p. 42.
136 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,”
Marines Magazine, January 1999 (Maxwell-Gunter AFB [online 19 November
2007]).
US GRAND STRATEGY AND CENTRAL ASIA 55  
ponents and contributor to the most recent US Army COIN doctrine,
signaled the continued importance of such operations in 2008 by pro-
moting a substantial group of likeminded military leaders in his ca-
pacity as head of the selection board for rising one star generals.137
Reviewing the doctrinal evolution of US Army COIN operations, Olof
Kronvall concluded that the latest doctrine reveals a deeper under-
standing of insurgency campaigns, “more fully embraces a political, as
opposed to a military, basis for COIN strategy,” sees greater involve-
ment for the US Army, and acknowledges the long-term commitment
needed for successful operations of this type.138 Similarly, the Depart-
ment of Defense has now institutionalized the growing emphasis on
stability operations through Defense Directive 300.05, which declared
that stability operations should “be given priority comparable to com-
bat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all
DOD activities.”139 As Jack Kem has noted, “offensive and defensive
operations rely on the destructive capabilities of military force; stabil-
ity operations rely on the constructive capabilities of the military,”
whereby emphasis is placed on providing a foundation for conflict pre-
vention.140 The newly released Field Manual 3-07, “Stability Opera-
tions,” marked a “dramatic change in thinking” for the US Army,
according to Kem.141
The 2006 QDR authors also emphasized stabilization operations
and recommended increasing support for the State Department’s Co-
ordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) and a “proposal to
establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response
Fund.”142 Bush echoed this concept in a key speech on the Iraq war on
10 January 2007, when he stated: “We also need to examine ways to
mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas where they
can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations re-
covering from war and tyranny.”143 The boundaries between military
and civilian roles in US security policy are increasingly blurred, exem-
plified by reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the unique
137 Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Warns of Militarized Policy,” Washington Post, 16 July 2008
[online 19 Nov 2008].
138 Olof Kronvall, Finally Eating Soup with a Knife? Oslo Files on Defence and Security,
no. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007), p. 43.
139 Quoted in Jack Lem, “Future Face of Conflict: The US Army’s Doctrinal Renais-
sance,” World Politics Review, 14 October 2008 [online 19 Nov]. 
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 QDR 2006, p. 86.
143 George W. Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation,” 10 January 2007, White House
[online 3 Apr 2008].
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military-civilian structure of the new Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Defense Secretary Gates voiced concern about the expanding role of US
forces to include roles normally handled by civilians, and argued for
increased funding for State Department initiatives.144
The growing emphasis on COIN and stabilization operations,
which are troop-intensive endeavors that require “boots on the
ground”, can be seen in current plans to expand US ground forces. In
a major Iraq speech of January 2007, and again in his State of the Un-
ion Address several weeks later, President Bush announced plans to in-
crease the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 troops over a
five-year period.145 The US military has increasingly used artificial
means to maintain force levels; US personnel serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan have been subject to “stop-loss” measures – involuntary
extensions of enlistment of up to 18 months.146 The Army has strug-
gled to maintain enlistments, meeting its 2006 recruiting goals only
after lowering its standards, allowing larger numbers of recruits who
scored poorly on entrance aptitude tests and granting waivers for re-
cruits with criminal records that might previously have disqualified
them from service.147 One possible source for these new troops may be
non-US citizens who would serve in the military in exchange for expe-
dited citizenship. 
In line with a grand strategy of primacy, the US military has con-
tinued to modernize its hardware in a way that emphasizes and incor-
porates technological advances in mobility, lethality and network
warfare capabilities well beyond the nearest peer competitor. The
2004 NMS acknowledged that “while the United States enjoys an
overwhelming qualitative advantage today, sustaining and increasing
this advantage will require transformation – a transformation achieved
by combining technology, intellect, and cultural changes across the
joint community,” a “Joint Force” that is fully integrated, expeditionary,
networked in time and purpose, decentralized to allow joint operations at
the lower echelons, able to respond quickly with appropriate capabil-
ities, can make better informed decisions more quickly, and highly le-
thal.148 The focus is on command, control, communications,
144 Robert Gates, speech to the US Global Leadership Campaign.
145 Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation”; George W. Bush, “State of the Union
Address,” 23 January 2007, White House [online 3 Apr 2008].
146 Tom Regan, “Stop Loss Used to Retain Up to 50,000 Troops,” Christian Science Moni-
tor, 31 January 2006 [online 19 Nov 2008]; Tom Vanden Brook, “Extended war tours
likely to continue,” USA Today, 27 October 2008 [online 19 Nov 2008].
147 CBS News, “Army Meets Goals With Signing Bonuses,” 9 September 2006; CBS
News, “Army Lowers Standards to Meet Goals,” 9 October 2006.
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computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and
the ability to obtain and use information from a broad array of sources
to maintain tactical and operational superiority both on the battlefield
and during peacetime.
For US ground forces (the Army and Marine Corps), new capabil-
ities are being developed that feature advanced networking technolo-
gy.149 Air capabilities for the US military include plans to increase
airlift capacity for force projection, the continued production of a fifth
generation fighter aircraft (F-22A) and the development of a long-
range strike capability. Plans for the maritime forces (the Navy, Ma-
rine Corps, and Coast Guard) include increasing the number of aircraft
carriers, a new destroyer class, new capabilities to project power in
coastal areas and river environments, new attack submarines, and an
increase in the use of Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB), or sea bas-
ing.150 The US will also “include a wider range of non-kinetic and con-
ventional strike capabilities, while maintaining a robust nuclear
deterrent, which remains the keystone of US national power.”151 In ad-
dition, the Pentagon plans to invest heavily not only in unmanned aer-
ial vehicles (UAVs) for battlefield ISR, but also in a space-based
system of satellites. The increased attention paid to unmanned drones
with both ISR and strike capabilities may allow the US to conduct
military operations in high-risk environments that might otherwise be
impractical due to concerns over potential US casualties.152 In sum, the
Pentagon’s procurements highlight the dual strategic goals of combat-
ing non-state actors and emerging powers by securing capabilities for
both types of threats.
Some analysts have concluded that the Pentagon has yet to priori-
tize asymmetrical warfare and counterinsurgency operations in its
budgetary planning. Michael Klare, in his analysis of the 2006 QDR,
observes that 
148 NMS 2004, p. 15. “Jointness is also emphasized in the most recent National Defense
Strategy from 2008.
149 The primary developmental program is the Future Combat System (FCS) which is
hosting a website named after the program. 
150 QDR 2006, pp. 42–61. Using surface ships as bases for ground forces has the advan-
tages of increased flexibility and mobility, without the headaches that accompany
permanent infrastructure, diplomatic arrangements, and security needs required for
housing troops in a foreign country.
151 QDR 2006, p. 49.
152 This type of capability has been used in Pakistan and Somalia. See Robin Wright and
Joby Warrick, “US Steps up Unilateral Strikes in Pakistan,” Washington Post, 27
March 2008 [online 19 Nov 2008]; Stephanie McCrummen, “US missile strike in
Somalia targets terror suspects,” Washington Post, 3 March 2008 [online 19 Nov
2008].
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ostensibly, the growing threat of international terrorism is
responsible for the Bush Administration’s proposed 2007 mili-
tary budget … but only a small share of the increase would
cover specialized anti-terror and counter-insurgency systems.
The biggest and costliest items … are intended for use against
an entirely different enemy: The People’s Republic of China.153 
Andrew Krepinevich reached a similar conclusion in an analysis of the
2006 QDR154 The military procurement process represents one area of
strategic planning that is heavily influenced by domestic political and
bureaucratic processes, which may act to complicate the implementa-
tion of strategic policy.
Global military posture
The overseas-basing structure of the US is a good indicator of Wash-
ington’s strategic thinking as it reflects both the threats judged to be
most significant as well as the military means by which the US will
combat them. Practical limitations on force projection – airlift capa-
bilities, access to facilities, etc. – demand some physical proximity to
the dangers and some means of rapidly constituting a military re-
sponse. The US basing structure must therefore reflect both future
threats and their expected location, which carries with it an inherent
geopolitical element. The process of establishing a base overseas, in-
cluding negotiations with the host country, the construction of facili-
ties, the positioning of troops and equipment, and the necessary
congressional approval for project funding, is not a decision taken hap-
hazardly. The economic, political, and military/strategic investments
involved in the US overseas basing structure are substantial and reveal
long-term US strategic thinking. 
“We are living in a revolution, and hardly anyone has noticed,”
wrote Charles Krauthammer in July 2003 about the repositioning of
US bases around the globe.155 As Douglas Feith, then Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, stated in 2003: “everything is going to move
everywhere … There is not going to be a place in the world where it’s
going to be the same as it used to be.”156 A strategic adjustment from
153 Michael Klare, “Not Terrorism – China Drives up US military spending,” Foreign Pol-
icy in Focus, 7 April 2006 [online 19 Nov].
154 Andrew Krepinevich, “The Quadrennial Defense Review,” Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 14 March 2006 [online 19 Nov 2008], p. 9.
155 Charles Krauthammer, “The Sleepy Superpower Awakes,” Time Magazine, 27 July
2003 [online 19 Nov 2008].
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the Cold War posture to one focused on the arc of instability is under-
way, though at the creeping bureaucratic pace of the Defense Depart-
ment. According to Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, the new global defense posture represents three ar-
eas of realignment: 
[1] adjusting our presence in Europe by shifting away from leg-
acy Cold War structures … [2] reforming [US] posture in the
Pacific, with increased emphasis on key capabilities to assure
allies … dissuade potential competitors, deter aggressors, and
defeat adversaries if called upon to do so … [and 3] developing
the operational flexibility and diversity in options needed to
contend with uncertainty in the “arc of instability.”157
Not only will the location of US basing undergo a geographic shift, so
too will the basic structure of basing for the US military. Robert
Critchlow of the Congressional Research Service outlined the new bas-
ing concept:
The Defense Department plan envisions three tiers of bases. It
would retain some of the large “main operating bases,” such as
Ramstein AFB in Germany, which have all of the comforts of
the U.S. — family housing, schools, supermarkets, convenience
stores, theaters, and populations in the tens of thousands. Fur-
ther, the military would establish an overseas network of “for-
ward operating sites,” which are more austere installations,
lacking the conveniences and hosting smaller numbers of per-
sonnel. Military personnel would deploy to these bases for tem-
porary duty (typically one year or less, unaccompanied by
families), in contrast to the permanent change of station moves
in which an entire family moves to a new base for two or more
years. Lastly, minimalist “cooperative security locations,” would
likely be run by host nation personnel and would not host U.S.
forces on a day-to-day basis. These locations would be used in
the event of a crisis to give U.S. forces access to the region. They
would also allow U.S. forces to train with local allies and partic-
ipate in cooperative activities, such as disaster relief or peace-
keeping, which can improve military-to-military ties.158
156 LA Times, “US To Realign Troops in Asia,” LA Times, 29 May 2003.
157 Henry, “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture,” p. 38.
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This tiered system of bases reflects the thinking of General James
Jones, former commander of the US European Command, who argued
for the creation of a collection of “lily pads” for US forces, “small, light-
ly staffed facilities for use as jumping-off points in a crisis.”159 The for-
ward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security locations (CSL)
would constitute the majority of US basing infrastructure within the
arc. This would minimize the US “footprint” in sensitive regions while
maintaining a forward posture that maximizes speed, flexibility, and
the “ability to project power from one region to another and to manage
forces on a global basis.”160 
On a practical level, the global redeployment of US forces entails
closing almost 200 facilities in Western Europe and shifting to smaller
installations in Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and
Romania, which “offer ports and airfields on the Black Sea, closer to
potential instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle
East.”161 Interestingly, the 2005 Overseas Basing Commission review
committee argued that:
Africa, for example, has become of increasing strategic impor-
tance to the United States … for years to come our ability to
project power (and, therefore, influence) is dependent on our
presence in Europe. The same realities exist for Eastern Europe,
the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and other regions east and
south of Central Europe.162
An increased US military focus on Africa was officially expressed in
President Bush’s 2008 budget proposal through the creation of an Af-
rica Command (AFRICOM), carved out of the expansive European
Command Area of Responsibility (EUCOM). An existing US base in
this new region, located in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti, was
established in 2002 and houses around 1,500 soldiers, while new for-
ward operating locations have been created elsewhere on the continent,
mainly in Western and Southern Africa (for example Senegal, Mali,
158 Robert Crichlow, “US Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight
Issues for Congress: CRS Report for Congress” (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2005), Federation of American Scientists [online 21 Apr 2007], p. 2.
159 Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2003.
160 Henry, “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture,” p. 39–40. This echoes the
“Base Force” concept of the early 1990s, where US dominance would be assured
through a preponderance of force in smaller bases spread across the globe.
161 Campbell and Ward, “New Battle Stations?”
162 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structures …, p. 9.
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Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, Zambia, and Namibia).163 The Defense De-
partment reportedly has plans to build a substantial naval base in the
Gulf of Guinea region, close to the oil-exporting countries upon which
the US will increasingly rely for its energy needs.164 In Asia, personnel
are shifting from South Korea and Japan, replaced in those countries
by rapidly deployable forces such as Stryker Brigades. Hawaii and
Guam will be important hubs for potential future operations against
China, and plans also include bases inside the easternmost edge of the
arc of instability, namely Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.165
In sum, the US network of overseas bases represents, according to one
recent report, “a new type of global expeditionary posture that sup-
ports rapid US power-projection operations, and one specifically de-
signed to maximize US global freedom of action.”166
Grand strategy implementation: political
The political and diplomatic policies of the Bush administration offer
further evidence of its grand strategic intentions to maintain its posi-
tion of global primacy. A surprising level of coordination exists be-
tween the Pentagon and the State Department in terms of threat
perception, geographic focus and shared understanding of the neces-
sary capabilities required. The emphasis on retaining America’s global
freedom of action can be seen in the administration’s approach toward
institutions and bilateral relationships. Further, the political imple-
mentation of US grand strategy clearly demonstrates the integrated na-
ture of ideology within the American perception of strategic interests.
The shift in geopolitical focus to more authoritarian arc regions rein-
forces this integration while presenting some practical challenges for
pursuing US interests there. As one might expect, these elements are
highly relevant in the context of US policy in Central Asia.
163 Colin Robinson, “Worldwide reorientation of US military basing in prospect,” Straus
Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI), 19 September 2003
[online 19 Nov]; US Department of State, “New Initiatives with African Countries:
Foreign Press Center Roundtable,” 8 March 2004 [online 19 Nov]; John Correll,
“European Command Looks South and East,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 86, no. 12
(December 2003).
164 Robinson, “Worldwide reorientation ….”
165 Henry, “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture”; Campbell and Ward, “New
Battle Stations?”
166 Andrew Krepinevich and Robert O. Work, A New Global Defense Posture for the Second
Transoceanic Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2007) (CSBA [online 19 Nov 2008]), p. 197. 
62 Defence and Security Studies 2-2008
Transformational diplomacy
The State Department required serious readjustments even prior to
Condoleezza Rice and her plans to reform the agency. A 1999 State De-
partment report warned that the agency was near “a state of crisis” due
to poor and outdated infrastructure and misallocation of resources, and
that “our overseas presence is perilously close to the point of system
failure.”167 During his tenure as Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005,
Colin Powell began addressing these shortcomings by investing in
technology and created several thousand new positions within the de-
partment. The principle restructuring plan, however, began under Sec-
retary Rice with her introduction of transformational diplomacy in
January 2006. Rice laid out the objectives of this effort as: “to work
with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain demo-
cratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their peo-
ple and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”168
Specifically, transformational diplomacy consists of at least six cat-
egories of readjustments directed at continuing the modernization
process within the department as well as increasing its ability to influ-
ence the internal characteristics of other states. First, diplomatic per-
sonnel have begun a geographic repositioning process whereby
hundreds of postings in Europe and Washington DC have been elim-
inated and new positions created in arc regions such as Africa, South
Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. Second, the State Department
will adopt a more regional focus within larger countries where the US
has no diplomatic presence, where regional public diplomacy centers
will utilize local collaborations to further US interests and “take
America’s story directly to the people.” Third, diplomats will be en-
couraged to engage more actively foreign publics outside the capital
cities, partly by making use of modern internet technology. Fourth,
the State Department plans to fine-tune and adjust personnel’s exper-
tise and skills more efficiently through new training methods and
greater demands for flexibility on the part of Foreign Service officers.
Fifth, the Department envisions increased collaboration between civil-
ian and military structures, exemplified by the Office of Reconstruc-
tion and Stabilization (S/CRS).169
167 US Department of State, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, report of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Board, November 1999, Federation of American Scientists
[online 19 Nov 2008].
168 Condoleezza Rice, “Transformational Diplomacy.”
169 US Department of State, “Transformational Diplomacy,” fact sheet issued by the State
Department’s Office of the Spokesman, 18 January 2006 [online 21 Feb 2008].
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The final set of readjustments involves consolidating the many for-
eign assistance programs under one framework, headed by the newly
created position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA). With direct
control over just over half of all US foreign aid, amounting to USD 20
billion, the DFA position is designed to ensure the improved efficien-
cy, coordination and strategic use of funds to achieve US foreign policy
objectives. These policy goals are contained within a five point frame-
work that includes peace and security, just and democratic govern-
ance, investing in people, economic growth and humanitarian
assistance. Additionally, the framework classifies target states into five
categories that will shape funding priorities: rebuilding states, devel-
oping states, transforming states, sustaining partnership states and re-
strictive states.170 Taken together, the reforms enacted under the guise
of transformational diplomacy highlight the strategic thinking es-
poused by Secretary Rice that places an increased emphasis on shaping
developments, trends and circumstances within countries, as opposed
to a more traditional interstate conceptualization of diplomacy. The
true effects of these organizational adjustments remains dependent on
funding that has yet to reach the levels deemed necessary to fully im-
plement existing plans. 
Less reliance on permanent institutions 
One political policy shift associated with the Bush administration has
been from having an institutionalized diplomatic framework as the in-
itial and primary foundation for military action, as Presidents George
H.W. Bush and Clinton generally had, to one that actively asserts its
prerogative to act independently of institutions such as NATO and the
United Nations. Admittedly, both former presidents committed mil-
itary forces to operations lacking a mandate from the UN Security
Council (Panama for Bush and Kosovo for Clinton), but the George W.
Bush administration has appeared particularly willing to commit forc-
es in lieu of finding diplomatic solutions. Stephen Walt wrote that 
Americans should worry when generally pro-American publi-
cations like the Economist describe the United States as “too
easily excited; too easily distracted, too fond of throwing its
weight around,” or when knowledgeable but moderate foreign
170 Nakamura, Kennon H. and Susan B. Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transfor-
mational Diplomacy CRS report for Congress, 23 August 2007, Federation for American
Scientists [online 19 Nov 2008], p. 7–8. 
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observers describe the United States as a “rogue superpower” or
“trigger-happy sheriff.”171 
A 2004 Council on Foreign Relations task force found that “public di-
plomacy is all too often relegated to the margins of the policy process,
making it effectively impotent.”172 Adjustments in Bush’s second term
have in part addressed this type of criticism, as low-level diplomatic
interaction with Iran and the resumption of talks with North Korea il-
lustrate.
The US increasingly prioritizes bilateral relationships and coali-
tions created for specific missions, reflecting current strategic needs.
NATOs invocation of Article 5 after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and
the US decision not to involve the alliance in the initial phase of Op-
eration Enduring Freedom after the offer of assistance was extended,
reinforced the perception of Washington’s interest in acting outside
the hindrances of a multilateral framework. A similar pattern exists in
the ongoing missile shield debate; the US chose to pursue its missile
defense plans on a bilateral basis with Poland and the Czech Republic
rather than coordinate its initial plans through a NATO framework. 
On the other hand, the US arguably has always seen NATO as an
instrument for pursuing its strategic interests. Richard Betts observed
that “the USA used alliance integration for its own purposes, and its
sovereignty was never substantially compromised by the integration,”
leading to a situation whereby “the United States would coordinate
with its allies as long as it was confident that Washington could con-
trol the essential resulting action.”173 Betts later addressed NATO ex-
pansion, noting that “For Washington, whose domination of NATO’s
command structure has never been in doubt, expansion of the alliance
was an extension of American power into Eastern Europe.”174 As the
Overseas Basing Commission review committee argued in its 2005 re-
port: 
US presence in Europe remains crucial to future global security.
The legitimacy of that presence lies directly with our ties to
NATO. Full participation in NATO allows us to maintain a
171 Stephen Walt, “A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy,” National Inter-
est, February/March 2005 (Boston Review [online 19 Nov 2008]).
172 Quoted in Walt, “A New Grand Strategy ….”
173 Richard K. Betts, “National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks,” Princeton
Project on National Security, November 2004 (Princeton University [online 19 Nov
2008]), p. 26–7.
174 Betts, “National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks,” p. 29.
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leadership position in European affairs, as well as contiguous
regions … Moreover, the ability to influence international
events from our base in NATO expands well beyond Europe
proper.175
One set of “allies and partners” that has increasingly seen improving
and closer relations are the Asian countries of India, Japan and
Australia. While the latter two countries have been solid US allies for
decades, a noticeably intensified strategic relationship has evolved over
the past few years. As the 2006 QDR stated, 
in the Pacific, alliances with Japan, Australia, Korea and others
promote bilateral and multi-lateral engagement in the region
and cooperative actions to address common security threats.
India is also emerging as a great power and a key strategic
partner.176 
Improving relations with India may signal Washington’s desire to en-
courage India’s development into a major regional power and thereby
serve as a regional anchor against growing Chinese influence. This dip-
lomatic alliance-building effort, combined with the continued acqui-
sition of military systems designed for conventional warfare, constitute
the US strategy of “hedging” against a rising China. At the same time,
the US has also attempted to engage bilaterally as well as integrate
China into international regimes.177
Exporting security and democracy to the arc
As outlined in the preceding chapters, the United States regularly in-
corporates ideological elements in both its strategic planning and its
rhetoric. Well-illustrated by the reforms associated with transforma-
tional diplomacy, the geographic focus of US diplomacy has shifted.
Washington has formed new bilateral relationships with countries in-
side and adjacent to the arc since the end of the Cold War, especially
since the War on Terror began. Operating in regions such as Central
Asia and Africa presents both opportunities and challenges for US pol-
icymakers. Countries located in the arc are characterized mainly by au-
175 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structures …, p. 9.
176 2006 QDR, p. 88. 
177 See for example Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Order,” Foreign Affairs
(March/April 2007); David Shambaugh and Karl F. Inderfurth, “China and the US:
To Hedge or Engage,” YaleGlobal Online, 11 April 2007 [online 19 Nov 2008]. 
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thoritarian rule, weak state structures, extreme poverty, and a lack of
internal democratic institutions. In one sense, this offers increased free-
dom of action for the United States in that active opposition to govern-
ment support for US counterterrorism activities will most likely be
minimal.
This new geographic focus has caused legal and diplomatic adjust-
ments tailored to these new circumstances. In addition, the US has
since 2002 signed so-called Article 98 agreements with at least 100
countries – the majority of them within the arc – whereby they pledge
not to surrender American citizens to the International Criminal
Court.178 The Bush administration discontinued US participation in
the ICC in 2001, believing it could be used for the political persecu-
tion of US officials and citizens. The Clinton administration held a
similarly skeptical position despite signing the Rome Statute, and
sought similar assurances for US citizens within the ICC framework.
The Pentagon is also pressing for increased legal maneuvering room at
home for relationships with countries in the arc that may not meet cur-
rent US legal standards in terms of human rights and democratic in-
stitutions. The 2006 QDR recommends that “Congress provide
considerably greater flexibility in the US Government’s ability to
partner directly with nations in fighting terrorists,” which may in-
clude “training, equipping and advising their security force” or “logis-
tics support, equipment, training and transport to allow them to
participate as members of coalitions with the United States or its al-
lies.”179
Legislation pertaining to foreign assistance, military aid, and In-
ternational Military Education and Training (IMET) contains provi-
sions restricting their use in countries with poor human rights records,
restrictions on the free exercise of religion, or other normative con-
cerns. One example, the “Global Train and Equip” program, is a joint
effort of the State and Defense departments to support military coun-
terterrorism efforts in countries such as Chad, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Lebanon, and Yemen. Similarly, Secretaries Gates and Rice pressed
Congress in 2008 for increased latitude in funding police, paramilitary
forces and indigenous clandestine operations.180 The US foresees the
178 US Department of State, “US Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement”, press statement by
Richard Boucher [online 8 Dec 2008].
179 QDR 2006, p. 89.
180 Ann Scott Tyson, “More Leeway Sought on Foreign Aid Spending,” Washington Post,
16 April 2008 [online 19 Nov 2008].
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bulk of its security challenges – China being the one substantial excep-
tion – as emanating from the arc, and US actions will require partners
in a region where democratic institutions and respect for human rights
are a rarity. This exemplifies just one of many difficult choices facing
US policymakers in conducting the war on terror or providing security
to the arc: prioritizing security interests or human rights concerns.181
Grand strategy implementation: economic
The economic and financial health and growth of the United States
represent another of these competing interests. The Clinton adminis-
tration greatly emphasized the economic component of its grand strat-
egy. In fact, observers such as Colin Dueck saw this as President
Clinton’s main focus: 
The Clinton administration stressed the heightened importance
of globalization, foreign economic policy, and economic “com-
petitiveness” in the new international order. One might even
say that the Clinton team believed that “geoeconomics” had
replaced “geopolitics” as the driving force behind international
relations.182
The spread of liberal economic institutions and structures abroad
would benefit the United States by allowing access to new markets,
and the anticipated evolution from liberal economic institutions to lib-
eral political institutions would spread democracy and therefore also
increase US security. 
Although the Bush administration has not embraced globalization
with the same fervor of the Clinton years, the basic proposition out-
lined above still resonates among policymakers. The 2006 NSS pro-
claims economic liberty “is ultimately inseparable from political
liberty” and praises the benefits of the market economy as “the greatest
antidote to poverty.”183 The strategy views economic freedom as rein-
forcing political freedom by “creating diversified centers of power and
authority that limit the reach of government. It expands the free flow
of ideas.”184 The Bush administration highlights its role in the Doha
181 For more on this, see Michael Mayer, Security or Human Rights: US Foreign Policy
Dilemma in Uzbekistan, Forsvarsstudier, no. 2 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence
Studies, 2006).
182 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 130.
183 NSS 2006, p. 27.
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round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization, the successful
passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, as well as the
negotiation of a number of regional and bilateral free trade agree-
ments. 
The Millennium Challenge Account constitutes just one small ex-
ample of US policy linking economic and political development, with
a focus on good governance. In a speech announcing the countries se-
lected for the program (with 14 of the 16 countries located in the arc),
President Bush outlined the effort as one that 
encourages all nations to embrace political and economic
reform. The United States has pledged to increase its core devel-
opment assistance by half, adding USD 5 billion annually by
2006. To be eligible for this new money, nations must root out
corruption, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of
law.185 
Similar thinking links US humanitarian and development assistance
with its strategic goals. By investing in AIDS relief programs and en-
couraging economic development, the United States serves to promote
political stability and individual freedom in vulnerable regions. Dip-
lomatic efforts by Washington to encourage economic development
are underway in nearly every region of the world; such initiatives dem-
onstrate close ties between ideological, humanitarian, economic and
strategic interests in US policy.
Energy resources and strategic interests
In regions where abundant energy resources are located, this connec-
tion between market access and US strategic interests is abundantly
clear. The United States today imports approximately 60 percent of its
petroleum needs, a figure that is projected to rise considerably in the
coming years as consumption steadily increases.186 As noted earlier, the
majority of the oil and gas reserves are found inside the arc: the Middle
East, the Caspian Sea region, northern South America, and Western
Africa. African petroleum now accounts for 15 percent of US oil im-
ports and this is projected to rise to 20 percent by 2010.187
184 Ibid, p. 28.
185 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at Ceremony Celebrating Countries
Selected for the Millennium Challenge Account,” 10 May 2004, White House [online
1 Apr 2008].
186 Energy Information Agency, “How dependent are we on foreign oil?” 22 August
2008 [online 21 Nov 2008]. 
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Washington increasingly sees the development of new and diversified
sources of energy outside the Middle East as a strategic interest. This,
coupled with the desire to expand market access and liberalize national
institutions, drives US policy both in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea and
among several of the Caspian Sea littoral states (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan). The situation is further complicated by
poor governmental structures in many of the countries possessing en-
ergy reserves, and state ownership of these reserves that could prevent
normal market forces from ensuring access.
Economic and strategic interests also converge in these regions
with regard to China. Securing access to energy resources is vital to the
US economy as well as its military. As one report predicted, future en-
ergy needs in both the developed world and in developing economies
such as China and India will eventually outstrip available supplies. As
a result, 
Competition for energy supplies will dominate the economic
landscape during the next 30 years … the prospect, apparent or
real, of the peak production of oil during the timeframe out to
2035 and progressive diminution of output thereafter will
intensify competition for remaining resources.188 
China has now begun a global campaign to secure access to these dwin-
dling resources to fuel its growing economy, entering into bilateral
agreements with countries in regions such as South America, Africa,
the Middle East, and Central Asia. Today, China imports roughly 30
percent of its oil needs from Africa and is seeking out new agree-
ments.189 The United States is actively engaged in energy-rich regions
around the globe. Having proclaimed its national security interest in
the free flow of energy from the Persian Gulf, the US also seeks to safe-
guard energy exports from western Africa and Central Asia. 
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Strategic aspects of US domestic economic and 
budgetary policy
In addition to strategic decisions made concerning US actions overseas,
domestic decisions are made that also directly affect US national secu-
rity. Apart from the economic aspects of US energy dependence, the
United States has become increasingly vulnerable due to its economic
and monetary policies. The US federal budget has undergone a dramat-
ic shift since 2001, when a USD 127 billion surplus in 2001 became a
USD 158 billion deficit in 2002. As Stephen Biddle wrote, “Barring
major changes in American fiscal policy, large, sustained expenditures
for ongoing preemptive warfare can be expected to create correspond-
ing increases in federal budget deficits” due to the fact that “these wars
are being funded by spending without corresponding taxation.”190
Biddle argued, along with the Wall Street Journal, that the US economy
could accommodate these increased costs, as the percentage of gross do-
mestic product devoted to defense spending (less than 5 percent of
GDP) is low by historic standards.191 
Constant and sizable deficits, however, can hamper economic
growth and foreign investors fund these budgetary shortfalls. The
overseas funding of US debt exacerbates the continuing balance of pay-
ments deficit (imports exceeding exports). As Biddle observes, “This
represents an ongoing net shift of wealth overseas. In the short run,
this enables Americans to enjoy a higher standard of living than our
own production can sustain. But in the long run, it transfers capital,
and thus productive resources, from America to other great powers.”192
Foreign ownership of the US national debt has increased from 17 per-
cent in 1988 to over 27 percent in 2006, with Japan holding the larg-
est share of the foreign-owned debt (20 percent), followed by China
(10 percent).193 Such budgetary decisions are not made in a vacuum
and have real-world consequences that can act to limit future policy
options.
Defense spending has risen markedly since President Bush took of-
fice. While some point out the defense budget’s relatively low ratio to
the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), approximately four per-
190 Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11, p. 17.
191 Wall Street Journal, “Our Small Defense Budget,” 20 October 2006 [online 19 Nov
2008].
192 Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11, p. 18.
193 Kimberly Amadeo, The U.S. National Debt and How It Got So Big, About.com:US
Economy [online 19 Nov 2008]. These types of arguments are only strengthened by
the financial crisis affecting the United States and the rest of the world as this study
goes to press.
US GRAND STRATEGY AND CENTRAL ASIA 71  
cent, a comparison between the United States and other countries re-
veals a clear budgetary priority to retain military superiority. The US
accounted for a large portion of global defense spending in 2006, its
USD 528 billion comprising 46 percent of the USD 1.1 trillion world
defense spending total. The US outspends second highest defense
spender China, at USD 59 billion, by nearly a factor of ten.194 For
Stephen Biddle, a US grand strategy based on great power competition
– and containment – entails one set of capabilities and costs, while a
war on terror, involving the “rolling back” of international terrorism
(as Biddle sees the US as attempting to do) entails another set of capa-
bilities and costs. These two strategies, Biddle argued, are tactically,
diplomatically, and economically incompatible.195
The wholehearted pursuit of a “rollback” GWOT strategy as pur-
sued by the Bush administration undermines efforts to prolong a bal-
ance of power defined by unipolarity and US primacy. At the very
least, the US is financially unable to sustain the costs associated with
the current administration’s policy of combining the two strategies,
and the increasing costs of the war in Iraq has forced the US into a po-
sition where it must choose.196 Nathan Freier reached a similar conclu-
sion, writing that the combination of rising economic costs for US
strategy and declining domestic and international support for US pol-
icies is a result of failing to adopt “a real ends-focused, ways and means-
rationalized, and risk-informed grand design,” and therefore “the
United States is vulnerable to slow surrender to strategic exhaustion
and voluntary retreat from that essential activism necessary to the se-
curity of its position in perpetuity.”197
Reviewing US grand strategy: 
constant themes of geopolitics and ideology
There is considerable convergence – among the strategic documents,
administration rhetoric, and the implementation of US military, polit-
ical, and economic policy – around a grand strategy of global primacy
based on addressing two distinct categories of threats. First, the US
currently views the challenge from non-state actors – mainly Islamic
194 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Recent trends in military expen-
ditures: The 15 major spenders in 2006,” SIPRI [online 19 Nov 2008].
195 Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11, p. 28.
196 Ibid.
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extremists but also drug traffickers and international crime syndicates
– and “rogue states” as the overriding strategic threat facing the na-
tion. A range of responses have been implemented that concentrate on
asymmetric warfare, preventative policies that address regional insta-
bility, and means of shaping state behaviors through direct interven-
tions and engagement. Secondly, the US actively hedges against rising
or resurgent regional powers such as China and Russia by continuing
to develop traditional military capabilities for use in conventional in-
terstate conflicts. US grand strategy therefore aggressively pursues
twenty-first century non-traditional threats while at the same time
maintaining a traditional state-centric approach.
The United States throughout the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first has consistently involved geopolitical reasoning and plan-
ning in its grand strategy. During the Cold War period, the policy of
containment closely followed the classic geopolitical theoreticians
such as Mackinder and Sypkman. Geographic imagery combined with
political realities to lead policymakers crafting US grand strategy to
pay particular attention to geographic positioning and strategic re-
gions such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Northeast and
Southeast Asia. During the containment era, lines were drawn on the
globe dividing the world into two camps – east versus west. The post-
Cold War era rendered this conceptualization less helpful and the
1990s saw US policymakers drifting towards a new strategic concept,
one of global primacy. With an increased focus on non-state actors, re-
gional instability and an emphasis on the political “character” of
states, the arc of instability again draws lines upon the globe to delin-
eate the areas of US vital interest. With a fundamental shift in US
overseas basing, the US reveals its strategic focus on the unstable, yet
resource-rich, areas of the globe, while remaining vigilant to tradition-
al interstate challenges from China or Russia.
Another consistent feature of US grand strategy has been the in-
clusion of ideological elements. US exceptionalism and the urge to
spread American values and governmental institutions overseas have a
strong influence over US policymakers and the American public. Even
though this component may appear instrumental or rhetorical, the im-
pact of liberal values and ideas on US grand strategy is real. Ideology
in US policy serves to shape policies in a way that strengthens the re-
solve of US policymakers and offers a strong rationale for US domestic
support of Washington’s foreign policy. The Cold War conflict con-
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tained a strong ideological component in using the spread of democ-
racy to prevent the spread of Soviet-style communism. Democratic
ideals continue to play an instrumental role in US grand strategy. As
the current evaluation of global threats to US interests includes regime
character, the inclusion of ideology serves both a rhetorical and func-
tional purpose in US strategic thinking.
A final feature of twentieth-century US grand strategy has been an
unwavering interest in the Eurasian continent. Since Mackinder’s
heartland theory at the turn of the century, perhaps even before, Eur-
asia has been the focus of US strategy, and developments there have
been closely linked to US national security by policymakers in Wash-
ington. During the Cold War, the US strove to contain the heartland
power of the Soviet Union, both on the Rimland as well as in other re-
gions where Soviet-style ideology seemed to take root. Today, the arc
of instability encompasses a large portion of the Rimland and repre-
sents the global commons where competition for resources and politi-
cal influence will be located. The increasing focus on containing the
anticipated emergence of China as a peer competitor, along with the
possible re-emergence of a Russian threat, keeps the US firmly focused
on Eurasia.
Unlike the geopolitics of Mackinder’s age, however, twenty-first
century geopolitical interaction will take place on a global basis.
Mackinder and Mahan saw the potential of the Eurasian heartland as a
generator for the resources necessary for world dominance, a region
naturally sheltered from the maritime powers of the day. Today’s stra-
tegic realities are such that the resources necessary for global influence
and domination are located not only on the Eurasian heartland, but in
the broad expanses of the arc as well. The modern global economy, in-
terconnected and crossing national boundaries, requires different
strategies for national economic strength than those of the early twen-
tieth century. With the advent of technological advances in commu-
nications, satellites, cyberspace, and power projection, a twenty-first
century containment strategy will be waged not only in those regions
in geographic proximity to the opponent, but also in the global com-
mons where the sources of economic wealth and political influence are
found.
These reoccurring themes in US grand strategy come together in
Central Asia. As the 2006 NSS document stated, 
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Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy … In
the region as a whole, the elements of our larger strategy meet,
and we must pursue those elements simultaneously: promoting
effective democracies and the expansion of free-market reforms,
diversifying global sources of energy, and enhancing security
and winning the War on Terror.198 
It is in Central Asia that the main characteristics of the arc of instabil-
ity – those of Islamic extremism, weak governments, economic discon-
nectedness, and abundant energy resources – combine with increasing
Chinese, Russian, and Iranian involvement and influence. Central
Asia, then, represents one of the principle arenas where all the elements
of US grand strategy will be tested in the coming years.
198 NSS 2006, p. 40.
Chapter 5
Central Asia regional
background
Historically known as “the land between the two rivers,” Central Asia’s
kingdoms – from Alexander the Great in 300 AD until as recently as
the fifteenth century – were protected from the Persians in the south by
the Amu Darya, while the Syr Darya slowed the periodic attacks by no-
madic invaders from the north.199 High mountain ranges – the Pamirs,
the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush – border the region to the east and
south, while the Caspian Sea lies to the west.200 As a political and ana-
lytical entity, Central Asia today normally comprises five countries:
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
Some scholars such as Olivier Roy suggest the inclusion of Azerbaijan
in this grouping, especially since recent events have shown that coun-
try’s economic importance to the region.201 Others scholars argue that
Afghanistan represents an integral part of the region’s culture and pol-
itics and should be defined as a Central Asian state, a position recently
taken by the US State Department as well.202 While the arguments for
a broader definition of Central Asia are compelling, the five Central
Asian states share a history and set of issues that both bind them togeth-
er and separate them from their neighbors.
199 Unless otherwise noted, the background information provided here relies on Mayer,
Security or Human Rights.
200 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin
Books, 2002).
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versity Press, 2000).
202 S. Frederick Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 4
(July/August 2005): 164–178; Svante E. Cornell and Niklas LP Swanstrom, “The
Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism
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east.
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The steppes of Central Asia have long been a crossroads for traders
and a tempting objective for repeated conquests, many of which have
left their mark on the present day dynamics of the region in the form
of social and political organization, language, religion, and culture.203
A network of trading routes known as the Silk Road traversed the re-
gion from the time of Alexander the Great around 300 BC until the
opening of new sea routes rendered the Silk Road obsolete in the fif-
teenth century. The legacy of both Turkish and Persian conquests of
Central Asia is today visible in the linguistic and common cultural
heritage of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran; the rest of Central Asia
retains Turkic cultural and linguistic roots. In more modern times,
Tsarist Russia, tempted by the mineral and cotton resources of Central
Asia, expanded into the region in mid nineteenth century. The Rus-
sian advance towards southern Central Asia occurred during a time
when the British Empire was expanding northward from India into
Afghanistan. Geopolitical maneuvering between these two powers for
control and influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan was intense dur-
ing this period, a time referred to by many as “The Great Game.”
Russia and Britain agreed to separate spheres of influence, separated by
the Durand Line that eventually formed the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Legacy of Soviet rule
Soviet planners decided in 1924 that the best way to counter the grow-
ing sense of pan-Turkic unity and rash of rebellions throughout Rus-
sian Turkestan was to divide the region into smaller entities. The
borders drawn up between 1924 and 1936 encouraged the establish-
ment of national identities in the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen
Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) rather than a pan-Turkic one, while
leaving sizeable ethnic minority populations in each republic to avoid
cohesive republics that might challenge Soviet rule. These SSRs were
never intended as independent states and they shared a common infra-
structure of power lines, pipelines and transportation networks.204 The
Soviet Union also set about dismantling traditional Islamic culture in
Central Asia, ultimately driving it underground. When the USSR col-
203 This paragraph based on Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia (London; IB
Tauris, 2006), pp. 17–36; Rashid, Jihad, pp. 19–25.
204 Megoran, Nick, “The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana
Valley boundary dispute, 1999–2000” Political Geography, vol. 23 (2004): 731–764.
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lapsed in 1991, the five newly independent states of Central Asia re-
tained roughly these Soviet boundaries and inherited a host of other
issues from Moscow’s rule.
The present day national borders are perhaps the most visible sign
of this set of problems inherited from the Soviet Union. The shared in-
frastructure, rather than encouraging closer cooperation, has often fos-
tered adversarial relationships that hinder the economic growth of
individual states and the region as a whole. In 1998, Uzbekistan im-
plemented measures to secure and demarcate its borders. The regime
restricted border crossings in a manner that adversely affected cross-
border trading, initiated the construction of a two-meter high barbed-
wire fence along portions of its Fergana Valley borders with
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and proceeded to lay unmarked landmines
along other stretches.205 While many of the land borders within Cen-
tral Asia have been satisfactorily demarcated over the past decade, ter-
ritorial rights in the Caspian Sea continue to be a point of contention
due to the valuable energy resources underneath the seabed.206 Water
rights represent a closely related source of conflict. The high moun-
tainous terrain of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provide Central Asia’s
two main sources of water: the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. The
low-lying agricultural areas of Uzbekistan depend on water from these
rivers for irrigation. The two upstream countries use the rivers to gen-
erate hydroelectric power, but have meager oil and gas resources and
therefore depend on gas imports, mainly from Uzbekistan. 
As the Soviet Union fell apart and each of the Central Asian Soviet
Socialist Republics gained its independence, the Communist Party
leadership in each republic was well-positioned to retain power during
the transitional period to statehood. The five Central Asian regimes
have exhibited varying levels of authoritarianism since independence.
Irregular voting practices, a lack of real opposition parties, and limited
freedom of the press are widespread throughout Central Asia. Heavy-
handed tactics are employed to quell unrest, suppress or eliminate op-
position movements and leaders, and ensure the regime’s continued
hold on power. Throughout the region, instances of politically moti-
205 Ibid: 734.
206 Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests (Wash-
ington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), Federation for American Scientists
[online 19 Nov 2008], p. 10. See also Kamyar Mehdiyoun, “Ownership of Gas and
Oil Rights in the Caspian Sea,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, no. 1
(2000): 179–189.
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vated arrests, torture, and imprisonment are well known and docu-
mented. Corruption is rampant throughout the region – bribery and
nepotism are a way of life. The authoritarian and closed nature of Cen-
tral Asian regimes can create future instability due to potential succes-
sion conflicts, although regime changes in both Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan occurred reasonably smoothly. In addition, the lack of po-
litical or legal recourse for opposition groups allows popular unrest to
be radicalized and can also contribute to regional instability.
Radical Islam, terrorism and narcotics
The Soviet authorities took active measures to suppress Islam within
the Central Asian SSRs by closing mosques, banning religious ceremo-
nies, and forbidding the reading of the Koran and the wearing of veils
by Muslim women. Moscow changed tactics in the 1960s by establish-
ing a government-sanctioned version of Islam, as part of an effort to
broaden the appeal of the Soviet system to Muslim countries abroad by
holding up Central Asia as a model. This move resulted in a dual sys-
tem of an “official” state-sponsored Islam while an underground “un-
official” Islam continued to exist. The closed nature of the Soviet
system, especially with regard to Islam, effectively froze the develop-
ment of religious thought in the region. When the Central Asian re-
publics became independent states in 1991, the dramatic increase in
mosques throughout the region was simply an outward sign of the pro-
found Islamic revival taking place. Muslim missionaries from other
countries, including Iran, Pakistan, and fundamentalist Wahhabis
from Saudi Arabia, streamed into the region to promote their particu-
lar brand of Islam and contributed to the radicalization of the religion
in Central Asia. Authorities initially banned Islam in the political are-
na, but eventually adopted increasingly repressive policies toward the
general practice of Islam among the populace.207
Concern over the northward expansion of Taliban forces during
the mid-1990s, coupled with Islamic militants fighting a civil war in
neighboring Tajikistan, contributed to a sense of imminent threat
from radical Islam. The resulting peace agreement in Tajikistan,
which established a power-sharing coalition between secular and Is-
lamic groups, had an equally profound effect on Central Asian leaders
concerned with retaining power. In February 1999, six car bombs ex-
207 Rashid, Jihad.
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ploded in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, as part of a possible assassi-
nation attempt on President Karimov, killing 13 and wounding 120
others. Uzbek authorities blamed an organized insurgent group called
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Another radical Islamic
group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, had also became active in Central Asia, advo-
cating the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia pur-
portedly through non-violent means and communicating principally
by spreading leaflets.
In 1999, IMU members conducted a cross-border raid into the
Kyrgyz portion of the Fergana Valley from their base in the Tajik
mountains. The following year, several hundred IMU militants again
conducted raids and engaged both Kyrgyz and Uzbek forces, with
fighting lasting for several months.208 After the October 2001 US in-
vasion of Afghanistan, the IMU reportedly left to fight alongside the
Taliban and Osama bin Laden and was severely weakened by coalition
forces.209 Signaling the group’s continued existence in 2004, IMU su-
icide bombings at the US and Israeli embassies in Tashkent killed
three and wounded a dozen more.210 Remaining elements of the group
are reportedly based in Pakistan’s tribal area of South Waziristan and
engaged in sporadic skirmishes with local Pashtun tribesmen. Tajik
and Uzbek officials have also warned of an increasing threat posed by
terrorist and extremist groups, though some observers interpret these
statements as political posturing to justify repressive domestic policies
and to elicit renewed international counterterrorism support.211
Chinese Islamic separatist Uighur groups, responsible for violence in
China’s Xinjiang province as well as in Kyrgyzstan, have reportedly
also been training with the IMU in Afghanistan.212
In addition, the IMU is reportedly heavily involved in drug traffick-
ing to finance its operations – the 1999/2000 incursions into the Fergana
Valley may have had more to do with opening up new smuggling routes
than with military insurrection.213 According to a 2007 United Nations
report, Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world’s illegal opium and
208 Ibid.
209 Nichol, Central Asia’s Security, p. 8.
210 Ibid, p. 7.
211 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Is Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Really
Back?,” RFE/RL 2 February 2006; Farangis Najibullah, “South/Central Asia: Is Talk
Of IMU Aimed At Courting Outsiders?” RFE/RL, 2 July 2007 [online 19 Nov
2008]; Farangis Najibullah, “Tajikistan: Are Concerns About ‘Islamic Extremism’
Justified?” RFE/RL, 26 April 2007 [online 19 Nov 2008].
212 Rollie Lal, Central Asia and its Asian Neighbors: Security and Commerce at the Crossroads
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 4–7.
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much of it is smuggled through Central Asia on its way to Russian and
European markets.214 The Taliban has reportedly forged a strategic alli-
ance with opium growers in Afghanistan, collecting taxes in exchange
for protection from government eradication programs.215 
The combination of Islamic militants in Central Asia, organized
crime, opium growers in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency, the in-
terests of neighboring Pakistan, and continued US/NATO efforts to
provide security and reconstruction assistance to the Karzai govern-
ment contributes to some extremely complex and significant political
dynamics in the region. Apart from the obvious social issues relating
to narcotics, including addiction and the spread of HIV through dirty
needles, there are political and security issues as well. Corruption is
rampant among Central Asian border officials, who are well-paid to al-
low heroin shipments to pass through checkpoints. Organized crime
represents a threat to vulnerable political institutions in Central Asia
through corruption, the “privatization” of these institutions for crim-
inal purposes, and even some evidence of organized crime’s involve-
ment in Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 political uprising.216
Energy issues
One primary reason for continued great power interest in Central Asia
is the presence of hydrocarbon reserves in the region. The bulk of Cen-
tral Asia’s oil and natural gas reserves are located in the Caspian Sea lit-
toral states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with Uzbekistan also
controlling some reserves. Kazakhstan’s proven oil reserves at the end
of 2006 amounted to nearly 40 billion barrels, while reserves in both
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were estimated at 600 million barrels
each. In terms of natural gas, Kazakhstan holds three trillion cubic me-
ters of gas, Turkmenistan 2.86 trillion, and Uzbekistan 1.87 trillion.
In October 2008, an independent auditing firm provided the first ex-
213 Justin Miller, “The Narco-Insurgent Nexus in Central Asia and Afghanistan,”
National Interest, 7 May 2003 [online 19 Nov 2008]; Svante Cornell and Niklas
Swanstrom, “The Eurasian Drug Trade …”: 10–28; Martha Brill Olcott, “Russia,
Central Asia and Caucasus Threats; A Four Year Assessment,” testimony prepared for
the House Committee on Armed Services Threat Panel Hearing on Threat in Eurasia,
22 September 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online 19 Nov 2008]. 
214 Imogen Foulkes, “Afghan opium production ‘soars’,” BBC News, 25 June 2007
[online 19 Nov 2008]. 
215 Jon Lee Anderson, “The Taliban’s Opium War,” New Yorker, 9 July 2007 [online 19
Nov 2008].
216 Miller, “The Narco-Insurgent Nexus …”; Cornell and Swanstrom, “The Eurasian
Drug Trade …”
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ternal analysis of Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves and reported sub-
stantial finds that greatly exceed current estimates. If the latest
numbers are accurate, Turkmenistan’s reserves may be between five to
ten times the amounts listed here.217 Using the older figures, the Cen-
tral Asian states are estimated to control approximately 3.3 percent of
total global oil reserves (comparable to Libya) and 4.3 percent of the
world’s natural gas (comparable to total North American reserves).218 
Table 1: Summary table of hydrocarbon reserves, production and consumption in 
Central Asia. The figures for Turkmenistan do not include the results of the 2008 
audit of gas reserves. (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.)
As the table above shows, Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas account for the
majority of hydrocarbon exports in Central Asia. According to an In-
ternational Crisis Group report, Kazakhstan is one of the few non-
OPEC producers “not expected to reach peak conventional crude oil
production for at least another two decades. It is possible that it has the
greatest conventional oil production growth potential of any non-
217 Bruce Pannier, “Independent Audit Shows Turkmen Gas field ‘World Class’,” RFE/
RL, 14 October 2008.
218 These figures are from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, available
online at their website. By comparison, the Middle East region controls 61.5% (oil)
and 40.5% (gas) of global reserves. Russia accounts for 6.6% (oil) and 26.3% (gas)
and Norway holds 0.7% (oil) and 1.6% (gas) of total reserves.
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OPEC country.”219 An important trend illustrated by the table is the
ratio of energy production to domestic consumption. While Kazakh
oil and Turkmen gas have lower domestic consumption rates and can
therefore be exported in greater quantities, Uzbekistan’s high domestic
use of oil and gas relative to production – the country is actually a net
importer of oil – currently limits exports.220
These three countries face political and economic challenges due
to the combination of authoritarian regimes and substantial economic
windfalls generated by state-owned energy resources. As the ICG re-
port warns, oil and gas riches can contribute to instability and conflict
in the region in several ways. Interstate conflicts may arise over own-
ership of reserves, though this has not yet occurred. Regimes may de-
vote oil and gas incomes to security forces and corruption at the
expense of solving domestic problems such as diversifying their econ-
omies or educating their citizens. Finally, the report observes that
countries with oil and gas production tend to experience “poverty, re-
pression, environmental degradation and labor tensions without see-
ing benefits from the wealth that is created.”221 As mentioned earlier,
corruption is widespread throughout Central Asia. According to UK-
based Global Witness, the bulk of Turkmenistan’s gas revenues were in
offshore accounts under President Niyazov’s personal control, in
amounts believed to be in excess of USD 3 billion. It appears that none
of the substantial income from gas sales is used in the national budget,
while living standards have fallen since Soviet rule.222 
The landlocked geographical position of Central Asia forces the re-
gion’s energy exporters to rely on neighboring countries to transport
their products to markets. Existing Soviet-era pipeline infrastructure
transported energy north to the rest of the Soviet Union, and the ma-
jority of Central Asian energy exports continue to transit Russian ter-
ritory. Since its independence, the region has witnessed intense
competition for pipeline projects that combine economic interests and
geopolitical considerations. Pipelines have been constructed that
transport oil and gas south into Iran, west from the Caspian port city
of Baku in Azerbaijan, and east from Kazakhstan into China. A host of
219 International Crisis Group (ICG), Central Asia’s Energy Risks, ICG Asia Report no.
133, 24 May 2007 [online 19 Nov 2008], p. 8.
220 BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2008 [online 21 Nov 2008].
221 ICG, Central Asia’s Energy Risks, p. 1.
222 In 2005, Turkmenistan scored 97th of 177 countries on the United Nation’s Human
Development Indicators, see Global Witness, Its a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-
Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006 [online 19 Nov 2008].
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planned projects are under consideration and depend largely on polit-
ical agreement between transit nations. With steadily increasing de-
mand in China and Europe for Central Asian gas, Russia’s traditional
stranglehold on exports from the region is under pressure. 
Russia in Central Asia
Central Asian gas exports are vital to Russia’s energy policy. Nearly all
of Central Asia’s natural gas is bought by the Russia’s state-owned en-
ergy company Gazprom. The region’s main producer, Turkmenistan,
will sell 85 percent of its gas exports to Russia by 2008, with the re-
mainder going south to Iran.223 Russia has used this near-monopoly on
Central Asian exports to pressure the region’s producers into selling
their gas at extremely low prices (one-fourth to one-third of market
value), and then reselling it to Europe for a handsome profit. This prac-
tice has allowed Russia to delay the substantial infrastructure invest-
ments needed to increase production by its own gas fields, which hold
one quarter of the world’s total reserves; however, these reserves are
more expensive to extract and will most likely require advanced West-
ern technology.224
Similarly, Kazakhstan routed 80 percent of its oil through Russian
pipelines in 2006 and President Nazarbayev announced in May 2007
that “Oil and gas cooperation [with Russia] is strategically important,
specifically in transporting Kazakh oil to global markets …
Kazakhstan is completely committed to transporting most its oil, if
not all of it, across Russian territory.”225 According to the March 2007
congressional testimony of analyst Kimberly Marten, Russia endeavors
to establish a pipeline monopoly over Kazakh oil, which is of higher
quality than Siberian crude and therefore more profitable. Russian
ownership of the pipelines has allowed it to insist on mixing the two
oils together into an “Urals blend,” which increases Russian profits.226
Even more fundamentally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported
223 Zorawar Daulet Singh, “The Great Game moves south,” Asia Times Online, 18 May
2007 [online 19 Nov 2008].
224 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Energy Sector Hides Weaknesses Behind Powerful Facade,”
Eurasianet Commentary, 16 May 2006 [online 1 Jun 2007]; see also Amy Myers Jaffe,
“Russia: Back to the Future?” Testimony before the United States Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 29 June 2006 [online 19 Nov 2008].
225 RIA Novosti, “Putin, Nazarbayev focus on energy, transport, space,” 10 May 2007
[online 19 Nov 2008]. 
226 RFE/RL, “Russia Seeking Control of Kazakhstan’s Oil, Expert Says,” 27 Marcy 2007
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that a 2004 Russian gas industry study had found that without Central
Asian gas exports, Russia would be unable to meet existing export
commitments to Europe and China.227 As analyst Stephen Blank
writes, 
It is easy to see how the loss of control over Central Asian energy
exports and production would severely damage Russia’s politi-
cal and economic interests … the availability of other export
options would force Moscow to pay considerably higher prices
for Central Asian oil and gas – a development that could have
ruinous consequences for the Russian economy.228
Russia has consistently demonstrated its concern over the spread of Is-
lamic extremism in Central Asia. The steadily increasing influence of
Islamist groups in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 1989 turned Tajikistan into Russia’s first line of de-
fense against the spread of radical Islam into Central Asia and southern
Russia. Russian troops patrolled the Afghan-Tajik border even after
Tajik independence, and Russia supported the secular interim govern-
ment against an Islamic-democratic coalition during the Tajik civil
war while at the same time organizing an anti-Taliban coalition inside
Afghanistan.229 The IMU incursions of 1999–2000 spurred Moscow to
renew regional security cooperation among the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS) members under the Collective Security Treaty
(CST), ultimately resulting in a CST rapid deployment force (CRDF)
in May 2001.230 Similarly, Russian concerns over the flow of narcotics
trafficking and organized crime from Central Asia into Russia have led
to cooperative efforts to address these threats. 
Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke of the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs note that Moscow had created a “common threat
perception in the CIS space … Russia has in the period after 11 Sep-
tember more readily blurred the lines between internal and external
227 Roman Kupchinsky, “Russia: Gas Export Plan Dependent on Central Asia,” RFE/RL,
28 March 2006 [online 19 Nov 2008].
228 Blank, “Russia’s Energy Sector.”
229 Jonson, Tajikistan, pp. 95–97. The Rahmon regime’s perception of Russia as its ulti-
mate security guarantor was aptly illustrated in 2005. When unrest in neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan led to the ousting of President Akayev, President Rahmon immediately
called President Putin for reassurance, which he received. 
230 Kathleen A. Collins and William C. Wohlforth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expecta-
tions,” Strategic Asia 2003–2004 Fragility and Crisis, National Bureau of Asian
Research [online 21 Nov 2008], pp. 291–318. The actual threat currently posed by
radical Islam in the region is more difficult to gauge as both Central Asian leaders as
well as Moscow have an interest in exaggerating the threat for political purposes.
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threats,” although “already from 2000 and onwards, Moscow seemed
to distinguish poorly between internal threats to Russian security
(Chechnya) and external threats involving the CIS territory.”231 While
Russia initially accepted the sudden increase in US military and dip-
lomatic activities in Central Asia after 11 September 2001, as Moscow
shared Washington’s objectives of eliminating the Taliban and other
Islamic extremists groups like the IMU, the US military presence soon
led to what Roy Allison has called a Russian “strategic reassertion” in
the region.232 In the spring of 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov proposed what came to be known informally as the Ivanov Doc-
trine, namely that Moscow reserved the right to conduct preemptive
strikes in the CIS against all manner of threats, be they military, eco-
nomic, or cultural (i.e. to protect ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet
space).233 The Georgian conflict of August 2008 merely served as an
illustration of such thinking.234
In a broader sense, the perception of Central Asia as firmly within
Russia’s distinct sphere of influence resonated strongly with some el-
ements of its foreign policy elite who have voiced support for reestab-
lishing Russian dominance over the post-Soviet space since the USSR’s
dissolution, among them Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Gennadii Ziuganov,
and Aleksandr Dugin. They represent a movement in Russian political
thinking some have labeled Eurasianism, a geopolitical theory similar
to Mackinder’s heartland concept that argues for Russian control over
the Eurasian heartland and the ultimate expulsion of Western influ-
ence in the region.235 Reflecting this trend, President Vladimir Putin
in April 2005 referred to the collapse of the USSR as one of the great-
est geopolitical catastrophes of the twentieth century, and has priori-
tized the restoration of Russian influence in Central Asia.236
231 Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, “Copy That …”: A Russian “Bush Doctrine” in the
CIS? (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005), p. 27.
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This combination of economic, security, and political interests in
Russia’s “Near Abroad” has translated into an active policy to retain,
as Mikhail Troitskiy puts it, “the ability to influence decision-making
in the states of the region in key spheres bearing directly on Russia’s
security and economic development.”237 This is accomplished through
bilateral agreements, security cooperation through the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) and CSTO (through which Russia sup-
plies Central Asian government with military equipment at reduced
prices), and maintaining Russian military bases in Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow’s approach requires regime sta-
bility, and Russia has therefore been suspicious of democratization ef-
forts that could lead to any political unpredictability and threaten
Russia’s growing influence in the region. 
China in Central Asia
In many respects, Chinese interests in Central Asia parallel those of
Russia: energy, Islamic extremism, and limiting the influence of other
actors in the region. In contrast to Moscow’s military and political en-
gagement with Central Asia, however, Beijing’s activities in the region
have largely been focused on improving trade ties and securing new
sources of energy. China’s security cooperation with the Central Asian
nations has been mostly conducted through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). 
China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and the country’s con-
tinued economic growth has only increased domestic demand. Domes-
tic oil production in 2005 amounted to 3.8 million barrels per day to
make it the sixth largest oil producer in the world, with the majority
of its production capacity located in northeastern China. However, the
most productive fields there have peaked and are now in decline, re-
sulting in a surge of exploration and development of other domestic
reserves.238 New fields are being developed in the northeastern portion
of the country as well as in the western provinces such as Xinjiang, in
addition to offshore sites in the South China Sea.239
237 Mikhail Troitskiy, Institutionalizing US-Russian Cooperation in Central Eurasia, Keenan
Institute Occasional Paper, no. 293 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, 2006) [online 19 Nov 2008], p. 3. 
238 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: China.”
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At the same time, China has increasingly looked outside its bor-
ders for additional energy resources to meet growing domestic de-
mand. As Peter Hatami and Andrew Wedeman note, China’s
controversial search for new oil reserves began in the 1970s and 1980s
with its claims of drilling rights in the South China Sea.240 In the
1990s, however, China shifted its tactics for securing imports through
commercial means and now holds investments and export agreements
in 50 countries throughout Africa, the Middle East, South America,
and Central Asia.241 In 2005, PetroChina, the country’s largest oil pro-
ducer, completed the USD 4.18 billion purchase of Canadian-based
PetroKazakhstan, the second largest producer of oil in Kazakhstan,
beating out challenges from India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
as well as Russia’s Lukoil.242 The Chinese National Petroleum Corpo-
ration (CNPC) agreed in 2006 to invest USD 210 million in oil and
gas exploration in Uzbekistan over a five year period. In April 2007,
Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov and Chi-
nese President Hu Jintao agreed to a production-sharing arrangement
to develop gas fields in eastern Turkmenistan. In addition, the two
leaders reaffirmed Turkmenistan’s 2006 commitment to sell 30 bil-
lion cubic meters of gas to China annually for 30 years, beginning in
2009.243 China’s activities in Central Asia’s oil and gas sector challenge
the Russian-dominated status quo and place Beijing in direct compe-
tition with Moscow for access to the region’s limited energy resources.
In addition to its energy interests in Central Asia, China has ex-
panded economic ties in other sectors as well. Inexpensive manufac-
tured goods from China have flooded Central Asian markets. China has
invested in various infrastructure projects throughout the region: a
highway in Tajikistan, a hydroelectric plant in Kazakhstan, an irriga-
tion project in Uzbekistan.244 As Mikhail Troitskiy observes, “Bei-
jing’s ‘quiet’ policy in Central Asia is focused on the economic
penetration of the region by means of small trade and on ensuring that
China gets a ‘fair’ stake in Central Asian energy projects.”245 The influx
240 Peter Hatemi and Andrew Wedeman, “Oil and Conflict in Sino-American Rela-
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of cheap manufactured goods that hinders the creation of an indige-
nous industrial base, and an increase in Chinese nationals working on
Chinese oil company projects, have raised concern among the popula-
tions of the Central Asian countries.246
The Chinese province of Xinjiang, which borders on Central Asia,
is strategically important to Beijing for a number of reasons. Pipelines
carrying energy imports from Central Asia must transit the mountain-
ous province to reach Chinese markets. Xinjiang also holds important
substantial and presently untapped oil reserves of its own. In addition,
it is home to a nuclear testing ground and a number of China’s nuclear
ballistic missiles.247 Several analysts argue that for Beijing to focus its
attention on Taiwan, it must first secure its flank: the north-western
border.248 China therefore strives to limit US engagement in Central
Asia, as well as contain the low-level insurgency threat posed by Tur-
kic Uighur separatist groups operating in Xinjiang.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, border delineation issues were
faced not only by the newly formed Central Asian republics, but by
their neighbors as well. Longstanding border disputes between China
and the Soviet Union in the region suddenly became easier for Beijing
to resolve successfully. In 1996, China initiated a group known as the
“Shanghai Five,” comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, which signed the Shanghai Agreement on Confidence
Building in the Military Field in the Border Area. An agreement on the
limitation and transparency of military forces in the region followed in
1997, building upon this new security regime.249
The success of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, combined with
Chinese and Kyrgyz concerns over Uighur separatist groups, encour-
aged the Shanghai Five to begin consultations on a collective counter-
terrorism effort. The increasing threat from the IMU led Uzbekistan
to seek inclusion in the organization, which then became known as the
246 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “China: Beijing Makes Further Economic Inroads”; Rollie Lal,
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247 Ibid, p. 6. 
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(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2007) [online 19
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The foundational docu-
ment of the new group addressed the three threats perceived to be
most pressing for SCO members: terrorism, separatism, and extrem-
ism.250 The SCO in 2001 announced its intention to form a counter-
terrorism center in Central Asia. The US invasion of Afghanistan in
response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks severely weakened
both the Taliban and the IMU, largely eliminating the threat for
which the SCO had been formed. Member states have been reluctant
to invest any real diplomatic energy or resources in joint security ef-
forts of this type.251 The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS)
was, after much discussion amongst SCO members, finally established
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2004.
For both Russia and China, membership in the SCO provides a
tool for combating common threats such as extremism and drug traf-
ficking as well as offering both regional powers increased influence in
the Central Asian states. Both countries have a complex set of political
interests that are well-served by SCO membership, though Russia and
China generally pursue their core national interests in Central Asia
through other means: Moscow uses the CSTO for security matters and
bilateral agreements for energy, while Beijing relies mostly on bilater-
al agreements for energy and trade. The Central Asian republics, for
their part, are able to use the SCO’s institutional framework to balance
Russia and China and prevent either one from dominating the region.
At the 2008 SCO summit in Dushanbe, member countries agreed that
while they support Russia’s “active role” in the Georgian conflict, they
did not recognize the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhaz-
ia.252 The resistance to Russian requests for full support illustrates the
complex nature of the organization and its balancing mechanisms. In
the end, Central Asian participation in the organization may ultimate-
ly hinge, as a report from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) found, on authoritarian regime security:
… A striking and unusual feature of the SCO is that … its
members all have more or less autocratic forms of government.
This not only provides the obvious explanation of why shared
measures against “extremism” and “secessionism” and the rejec-
tion of foreign “interference” have featured so highly on the
250 James Brian McNabb, “The Unanticipated Utility of US Security Structures”: 318;
Collins and Wohlforth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations,” p. 305.
251 Ibid.
252 RFE/RL, “SCO Fails to Back Russia Over Georgia,” 28 August 2008.
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group’s agenda, but also allows SCO proceedings to take place in
an exclusively state-to-state mode, with minimal transparency
and no significant means of democratic control. In this perspec-
tive it is not unfair to categorize the SCO as a pact for regime
survival: a pro-status quo, as well as anti-terrorist, coalition.253
Afghanistan: the soft underbelly?
At the 2008 SCO summit, Uzbek President Islam Karimov argued
that the most important concern for Central Asia was stabilizing
Afghanistan, as instability there affected the entire region.254 The on-
going conflict against the Taliban along with the continuous flow of
narcotics from Afghanistan into Central Asia does indeed have a sig-
nificant impact on security throughout the region. As mentioned ear-
lier, a potent mix of Islamist fighters from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
China have been reported in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). Just as the specter of radical Islam affected the security
dynamics of Central Asia during the 1990s, the resilience of the Tali-
ban resistance in Afghanistan creates uncertainty and unease among
the region’s leaders. There is also profound interest throughout Central
Asia for new trade routes, and the region’s economic opportunities
would be enhanced immeasurably by a stable and secure Afghanistan. 
Finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is com-
plicated by an intricate web of regional concerns and the historical ge-
opolitical interests of its neighbors. Iran, with its cultural and
linguistic ties to Tajikistan, also has an interest in regional security via
stability in Afghanistan. In addition, Iran sees economic opportunities
in both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Having a stake in Caspian Sea
energy deposits as well as providing a possible export outlet for Cen-
tral Asian energy, Iran has increasingly been active in the region.
India, for its part, also has historic links to Tajikistan. India supported
the Northern Alliance and Tajik tribes in their fight against the
Pakistani-supported Taliban during the 1980s, and the relationship
has expanded to include military cooperation with Tajikistan and an
Indian military facility in Farkhor. The base would guard against a
possible Taliban resurgence in the region, as well as allow quick air ac-
cess to the contested region of Kashmir.255
253 Alyson Bailes, et al., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, p. 9.
254 RFE/RL, “SCO Fails to Back Russia Over Georgia.”
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As Robert Kaplan outlined in a recent article, the Afghan conflict
cannot be properly understood without accounting for the Indian-
Pakistani conflict:
The war in Afghanistan is part of Pakistan’s larger struggle with
India. Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan and India have
fought over directly and indirectly for decades. To Pakistan,
Afghanistan represents a strategic rear base that would (along
with the Islamic nations of ex-Soviet Central Asia) offer a united
front against Hindu-dominated India and block its rival’s access
to energy-rich regions. Conversely, for India, a friendly Afghan-
istan would pressure Pakistan on its western border—just as
India itself pressures Pakistan on its eastern border—thus deal-
ing Pakistan a strategic defeat.256
Many experts are concerned over Pakistan’s internal stability after a
leadership and legitimacy crisis ultimately forced President Pervez
Musharraf to step down as violence from Islamist radicals intensified.
With the ungoverned FATA used by insurgents as a base for attacks
both within Pakistan and Afghanistan, a weakened Pakistani govern-
ment currently seems unable (or unwilling) to address the threat. 
Summary: Central Asia background
Central Asia is a region rife with pressing issues on many fronts: secu-
rity, economic, political, and environmental. At the same time, a
number of powerful external actors have compelling interests in the re-
gion and pursue them through both bilateral and institutional means.
While the tired “Great Game” analogy may indeed be overused, the
political situation in the region remains highly charged and is viewed
by many through a prism of geopolitical and geo-strategic considera-
tions. The fundamental issues at stake in Central Asia are those of en-
ergy, extremism, autocratic leaderships, and economic growth. Despite
China’s growing economic presence in the region, the dominant role
still belongs to Russia. It views the region as vital to its energy and se-
curity policy, as well as in a fundamentally nationalistic sense as
Russia’s “Near Abroad.” Other actors have shown increasing interest
255 See Lal, Central Asia and its Asian Neighbors, p. 31.
256 Robert D. Kaplan, “Behind the Indian Embassy Bombing,” Atlantic, 1 August 2008
[online 19 Nov 2008].
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in Central Asia in recent years, including the United States. As the
myriad of interested parties interact with one another, and with the
countries of the region, a fascinating strategic game has emerged.
Chapter 6
US policy in Central Asia
Early US policy in the region (1991–2005)
When the Central Asian republics became independent states in 1991,
policymakers in Washington saw both dangers and opportunities.257
Structural and institutional weaknesses among these new states left
them vulnerable to the types of transnational threats that would be-
come increasingly worrisome in the post-Cold War era. A sizeable por-
tion of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal positioned in Kazakhstan, for
example, suddenly made that nation a temporary leading nuclear pow-
er. Poor economic conditions, weak security arrangements, low salary
levels and porous borders made the proliferation of these weapons an
immediate concern. Other Central Asian nations, such as Uzbekistan,
had biological or chemical weapons laboratories susceptible to similar
concerns. The sudden introduction of a large regional security vacuum
in Central Asia prompted a series of initiatives from the George H.W.
Bush and Bill Clinton administrations.
The Freedom Support Act, approved by Congress in 1992, author-
ized funding for a wide range of programs for Russia and the other
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. One of them, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, consisted of non-proliferation
initiatives aimed at securing loose Soviet weaponry, strengthening
border controls and initiating the decommissioning of weapons sites.
The region-wide approach was also seen in other efforts: solidifying
the sovereignty of the new states, generating regional economic devel-
opment, encouraging democratic reforms and improved human rights
practices, and granting broad humanitarian assistance packages. In ad-
dition, the US took an interest in the energy resources present in the
Caspian Sea region, and became a strong supporter of developing new
257 This summary of US policy in Central Asia prior to 2005 is based on Mayer, Security
or Human Rights.
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oil and gas export routes. These programs were conducted with sensi-
tivity to the Russian government to reassure Moscow that US inten-
tions were benign, a consideration evident in President Bush’s policies
and one that continued through the first years of the Clinton adminis-
tration. 
By the mid 1990s, foreign policy and regional experts began to
question the value of a region-based policy dependent on preserving
US-Russian relations. Frederick Starr’s 1996 Foreign Affairs article,
“Making Eurasia Stable,” was representative of this new thinking.258
Starr argued that Central Asia faced three possible futures: a return to
Moscow’s sphere of influence, increased instability and chaos, or a stra-
tegic equilibrium attained through the emergence of one or several an-
chor states. As the largest and most influential regional player, Starr
considered Uzbekistan best suited to act as an anchor state and encour-
aged the US to form its policies to strive toward this outcome. Others
argued in a similar fashion, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and former
Lt. General William Odom of the Hudson Institute. 
Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott’s speech in July 1997 out-
lined the possible consequences of US inaction in the region:
If economic and political reform in the countries of the Caucasus
and Central Asia does not succeed – if internal and cross-border
conflicts simmer and flare – the region could become a breeding
ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political extrem-
ism, and a battleground for outright war. It would matter pro-
foundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area
that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil.259
Regarding US–Russian relations, Talbott refuted the widespread in-
terpretation of Central Asia as the backdrop for a renewed Great Power
rivalry between the US and Russia, stating that Washington was not
interested in zero-sum solutions:
For the last several years, it has been fashionable to proclaim, or
at least to predict, a replay of the “Great Game” in the Caucasus
and Central Asia. The implication, of course, is that the driving
dynamic of the region, fueled and lubricated by oil, will be the
258 S. Fredrick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (1997): 80–
92.
259 Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman,” speech at Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC, 21 July 1997 (US Department of State [online 19 Nov 2008]).
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competition of the great powers to the disadvantage of the peo-
ple who live there. Our goal is to avoid and to actively discour-
age that atavistic outcome. In pondering and practicing the
geopolitics of oil, let’s make sure that we are thinking in terms
appropriate to the 21st century and not the 19th. Let’s leave
Rudyard Kipling and George McDonald Fraser where they
belong – on the shelves of historical fiction. The Great Game –
which starred Kipling’s Kim and Fraser’s Flashman – was very
much of the zero-sum variety. What we want to help bring
about is just the opposite: We want to see all responsible players
in the Caucasus and Central Asia be winners.260
The Clinton administration actively supported pipelines that traversed
Turkish territory rather than through Russia, and pushed for an export
route from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey. Through US Spe-
cial envoy Richard Morningstar, an agreement was signed in 1999 and
the recently completed Baka-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline became
the first major oil export route that avoided Russian territory.
The 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
predicated a shift in US strategy towards the region, as an increased fo-
cus on radical Islamic terror group al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin
Laden required intensified bilateral security cooperation with
Uzbekistan. The secular and authoritarian regimes of Central Asia had
been viewing the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan with increas-
ing concern, viewing the fundamentalist movement as potentially in-
spiring other radical groups in the region to challenge their hold on
power. Such groups were becoming increasingly active throughout the
region, especially in the volatile Ferghana Valley, where insurgent
groups launched incursions into Kyrgyzstan and were thought respon-
sible for bombings in Tashkent. The Uzbek government, already ac-
tive in its fight against suspected extremist groups, welcomed US
cooperation and the increased security assistance that followed. In the
final years of the Clinton administration, security concerns began to
outweigh diplomatic pressure for political reform.
The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 accelerated this trend.
As the US prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan, named Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), the cooperation of the Central Asian repub-
lics became crucial to the practical implementation of US strategy.
260  Ibid.
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Conducting combat operations in this landlocked region required lo-
gistical support, overflight arrangements and basing rights.
Uzbekistan became an irreplaceable ally due to its central location in
the region and its border crossings that offered good access into the
mountains of northern Afghanistan. Just one hour after the intense ne-
gotiations with Tashkent had resulted in a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), the US commenced its air campaign against the Taliban, soon
followed by the establishment of a US military presence at Karshi-
Khanabad (K2) in southern Uzbekistan. A second base at Manas,
Kyrgyzstan, also served to maintain vital supply lines to OEF and the
stabilization operations that followed.
New agreements and intensified relationships were quickly estab-
lished in Central Asia to arrange logistical support for Operation En-
during Freedom, as well as create a revised framework for pursuing
other US security interests in the region. Tajikistan’s strategic location
along Afghanistan’s northern border also made it attractive to military
planners, though far from ideal for basing purposes, as there were still
lingering tensions from its recently ended civil war, widespread govern-
ment corruption and ties to narcotics traffickers, and a significant
number of Russian troops still garrisoned in the country. Nonetheless,
access to Tajik territory was valuable for transporting men and equip-
ment into northern Afghanistan.261 Similarly, the K2 base in
Uzbekistan provided direct border access to Afghanistan as well as an
airstrip capable of acting as a logistics hub for the military.
Over the next several years, US-Uzbek relations in particular in-
tensified as the strategic partnership developed and concerns over hu-
man rights violations were toned down. When congressional
legislation limited the delivery of security assistance in 2004, the Pen-
tagon used departmental funds to ensure continued cooperation. This
emphasis on the US-Uzbek bilateral relationship was a cause of con-
cern for other Central Asian countries, wary of Uzbekistan’s aspira-
tions towards regional hegemony and its aggressive behavior toward
its neighbors concerning everything from gas supplies to border de-
marcation. Despite US efforts to maintain the bilateral relationship,
however, Tashkent began to voice its irritation over the lack of remu-
neration for the K2 base. The invasion of Iraq and the series of “Color
261 William O’Mallery, “Central Asia and South Caucasus as an area of operations: Chal-
lenges and Constraints,” in Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus:
Implications for the US Army, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas Szanya (Arroyo Center:
RAND, 2003), p. 267.
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Revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan led President
Karimov – and many Central Asian leaders – to equate US democracy
promotion with regime change. In Kyrgyzstan, the American-based
NGO Freedom House even proclaimed “mission accomplished” as
President Askar Akayev was forced into exile in 2005.262 
The increased suspicion of US motives created a climate in which
NGO projects dealing with political and economic reforms became
difficult to continue. As NGOs began to experience pressure from gov-
ernments such as the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, Congress, by
limiting security assistance to Uzbekistan, sought to spur some move-
ment towards political reform. Instead, such actions portrayed the US
as an unreliable ally and only served to increase frustrations. When Uz-
bek security forces opened fire on crowds of protesting civilians in
Andijan in May 2005, the US could no longer avoid open and direct
criticism of the regime. As Secretary Rice became personally engaged
in transporting Andijan refugees out of neighboring Kyrgyzstan –
against Tashkent’s wishes – the Karimov regime issued an eviction no-
tice demanding the US leave its base in Uzbekistan within 180 days.
US relations with Tashkent in the period immediately following this
development experienced a temporary setback, and Washington’s in-
fluence appeared limited after the loss of its strongest bilateral rela-
tionship.263
Current US policy in Central Asia
In a ceremony laden with symbolism, officials and representatives from
several nations marked the official opening in August 2007 of a 670-
meter bridge over the Pyanj River connecting Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Financed by the US and Norway, the bridge is anticipated
to stimulate regional trade between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the
rest of Central Asia through improved market access and export routes.
US Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, on hand for the ceremony,
noted that the bridge was a “physical and symbolic link between Cen-
tral and South Asia.”264 The Pyanj River Bridge stands as a concrete
symbol of the recent shift in US policy in Central Asia.
262 Craig Smith, “US helped to prepare the way for Kyrgyzstan’s uprising,” New York
Times, 30 March 2005 [online 19 Nov 2008]. While the quotation was most likely
taken out of context, it reinforced the pre-existing perception of US involvement in
these ‘democratic revolutions’.
263 See Mayer, Security or Human Rights.
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The State Department restructured its Central Asia bureau in
2006, moving the region out of the European area of responsibility and
instead combining it with the South Asia bureau that includes
Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. As Secretary Rice noted, the admin-
istrative placement of Central Asia together with Europe “really was
an artifact of their having been states of the Soviet Union,” and that
the new Central and South Asia bureau “represents what we’re trying
to do, which is to think of this region as one that will need to be inte-
grated, and that will be a very important goal for us.” Remarking that
the Central Asian countries seem to view Afghanistan as part of Cen-
tral Asia, Rice claimed that Central and South Asia had once been
termed by Brzezinski as an “arc of crisis,” but was now an “arc of op-
portunity.”265 The overall US foreign policy framework for the region
is now one of integration, with Afghanistan acting as the keystone be-
tween Central and South Asia.
From a US perspective, there is much at stake in Central Asia. In
his March 2007 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the
Middle East and South Asia, newly appointed Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher acknowledged that
in this wider region one could find “some of the world’s most danger-
ous threats – weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, terror-
ism, narcotics, poverty, pandemics, illiteracy, and corrupt
institutions.”266 As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan A.
Feigenbaum remarked in September 2007, Central Asia represents a
microcosm of a host of critical issues for the US:
Russia resurgent and assertive in its neighborhood; China’s
emerging regional and global footprint; Iran’s influence in its
region and around the world; energy security at a time of high
prices and expanding global demand; democracy promotion
among governments and elites who – let’s be candid – do not
exactly share our enthusiasm; the future of Afghanistan; debates
about, and within, Islam; the challenge of transnational terror-
264 US State Department, “Afghanistan-Tajikistan Bridge Links Central, South Asia,”
distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, America.gov, 29
August 2007 [online 20 Nov 2008]. 
265 US Department of State, “Central Asia now ‘Arc of Opportunity,’ Not ‘Crisis,’ Rice
says” distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, America.gov, 6
January 2006 [online 20 Nov 2008]. 
266 Richard A. Boucher, “A Regional Overview of South Asia,” testimony before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia,
7 March 2007 (US Department of State [online 20 Nov 2008]). 
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ism; and economic development amidst sometimes crushing
poverty.267
The US State Department’s five-year strategic plan (2007–12) propos-
es to address these threats through cooperation with other US govern-
ment agencies as well as international partners to:
help build regional stability by countering terrorism and nar-
cotics production and resolving conflict; deny proliferation
routes through the region; promote regional integration
through energy, infrastructure, trade, and communication
projects; strengthen democracy and good governance; and create
healthy, better educated, and more prosperous populations.
The Bush administration has consistently spoken of its intention to in-
tegrate political, economic and security-oriented elements in the for-
eign policy approach regarding Central Asia, and that these elements
are interrelated and complementary. In June 2002, Assistant Secretary
of State Lorne Craner testified before Congress that military assistance
and human rights “need not be a question of balancing and competing
interests, but can, as we’re attempting, be an issue of mutually rein-
forcing goals.”268 Four years later, Assistant Secretary Boucher reiterat-
ed this approach and expanded upon its rationale:
Our strategy rests on three integrated pillars: security coopera-
tion; our commercial and energy interests; and political and eco-
nomic reform. We see these three pillars as mutually
reinforcing. Genuine stability, in our view, requires a process of
democratic change, and stability, in turn, provides for economic
development and prosperity. Thus, we are determined to pursue
all three sets of interests simultaneously in a balanced way.269
267 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “‘Turning the Page’ in US-Turkmenistan Relations,” speech to
the Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 17 September
2007 (US Department of State [online 26 Feb 2008]).
268 Lorne Craner, “Balancing Military Assistance and support for human rights in Cen-
tral Asia,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations committee, Subcommittee
on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, 27 June 2002, GlobalSecurity.org [online 26
Feb 2008].
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The manner in which these three groups of interests are pursued, the
level of intensity and focus afforded each set of political aims, and the
balance between the three in terms of the expenditure of political and
financial capital, have varied greatly over the past fifteen years. Since
2005, the center of gravity among the three pillars of foreign policy has
shifted yet again, from a security-oriented balance after 9/11 to a more
economics-based approach. It should be noted that these three pillars
of implemented policy roughly correspond to the three divisions of
grand strategy: military, political and economic.
Pillar one: security cooperation
The Bush administration’s reactions to the September 2001 terrorist
attacks, and the subsequent impact those events had on US strategic
thinking, clearly altered the political realities in Central Asia. The in-
troduction of US combat forces in Afghanistan and the fall of the Tal-
iban regime, combined with strategic partnerships in most of the
Central Asian republics to facilitate the execution of Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, have altered the strategic dynamics of the region. Ulti-
mately, though, the war in Afghanistan and the broader war on
terrorism have not created new threats or new national interests. Rath-
er, these developments have simply served to intensify, and in some
cases reshape, preexisting concerns. These include Islamic extremism,
counternarcotics activities, non-proliferation efforts, military reform
efforts, and countering Russian and Chinese influence in the region.
US security interests are so closely and clearly interconnected that none
are able to be analyzed in isolation.
The Central Asian republics, as mentioned earlier, are themselves
confronting Islamic extremism to varying degrees. The initial security
assistance offered by the Central Asian republics and the more limited
assistance they continue to provide originate as much from self-
interested motives as from a desire to accommodate the US. Addition-
al benefits include financial rewards from Washington and the more
intangible benefit of offering the possibility of conducting a “multi-
vector” foreign policy that balances Russian, Chinese and American
pressures. In any case common security interests provide a foundation
whereby cooperation with the US over OEF has generally been a mu-
tually beneficial proposition.
US restrictions on the sale or transfer of military items to
Tajikistan, in effect from 1993 due to the civil war and on-going gov-
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ernment abuses, were immediately lifted after 9/11 as Tajikistan be-
came a “front-line state” in the war on terror.270 The US government
provided USD 8 million in military assistance between 2002 and
2007, mostly grants for purchasing non-lethal supplies such as com-
munications equipment. Direct commercial arms sales remained low,
totaling less than USD one million for the five-year period after 2001.
Tajikistan also received some counterterrorism training through vari-
ous programs, including the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
within the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, De-mining, and Related
Activities (NADR) account. 
Military assistance to Kyrgyzstan has tripled in the five years since
2001, reaching USD 27 million over the period. Commercial arms
sales, non-existent prior to 9/11, totaled nearly USD 62 million from
2002–06. The loss of the military base in Uzbekistan has left
Kyrgyzstan as the only host nation in Central Asia. According to the
US military, “Manas Air Base is the primary mobility hub for Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom. The wing’s around-the-clock mission in-
cludes strategic airlift operations, aerial refueling, combat airlift and
airdrop, and areomedical evaculation.”271 Manas provides an irreplace-
able power projection capability throughout the region and into
China. In addition, the presence of a Russian base in Kant, less than
50 kilometers from Manas, underlines the geopolitical symbolism of
the base. Despite some diplomatic crises, it appears the US will retain
its base in Kyrgyzstan for the foreseeable future.272
Other countries experienced equally dramatic increases in military
assistance and counterterrorism training after 2001. A comparative
study conducted by the Center for Defense Information of the five-year
period before 2001 and five years after reveals substantial changes.273
Kazakhstan’s military aid doubled; US arms sales rose from USD
182,000 to USD 19 million in the two periods, with USD 20 million
projected for 2007 and 2008. Even though Congress eventually re-
stricted military assistance to Uzbekistan, funding increased from
around USD 10 million to USD 48 million during the two periods;
270 All figures from Rachel Stohl et.al., US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the
“Global War on Terror,” Center for Defense Information, World Security Institute
(2007) [online 20 Nov 2008]. 
271 US Air Force, “376 AEW Fact Sheet,” 376th AEW Manas Air Base [online 20 Nov
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commercial arms sales went from USD 6000 to USD 52 million.
Turkmenistan, maintaining its long-held neutrality, has accepted only
a limited amount of US military assistance both before and since 2001,
amounting to just over USD 2 million in each period. 
The US preoccupation with counterterrorism and the need for co-
operative relationships in the region resulted in military equipment
flowing into the region and a relaxation of restrictions on arms sales.
None of the Central Asian republics are particularly noteworthy for
their democratic institutions or respect for human rights. Further, di-
visions between internal security forces and the military are not always
clear-cut, especially when domestic Islamist groups are seen as posing
the greatest threat to the regimes. Military assistance in the form of
arms and training, intended to increase military professionalism and
strengthen counterinsurgency efforts, necessarily benefits the authori-
tarian regimes that receive it. Some members of Congress have raised
concerns over the possibility that some Uzbek security forces involved
in the mass killings at Andijan may have received US military train-
ing.274
Viewed from an ideological standpoint, military to military coop-
eration offers both positive and negative elements. Military equipment
and training undoubtedly strengthen the position of authoritarian
leaders in Central Asia. However, while target states benefit by build-
ing up much-needed capabilities and increase the competencies of
their armed forces, such training may also be seen as a method for the
United States and NATO to promote military professionalism. As
Kurt Meppen argues, “western military training teaches soldiers the
value of personal initiative and decision-making skills, intrinsic qual-
ities in later establishing economic reform and a stable economic mid-
dle class” and “can impart to individuals the skills necessary for a just
society and positive social development.”275
NATO has emphasized military reforms and interoperability with
alliance forces through Central Asian participation in the Partnership
for Peace program, in which all countries are members. The alliance’s
interest in military cooperation changed with NATO’s involvement in
Afghanistan and its assumption of leadership in 2003 of the Interna-
274 Ann Scott Tyson and Robin Wright, “Crackdown muddies US-Uzbek relations,”
Washington Post, 4 June 2005 [online 20 Nov 2008].
275 Kurt Meppen, “US-Uzbek Bilateral Relations: Policy Options” in Anatomy of a Crisis:
US-Uzbek Relations 2001–2005, ed. Svante Cornell, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program (John Hopkins University-SAIS and
Uppsala University, 2006) [online 20 Nov 2008], p. 40–41.
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tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there. Even though the US was
forced to leave its military base in Uzbekistan, the Germans continue
to maintain a base at Termiz, in the southern tip of the country near
the Afghan border in support of NATO operations. 
Joint Kazakh-NATO training exercises in September 2008, part
of a cooperative agreement to raise Kazakh military standards to
NATO levels, underlined Astana’s desire to steer a foreign policy
course independent of Russia and NATO’s desire to remain active in
the region.276 According to analyst Richard Weitz, “NATO has be-
come engaged in a long-term project to promote stability and security
in Central Asia.”277 Weitz outlines the problems NATO has had in the
region with its limited political leverage, its “modest progress” in mil-
itary reforms, and the pervasive view of NATO among Central Asian
governments as no more than a useful supplier of Western military
equipment.278 The United States generally appears to emphasize bilat-
eral military relations in Central Asia, but maintains some cooperative
efforts in a NATO framework. This approach allows the US to retain
several avenues through which it may pursue its traditional security
interests.
Central Asia’s longstanding history as a transit route, its geo-
graphic location, poor economic conditions, and its weak central gov-
ernments has made the region a prime smuggling route. Having
inherited from the Soviet Union a substantial infrastructure of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons facilities, securing these materials in
countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has long been a priority
for the US. The main avenue for this endeavor has been assistance
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program that has decom-
missioned nuclear facilities, cleaned up weapons laboratories, trans-
ferred radioactive materials to secure locations, and found alternate
and peaceful employment for former weapons scientists. 
A broad range of programs administered by the Departments of
Energy, State and Defense are also involved in non-proliferation activ-
ities. A major focus of these activities is to increase the proficiency and
effectiveness of border security throughout Central Asia by funding
training programs and equipment purchases through initiatives such
as the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.
276 RFE/RL, “Kazakhstan, NATO Hold Joint Military Exercises,” 23 September 2008.
277 Richard Weitz, “Analysis: Renewing Central Asian Partnerships,” NATO Review
(autumn 2006) [online 20 Nov 2008].
278 Ibid.
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In Tajikistan, for instance, the State Department describes the EXBS
program as working with “Tajik export control officials, customs au-
thorities, and border guards to combat the transshipment and export
of WMD related and illegal dual use technology items, and seeks to
reduce overall border security violations.”279 The Tajik-Afghan border
is of particular concern to the US, as a lack of training, funds and in-
adequate patrolling capacity makes border control a major challenge
to stability and progress in Tajikistan. In neighboring Kyrgyzstan,
EXBS “helps Kyrgyz officials better detect, interdict, and prevent
shipments of weapons and WMD components and other illicit items”
through programs that “train and equip personnel at border crossing
points, and provide training for customs and border police.”280 
In 2003, President Bush announced the creation of the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI). Rather than a formal organization, the
PSI “envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing
their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomat-
ic, economic, military, and other tools to interdict shipments” of
weapons of mass destruction.281 As of November 2007, the State De-
partment listed 86 countries as participants in PSI, including all the
countries of Central Asia.282 As one report for Congress noted, howev-
er, the lack of any formal mechanisms, institutions, or binding agree-
ments provides a weak foundation that relies heavily on voluntary
participation without any means of measuring the initiative’s suc-
cess.283 In any regard, nonproliferation remains a central security con-
cern – especially in the context of the war on terror – in which the US
has consistently invested considerable effort and financial resources.
As extremist groups in Central Asia rely on revenues from the nar-
cotics trade, there are close links between the war on terror and coun-
ternarcotics efforts. Afghanistan has experienced a substantial upsurge
in opium production since 2001, and one main export route transits
279 US Department of State, “US Assistance to Tajikistan – Fiscal Year 2006,” fact sheet,
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 28 November 2006 [online 20 Nov
2008].
280 US Department of State, US Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic – Fiscal Year 2006,”
fact sheet, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 28 November 2006 [online 20
Nov 2008].
281 US Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Ques-
tions (FAQ),” fact sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation, 26 May 2005 [online 20 Nov
2008]. 
282 US Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation [online 4 Mar 2008].
283 Mary Beth Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative, CRS Report for Congress (Wash-
ington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), Federation for American Scientists
[online 20 Nov 2008], p. 3.
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Central Asia. In addition to funding extremism, narcotics smuggling
also weakens vulnerable institutional structures due to increased cor-
ruption, and exacerbates social problems such as drug addiction and
the spread of infectious diseases. A number of US agencies administer
programs designed to bolster counternarcotics efforts in the region,
and offer training provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Agency and the US Customs Service.284 A substan-
tial portion of US security assistance to Central Asia, even after 2001,
has been devoted to border security and nonproliferation. 
Tajikistan again stands out as a prioritized case. Secretary Boucher
testified that “since the withdrawal of Russian Border Forces from the
Tajikistan–Afghanistan border last year [2005], we have intensified
our assistance efforts with European Union partners to build and equip
a network of outposts on that border and to ensure the border troops
receive training, equipment and salaries to do their jobs.”285 Much of
the US efforts in this regard parallel counter-proliferation assistance,
especially in emphasizing the need for improved border security. The
ongoing war in Afghanistan presents an opportunity for the US to ad-
dress both interdiction and crop suppression. As with many issues in
Central Asia, the symbiotic relationship between the region and its
southerly neighbor Afghanistan creates a complex web of policies and
interests.
Pillar two: economic and energy cooperation
While security interests seemed to dominate US policy immediately
after 9/11, the theme most often stressed by diplomats and administra-
tion officials is that of economic development and integration. Secre-
tary Boucher described US efforts in this field as a way to:
Foster inter- and intra-regional energy trade, investment, and
competition through technical assistance and coordination with
relevant international financial institutions. Likewise, diversifi-
cation of Central Asian economies and the growth of small- and
medium-size enterprises outside the energy sector can help cre-
ate new jobs in the region to extend prosperity. When possible,
assistance programs should increasingly incorporate regional
links, whether the focus is roads, energy, education, or even
284 Nichol, Central Asia’s Security.
285 Boucher, Prepared statement for US Policy in Central Asia. 
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training exchanges to include participants from neighboring
countries.286
To this end, Secretary of State Rice unveiled in October 2005 the Cen-
tral Asian Infrastructure Initiative (CAII), administered by the US
Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) and closely coordinated
with the State Department, Commerce Department and the US Trade
Representative. According to a USTDA press release, the CAII intends
to “target activities in the areas of energy, transportation, and commu-
nications that promote cooperation among the countries in the region
and their integration into the global economy.”287 Another program
aimed at furthering these objectives, the Central Asia Trade and In-
vestment Framework Agreement (TIFA), “creates a mechanism for dis-
cussion on mutual issues relating to trade, investment, development,
regional cooperation, economics, and regulatory frameworks” and con-
stitutes a “major component of the US agenda” in the region. The
TIFA Council gathers together both the private and public sectors
within Central Asia and meets once a year to discuss trade issues such
as cooperation on telecommunications, regional water planning, mod-
ernizing customs clearance procedures, and developing a regional en-
ergy market. Although the CAII and the TIFA symbolize the new
direction of US policy in the region, the concrete manifestations of
these initiatives are more difficult to observe, especially given their
limited budgetary allotments. 
Energy initiatives have featured prominently in US policy as a
pathway to regional integration and cooperation in Central Asia, as
well as a means of connecting Central Asia to energy-hungry South
Asian nations such as Pakistan and India. The Central Asian nations
have longstanding disagreements over the distribution of energy re-
sources. The upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can pro-
duce hydroelectric power: the downstream agricultural countries of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan require substantial quantities of water
but have natural gas supplies needed for heating and cooking by the
upstream states. Finding mutually beneficial solutions may not only
stimulate economic growth and improve living standards, but may
also reduce political tensions in the region. Electricity generated in
Tajikistan can be sent southwards to Afghanistan, thereby assisting re-
286 Ibid.
287 US Trade and Development Agency, “USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure
Integration Initiative,” press release, 14 October 2005 [online 20 Nov 2008].
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construction efforts and ultimately acting as a stabilizing – and there-
fore strategic – factor. As Secretary Boucher noted, 
one of our leading objectives is to fund a greatly expanded
Afghan power grid, with connections to energy sources in Cen-
tral Asia. It’s a winning solution for both sides, providing much-
needed energy to Afghanistan and serving as a major source of
future revenue for countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.288 
Afghanistan has emerged as a defining element in US policy in Central
Asia. While many US national security interests noted in the previous
section are fundamental in nature and therefore pre-date Operation En-
during Freedom, the invasion of Afghanistan has opened up new pos-
sibilities for US economic policy. In more recent US policy
conceptualizations, Afghanistan plays a key role by functioning as a
bridge between Central and South Asia, as well as providing a starting
point for US efforts to integrate the region economically. In a 2006 ar-
ticle in the State Department’s magazine State, Central Asian diplo-
mats James DeHart and Tristram Perry wrote – perhaps prematurely
– that “US success in Afghanistan allowed the Department a fresh per-
spective on Central Asia’s place in the broader region,” and they noted
how a recent US-sponsored conference examined how “the Central
Asian states can help break Afghanistan out of its geographic isolation
and give it access to global markets.”289 Failure to secure a successful
outcome in Afghanistan in many ways threatens the successful imple-
mentation of American regional strategy in Central Asia.
The US makes a similar argument about the hydrocarbon-rich
states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – as energy ex-
porters in need of increased access to global markets. The US has long
supported the development of multiple export routes for the substan-
tial oil and gas resources found in this landlocked region. It has devot-
ed considerable efforts to promoting alternative routes that avoid
countries that are politically at odds with the US, namely Iran, Russia
and China. With the BTC pipeline now online, the focus has turned
to a new export route underneath the Caspian Sea (the Transcaspian
Pipeline or TCP) that would become the first step in a pipeline system
to Europe. The US Trade and Development Agency in August 2007
288 Ibid.
289 James DeHart and Tristram Perry, “Central Asian Affairs: Creating new links and
new beginnings,” State Magazine, July/August 2006 (US Department of State [online
20 Nov 2008]), pp. 40–42.
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provided the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)
with a USD 1.7 million grant to study economic and technical aspects
of the TCP.290 Meanwhile, continuing instability in Afghanistan has
hindered further progress on the ambitious southerly gas route from
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. 
In his 2006 testimony, Secretary Boucher stated that the US sup-
ports 
establishing multiple, commercially viable pipelines and other
new energy transportation routes, because the United States
believes that diversification of energy transport routes to and
from Central Asia increases stability and energy security, not
just regionally but throughout the world.291 
During that same hearing, USAID official Drew W. Luten echoed this
sentiment, arguing that “the United States, as a significant energy im-
porter, has a vital interest in ensuring that efficient export outlets are
developed and that Central Asia emerges as an important source of en-
ergy in the years ahead, not just for the United States but for the world
market.”292
The political and economic dynamics of Central Asia experienced
a potentially course-altering shift in December 2006 with the death of
Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov. His replacement,
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, signaled the possibility of a differ-
ent political course with increased domestic openness and foreign pol-
icy flexibility. In the wake of a May 2007 announcement of an
agreement between Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia to expand
a pipeline running northwards into Russia, a series of high-level US
delegations traveled to Ashgabat, including State Department officials
and CENTCOM commmander Admiral William Fallon. President
Berdymukhammedov also met with US Secretary of State Rice while
in New York for the opening session of the United Nations General
Assembly.293 
290 US Trade and Development Agency, “USTDA Grant Launches Study of Trans-Cas-
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The diplomatic activity appeared to have some effect when
Berdymukhammedov said during his US visit that “Turkmenistan
gives primary importance to developing relations with the United
States, particularly in oil and gas.”294 Prior to the twelfth annual
Turkmenistan Oil and Gas Exhibition in November 2007 that attract-
ed 150 companies from 21 countries, Berdymukhammedov declared
that his country’s energy policy prioritized the “formation of a multi-
variant system of supplies of Turkmen fuel to world markets” along
with its strategic energy partners “Russia, China, and other countries.”
US Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman attended the conference, becom-
ing the highest ranking US official to visit Turkmenistan in years.295
The results of Turkmenistan’s independent audit in October 2008,
confirming the country’s claims of holding “world class” natural gas
reserves, have only served to intensify interest in energy exports.
The United States views government transparency as closely relat-
ed to, and as mutually reinforcing, political reforms and economic
growth. In a 2007 panel discussion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Evan Feigenbaum recounted a meeting with a Tajik official, dur-
ing which Feigenbaum began discussing the rule of law:
He interrupted me in the middle of my sentence and he said,
“There you go again with your democracy agenda. I don’t want
to talk about democracy. I want to talk about investment and
trade.” And I said, “Well, I am talking about investment and
trade because American companies will not invest here if you
can take a contract and simply rip it up; if there is no judicial
redress in the event of a contractual dispute.” So if you look at
where we focus programmatically, if you look at where we put
our money, we’re increasingly focused on building capacity in
these countries in ways that really, I think, have implications for
more than one basket [of interests].296
Pillar three: political and economic reform
The countries of Central Asia are among the most authoritarian in the
world, according to the independent NGO Freedom House. In its latest
294 John C.K. Daly, “Analysis: Turkmenistan sides with Kremlin,” UPI.com, 30 Novem-
ber 2007 [online 13 Mar 2008].
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296 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Pursuit of Black Gold: Pipeline Politics on the
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Freedom in the World survey, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan were determined to be “not free;” Kyrgyzstan was deter-
mined to be “partly free” by the survey. During the 1990s, the limited
political and civil liberties existing in these countries were restricted to
an even greater degree. Prior to the intensified US engagement with the
region in 2001, none were considered even partly free. Since 2000, both
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have marginally improved their rating, while
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have retained constantly poor ratings.
Uzbekistan fell slightly and thereby was given the worst score possible
in both categories (political rights and civil liberties), sharing the bot-
tom of the rankings with the likes of Burma, North Korea, Libya, and
neighboring Turkmenistan.297
In such a repressive political climate, the task of encouraging dem-
ocratic reforms and institution-building becomes a challenging one.
The United States has generally attempted to influence the internal
political character of other states by pursuing two types of policies.
First, state leaders can be pressed to initiate reforms through, for ex-
ample, public pressure, shaming, binding agreements, or even sanc-
tions. The 2002 Strategic Partnership Agreement between the US and
Uzbekistan also contains elements of this top-down approach. This
top-down strategy was employed by the European Union through its
travel ban on Uzbek leaders after 2005. The other option, a bottom-
up approach, seeks to lay the foundations for democratic institutions
and civic organizations by promoting certain aspects of civil society
that are necessary for a healthy democracy. This represents the bulk of
US democracy promotion, the majority of which is carried out by US-
AID and its NGO subcontractors. According to Assistant Administra-
tor for USAID Drew Luten, the agency follows a three-pronged
strategy for development assistance in Central Asia: “promoting a
democratic culture,” “bolstering economic growth and reform,” and
“facilitating social transition through more effective and equitable ap-
proaches to health and education.”298
The US State Department outlined its efforts to promote democ-
racy throughout 2006 in this way:
Our efforts focused on the three core components of a working
democracy that must be present if human rights are to be effec-
297 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Report 2008”; Freedom House, “Freedom in
the World Country Ratings 1972–2007.”
298 Luten, Prepared statement for US Policy in Central Asia.
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tively exercised and protected: One – a free and fair elections
process, with a level playing field to ensure genuine competi-
tion; Two – good governance, with representative, transparent
and accountable institutions operating under the rule of law,
including independent legislatures and judiciaries; and Three –
a robust civil society and independent media that can keep gov-
ernment honest, keep citizens engaged, and keep reforms on
track.299
Electoral programs include political party assistance and advising local
governmental institutions, as well as voter education programs and
election monitoring training. Good governance efforts have included
judicial training centers for judges, rule of law training for lawyers,
judges and legislators, and local government programs that emphasize
decentralization. Programs designed to strengthen civil society include
assistance to establish free legal clinics staffed by law students, civic
education and youth advocacy programs, and student exchange pro-
grams that expose Central Asian citizens to a democratic free market
society.
These types of programs have increasingly come under pressure
from state leaders, especially since 2003. According to the State De-
partment’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor:
In Central Asia, restrictions on civil society and opposition
political parties that began after the so-called Color Revolutions
remained and in some cases increased. Government restrictions
on civil society were often directed at US implementing part-
ners, many of which had to shut down their operations during
the last two years.300
In addition, the US has also observed “backsliding” by Central Asian
countries on key democracy indicators such as press freedom, judicial
independence, and conducting free and fair elections. In response, the
US has focused its efforts on “strengthening civil society; bolstering in-
dependent media; protecting human rights; and promoting reform at
the local levels.”301 The effects of democracy promotion programs are
299 US Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2006,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 5 April 2007 [online 20 Nov
2008], p. iii. 
300 US Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy, p. 188.
301 Luten, Prepared statement for US Policy in Central Asia.
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difficult to measure in any quantitative way, noted a report to Congress
by the National Endowment for Democracy, calling the task “over-
whelming, if not impossible.” Further complicating democracy pro-
motion efforts are reports of non-existent conceptual frameworks,
guides or educational materials for those engaged in promoting de-
mocracy.302
Less controversial for Central Asian leaders are US economic assist-
ance programs, which contain elements of political and social reform.
The US directs a substantial amount of its foreign aid towards invest-
ment and development projects within the Central Asian states. Ac-
cording to the State Department, the economic restructuring program
in Kazakhstan
… supports trade and investment, business and economic devel-
opment and removal of investment constraints, economics and
business education, and micro-enterprise development. [US
Government] programs also support customs reform, fiscal and
banking reform, pension reform, mortgage industry develop-
ment, accounting reform, small and medium enterprises train-
ing and advisory services.303
In other Central Asian countries, market reform programs have fun-
neled assistance to similar projects that support ground-level, sustain-
able economic growth. In addition, such investment programs often
involve US corporations and therefore serve US economic and corporate
interests as well. Tellingly, while total US assistance to the region is
declining, economic assistance remains steady or is increasing.304 Re-
calling the strong linkages between economic and political freedoms
expressed in US strategic documents such as the 2006 NSS, it appears
that the US, after encountering resistance to democracy promotion ef-
forts in Central Asia, has instead begun emphasizing economic aspects
with the same ideological goals in mind.
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Conclusions: US strategy in Central Asia
Situated at the apex of the arc of instability, Central Asia encapsulates
the entire collection of US interests throughout the globe in addition
to harboring all of the threats to those interests. Just as other observers
have noted, Central Asia is indeed a microcosm of the world as seen
through the prism of US grand strategy. As such, a number of elements
from the broader global strategy are present in the regional one, both
by chance and by design. Given the host of strategic interests present
in Central Asia, one might expect the US to prioritize this region
across the three categories of national power. Surprisingly, the totality
of US efforts reveals less strategic emphasis than the sum of its parts
might suggest. While the US strives for primacy and the prevention of
regional hegemonic powers – and it does pursue such goals in Central
Asia – the political effort and financial resources devoted to the region
reflect the practical limitations facing the US in the region. As men-
tioned earlier, success in Washington’s Central Asia strategy is in
many ways dependent on a successful outcome in Afghanistan, and it
is here the primary focus of US policy rests.
In military terms, the logistical demands of Operation Enduring
Freedom exemplified the need for global strategic access. While terror-
ism and energy had held US interest throughout the 1990s, OEF
sparked an unprecedented military presence in the region. This includ-
ed the establishment of US bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, more
limited military cooperation with Tajikistan, and refueling and over-
flight agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Within weeks,
the US had transformed from an outside actor involved in non-
proliferation efforts, border security and energy exports to one with a
substantial military presence in Central Asia and engaged in a war on
the region’s southern border. The unexpected eviction of US troops
from Uzbekistan in 2005 weakened the US military’s capacity to sup-
port operations in Afghanistan as well as project power in the region,
thereby increasing the importance of maintaining its base in
Kyrgyzstan as a forward operating site. The United States appears to
have replaced Uzbekistan with Kazakhstan in the role of “regional an-
chor.”
The US continues to view security issues in Central Asia through
the lens of the highly prioritized war on terror. Ironically, this has sim-
ply reinforced the set of policy issues in focus prior to 9 /11: non-pro-
liferation, WMD site clean-up and security, border security
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procedures and military reform. Cooperation in these areas furthers
specific US interests and promotes closer bilateral relations. Even if
terrorism were to fade as a national security priority, such issues would
remain pressing concerns. Lacking political and practical avenues to
pursue its interests in Central Asia and currently preoccupied with
counterterrorism operations on the region’s fringes in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Washington’s strategy is more restrained and focused on
long-term gains. Given the spectrum of security interests present in
the region, this static condition has the potential to rapidly create
more pressing strategic concerns and crises.
The economic component of US grand strategy, which includes ac-
cess to energy supplies, has been the most active and evolving element
of US Central Asia strategy during the final years of the Bush admin-
istration. Similar to US security interests in the region, the emphasis
on economic development and pipeline export routes represents a con-
tinuation of policies from the 1990s. Free market reforms and the pro-
motion of foreign investment are seen both as commercial
opportunities for US firms to gain new markets as well as a means of
nudging along economic reforms that may eventually lead to political
reforms. 
While pipeline projects and geo-economics capture the imagina-
tion of many Central Asia observers, the actual political processes in-
volved in negotiating and lobbying for a particular project are
painfully slow and unpredictable. While the US strongly advocates
westerly and southeasterly routes from the Caspian Sea, the effects of
such support are difficult to observe and measure. While the US clear-
ly played a political role in the construction of the BTC pipeline, it re-
mains unclear whether this success can be replicated in the form of a
trans-Caspian route or, even more unlikely, a trans-Afghan route to
Pakistan and India. The change of leadership in Turkmenistan has of-
fered a new twist in Central Asian energy politics, and it remains to be
seen whether Berdymukhammedov will embrace Western involve-
ment or continue to send the country’s gas exports north to Russia and
east to China. The energy reserves in Central Asia alone are hardly a
prize for the US, but US grand strategy emphasizes open and accessible
world energy markets that ultimately benefit the US economy. US
strategic interests are also served by limiting Russian influence in the
region and depriving the re-emerging power of an important economic
base.
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In the political and diplomatic realms, the main tenets of transfor-
mational diplomacy are evident in US Central Asian policy, The inter-
dependent nature of the international system leads the US to focus on
states’ character and their internal governance structures, while em-
phasizing a direct connection with populations outside the capital cit-
ies and the use of technology to spread American culture and ideas.
Without any real options for pursuing multilateral or regional frame-
works such as the SCO, the US remains dependent on maintaining
good bilateral relations. This too is consistent with the global pattern,
where such relationships are favored over multilateral organizations.
Despite some setbacks, the US continues to fund and operate an
extensive set of democracy promotion programs based on developing
civil society, reforming governmental institutions, strengthening in-
dependent media outlets and improving election processes. While
most Central Asian regimes have restricted the activities of the NGOs
responsible for implementation, limited programming continues.
Correspondingly, few diplomatic pressures are placed on the regimes
themselves in an attempt to maintain some type of working relation-
ship. Democracy and political reform efforts expanded rapidly after
2001, only to be curtailed again three years later as Central Asian lead-
ers became nervous. The US’ focus has now shifted to economic re-
forms as a means of positioning and preparing these states for eventual
political reforms. 
Surprisingly, the US does not appear to prioritize Central Asia de-
spite the seeming confluence of strategic factors in the region. Coun-
ter-terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational criminal networks,
energy resources, poverty, disease and the lack of political reforms are
overlaid by great power politics. Despite this potent combination, US
assistance levels in the region are falling. One expert observed, “It is
hard to imagine a wider gulf between the US’s real interests and its
budgetary actions” in Central Asia.305 The region attracts only sporad-
ic attention from high-ranking political leaders from the Bush admin-
istration, nor is it often the subject of Congressional hearings. Apart
from the period 2004–05, the region has existed outside Washington’s
area of interest, though both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have re-
cently awakened some interest.
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Based on US regional strategy in Central Asia, as stated and im-
plemented, one can see a number of parallels to US strategy on a global
level. Within both fundamental components of US strategy, namely
geopolitics and ideology, each of the three elements of grand strategy
– military, political and economic – are represented on both the re-
gional and the global level. These parallels are perhaps more apparent
when placed in a table such as the one below. 
Table 2: Summary table of US grand strategy in Central Asia
Elements of US Grand Strategy in Central Asia
Global Central Asia
G
eo
p
o
lit
ic
al
M
ili
ta
ry
Strategic access, base restruc-
turing, prevent regional powers, 
focus on both traditional war 
and COIN in force structure and 
weapons systems
Uzbek and Kyrgyz bases, Afghani-
stan support, Non-prolif. /border 
efforts, bilateral/NATO training co-
operation 
Po
lit
ic
al
Bilateral relationships, less insti-
tutions, more flexibility, transfor-
mational diplomacy, counter 
regional powers
Counter Russian (Chinese) influ-
ence, pull political center of gravity 
toward Afghanistan, bilateral rela-
tionships with Uzbeks, Kazakhs
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic Secure energy resources, new 
markets
Pipeline geo-economics, pull re-
gion southwards with CAII, other 
initiatives
Id
eo
lo
g
ic
al
M
ili
ta
ry
Increased focus on stabilization, 
reconstruction, humanitarian 
operations – AFRICOM model
Training for increased professional-
ism (incl. human rights, anti-corrup-
tion) and security in Central Asian 
states, counternarcotics efforts 
Po
lit
ic
al Democracy promotion, good 
governance programs, transfor-
mational diplomacy
Limited democracy promotion, 
good governance & civil society 
programs
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic Economic liberty connected to 
political liberty, Millennium pro-
gram
Economic development and re-
forms as means to prepare region 
for political reform
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In broader terms, US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has
evolved and expanded in order to address security threats arising from
non-traditional actors such as terrorist groups and rogue states. The
2001 terrorist attacks reminded Americans that ocean buffer zones of-
fered little protection in a modern, globalized, interdependent world
with technology available to non-state groups that could seriously
harm the US mainland.  The growing strategic consensus appears to
have settled on a two-pronged approach. An active forward military
posture, combined with ideologically inspired policies of democratic
and economic reforms, seeks to address threats emanating from within
other states. The large-scale global presence required to stabilize vul-
nerable regions also serves to counter the influence of rising powers
around the globe. It is worth recalling the similar focus of the 1992
DPG, a fact that underscores the continuity in US strategic think-
ing.306 As this study has shown, there is substantial evidence that the
US actively plans and implements policy reflecting each part of this
dual approach. Thus, the two ever-present underlying components of
US grand strategy – geopolitics and ideology – continue to drive
American strategic thinking.
Geopolitics and ideology: synergy
The two reoccurring elements in US grand strategy, geopolitics and
ideology, are primary drivers of US policy in Central Asia. The admin-
istration’s strategy to redirect the region’s economic and political focus
south and east towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is fundamen-
tally motivated by geopolitical interests. Attempting to disconnect
306 See chapter two of this study.
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Central Asia from its natural trading partner Russia, as well as the rap-
idly expanding economic presence of the Chinese, may eventually ben-
efit the Central Asian countries. However, endeavoring to direct the
region’s economic activity southwards toward an unstable and conflict-
filled Afghanistan at this point seems better designed to serve US in-
terests than those of Central Asia. In any case, some synergy exists
between US geopolitical interests and its ideological ones. 
The US routinely denies any great power competition or zero-sum
game thinking in its approach to Central Asia, but consistently acts to
counter Russian influence. By integrating the Central Asian republics
into the NATO system through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-
gram, and its intense lobbying for pipeline export routes that avoid
Russian soil, the US has pursued policies that sought to limit Russian
influence. In 1998, then energy secretary Bill Richardson was partic-
ularly candid about this fact when commenting on Caspian energy:
This is about America’s energy security, which depends on
diversifying our sources of oil and gas worldwide. It’s also about
preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our val-
ues. We’re trying to move these newly independent countries
toward the West. We would like to see them reliant on Western
commercial and political interests rather than going another
way. We’ve made a substantial political investment in the Cas-
pian, and it’s very important to us that both the pipeline and
the politics come out right.307
Richardson’s perspective remains highly relevant even as current US
officials are unwilling to express such thoughts openly. The Central
Asian energy producers would indeed benefit from increased market
access, as US officials argue, especially considering the discount prices
Russia pays. Russian interests would be most affected by new export
routes for oil and gas, as it has become economically dependent on re-
selling Central Asian energy to Europe while it develops new domestic
gas fields. The revenues earned from these transactions have helped to
fuel Russia’s military revitalization. Therefore, increasing the region’s
economic options benefits the Central Asian republics and potentially
weakens an increasingly assertive Russia. The geopolitical aspect of
307 Stephen Kinzer, “On Piping Out Caspian Oil, US Insists the Cheaper, Shorter Way
isn’t Better,” New York Times, 8 November 1998 [online 12 Mar 2008].
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Washington’s efforts to vector Central Asia west and south are unmis-
takable. As Stephen Blank has argued:
energy access, though important, is not and should not be the
primary driver of US policy here. Rather it is a means to an end
… the driving force behind US policy is anti-monopoly …
This American policy of defending the independence, integ-
rity, and security of these states extends the long-established
vital geostrategic interest of the United States in forestalling
the rise of any Eurasian empire in either continent that could
challenge it.308
In this regard, the ideological component of US strategy acts to reinforce
the geopolitical repositioning. Despite Russia’s historical dominance in
the region, the Central Asian countries have increasingly resorted to a so-
called multi-vector approach to foreign policy. Countries such as
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan established bilateral relationships with the
US as a way to balance Russian pressures, a pattern also adopted by
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Secretary of State Rice’s visit to Kazakhstan
in October 2008, shortly after joint Kazakh-NATO military exercises,
reflects a new chapter in geopolitical relationships. In recent years, bilat-
eral relations with China have also acted as a balancer. This mechanism
has been institutionalized by the SCO and remains one of the greatest
benefits of membership for the Central Asian states. Another benefit of
SCO membership is regime security. As one report noted, “it is not un-
fair to categorize the SCO as a pact for regime survival,” a “pro-status
quo” coalition.309 The United States, through its programs of democracy
promotion and economic reform, is very much a revisionary anti-status
quo actor seeking to alter the political landscape in the region.
Just as the US argues that its economic policies are in the best in-
terests of the citizens of Central Asia, so too are its policies of demo-
cratic reform. In promoting representative government institutions,
the US also weakens Russian and Chinese influence over the authori-
tarian regimes in the region. Of course, both autocrats and democrats
alike have various rationales for their foreign policies, independent of
their particular form of government. Autocratic regimes, however,
have one overriding interest: retaining power. In Kazakhstan,
308 Stephen Blank, US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them (Carlisle: Strate-
gic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 3.
309 Bailes et.al., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, p. 9.
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Tajikistan and even Uzbekistan, if widespread civil unrest ever threat-
ens the regime’s continued hold on power, the appeal for assistance
will most likely be directed towards Moscow or Beijing. In this way,
Russia and China have more leverage with which to influence the pol-
icy decisions of authoritarian regimes. Simply advocating democratic
reforms, a process that entails eventual regime change, sets the US on
a collision course with the two powers. US geopolitical and ideological
interests are therefore in alignment in Central Asia insofar as they
counter Russian (and to some extent Chinese) influence in the region.
Geopolitics and ideology: conflict
At the same time, these two elements also work against each other in
the practical implementation of US policy in the region. The synergy
noted above exists on a strategic and theoretical level focused on future
outcomes over time. In the short term, the US remains somewhat lim-
ited by its ideological rhetoric and commitment to democratic princi-
ples. Although the US often acts pragmatically and in ways that run
counter to the ideological rhetoric of freedom and democracy, such
principles nevertheless hinder the ability of the US to act in wholly re-
alpolitik fashion. The US record in Uzbekistan stands as a testament to
this fact: despite substantial military assistance and reports of rendi-
tion to Uzbek prisons, the US was unable to continue the bilateral re-
lationship largely due to ideologically motivated actions elsewhere by
the administration and Congress.
US support for various actors involved in the Color Revolutions in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – and the public acknowledgement
of such support – fueled resentment and suspicion throughout Central
Asia. Grouping these activities together with US NGO democracy
promotion programs, authoritarian regimes delivered what Thomas
Carothers described as a “backlash” against US democracy efforts.
Why would any regime cooperate with a nation that endeavors to top-
ple it? Therein lies the current conundrum for US policymakers: how
to accomplish their geopolitically inspired strategic goals – which en-
tail close cooperation with partner governments – while working to-
wards political reforms that threaten that same partner. Even more
challenging for the US is the willingness of other actors, such as China
or Russia, to offer military and economic support to the Central Asian
regimes without the hassle of such bothersome reforms.
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Due to this self-imposed limitation, the US will experience difficul-
ties in competing for influence with Russia or China in Central Asia as
long as the ideological component of US grand strategy remains. It can-
not offer long-term and unquestioning support for the regimes due to
this ideological “handicap,” and therefore cannot be regarded as a com-
pletely reliable ally. The rise and sudden fall of US engagement from
2001–05 can be seen as a failed experiment: the administration’s desire
for short-term gains in the war on terror revealed the long-term weak-
ness of US partnerships in the region. Close strategic partnerships with
authoritarian regimes, such as the one between the US and Uzbekistan,
seem to be untenable over the long term. Washington might therefore
have limited access to Central Asian leaders and therefore some ability
to influence political and strategic outcomes, but is unlikely to gain any
real permanent political foothold in the region.
Several other fundamental conflicts exist between US geopolitical
ambitions and its efforts to promote democratic forms of government.
While Russia and China indeed might find it easier to influence auto-
cratic leaders in Central Asia and interpret US efforts at democracy
promotion as counter to their strategic interests, it must not be as-
sumed that the development of democratic states will automatically
serve US interests.310 Anti-Russia policies are not necessarily the same
as pro-US policies. As Paul Saunders wrote in a 2007 article for the
National Interest, “democracies – like all other states – have different
interests … And even when democracies share both values and inter-
ests, they often have different priorities.”311 Furthermore, Saunders ar-
gues that public opinion in some regions is such that representative
governments would be less likely to cooperate with the US; Egypt and
Saudi Arabia can “work with Washington precisely because they are
insulated from popular pressure.”312 
Democracy promotion may also run counter to the US desire for
political stability in the region. A comprehensive study of the causes
of state failure found regime type to be the most decisive factor: almost
all partial democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa failed within the span of
a few years, and full democracies were five times more likely to fail
than autocratic states. In predominantly Muslim countries, partial and
310 By the same token, one may also question whether autocratic states share similar
long-term interests simply due to their lack of democratic institutions.
311 Paul J. Saunders, “Learning to Appreciate France,” National Interest online, 1 March
2007 [online 4 Apr 2008].
312 Ibid.
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full democracies faced the same odds, being five times more likely to
fail than autocratic regimes.313 Based on these findings, US programs
encouraging the creation of democratic institutions in Central Asia
(and elsewhere) work at cross-purposes with US geopolitical interests
in regional stability and security.
An economic great game
Despite Strobe Talbot’s proclamation that the US hoped to avoid a
zero-sum game in Central Asia, it is difficult to avoid the realities of
energy politics. With finite resources and increasing demand, there
will be winners and losers: Central Asian gas piped eastwards to China
deprives Russia or the BTC pipeline of that volume. The existing net-
work of pipelines heavily favors continued Russian dominance of the
energy market in the region, though China steadily makes inroads
with several projects nearing completion. This may lead to friction be-
tween the two countries due to diverging economic interests. Those ac-
tors most disadvantaged in the current climate are Europe and the
United States. West-flowing pipeline projects are dependent on prob-
lematic agreements between partner states and sufficient flows from
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Any southerly export route must con-
tend with Afghanistan’s continued instability or political uncertainty.
The economic relationships between the Central Asian countries
and the regional powers of China and Russia are significant in several
ways. Closer economic ties invariably lead to closer political relations,
especially when increasing portions of national economies depend on
foreign investment. Russia and China desire regime stability and po-
litical predictability to protect their interests and growing invest-
ments in the region. Theirs are direct and immediate national
interests, while the US views Central Asia as important but not cru-
cial. For the United States, it is the conflict in Afghanistan that weighs
most heavily. Regional stability and strategic access are deemed nec-
essary for the US and its allies to succeed there. The US involvement
in Afghanistan has reinforced existing concerns and increased the
stakes for US policy in the region that exceed simple political maneu-
vering on pipeline routes. Interestingly, while the US remains the
313 Jack A. Goldstone et al., “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings,” Center
for Global Policy, 30 September 2000 (George Mason University [online 20 Nov
2008]).
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dominant actor on the global stage with Russia and China acting as
spoilers to US strategic ambitions, the roles are reversed in Central
Asia. Here, the US plays the peripheral role and struggles to secure po-
litical access and leverage to further its interests. In this region, multi-
polarity is indeed a reality.
Ironically, there appears to be broad areas of common interest be-
tween Russia, China and the United States. None wish for a further
radicalization of Islam in the region or the re-emergence of a Taliban
regime, all view the spread of transnational criminal syndicates and
narcotics trafficking as a serious problem, all have an interest in com-
bating the spread of HIV/AIDS, and all have an interest in avoiding
widespread political instability. Despite this, there has been little real
cooperation between the three. The Russian and American military
bases in Kyrgyzstan ostensibly have the same counterterrorism man-
date, but have no cooperative agenda. While SCO member states have
cooperative security efforts, these are largely symbolic in nature. It is
particularly challenging to account for the lack of coordination be-
tween the US and Russia without viewing the relationship through
the lens of geopolitical competition and mutual suspicion over under-
lying motives. Despite the broad set of US national interests in Central
Asia, Washington has apparently chosen to emphasize the economic
and energy aspects.
The future of US grand strategy
The strategic outlook at the end of the second Bush administration
represents a culmination of trends that integrate geopolitical and ide-
ological elements in a way consistent with past strategies. More than a
simple window dressing or casual addition, ideology has increasingly
been incorporated as an active strategic element in US policy planning,
a tool to help address the more intangible and diffuse threats arising
since the end of the Cold War. Despite the sound internal logic of the
current approach, some have questioned the sustainability of a grand
strategy based on primacy. Questions also arise regarding the practical
limitations of pursuing US security through active military, political
and economic efforts to provide security and developmental and polit-
ical assistance to troubled and fragile regions in the arc of instability. 
The new geopolitics of Central Asia plainly illustrates the chal-
lenges involved when implementing the two-pronged grand strategic
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approach taken by the US in an area where both elements must find a
sort of synergy. While Central Asia presents unique and long-term
challenges to US strategists, similar conditions may also be found in
the Middle East and on the African continent. Due to the globalized
nature of American primacy, challenges to US freedom of movement
and the growing influence of regional actors outside their traditional
geopolitical spheres (such as Chinese activities in Africa) will require
global capabilities.
Many components of the current grand strategy outlined here en-
joy broader support, and have been partially institutionalized, so that
radical changes appear unlikely beyond a gradual reduction in ambi-
tiousness. From State and Defense Department officials to US military
leaders, there appears to be a growing consensus on the continued need
for capabilities that can influence the internal dynamics of other states,
including robust counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction
forces. There has been a visible shift away from forceful democracy pro-
motion during Bush’s second term, towards fundamental building
blocks of democratic society such as economic development, humani-
tarian projects, and good governance. It is important to note the con-
vergence within policymaking circles around such policies. Just as
Secretary Rice argued, the boundaries between security, development
and democracy have become less clear. Some security policy consensus
may evolve as liberal internationalists, human rights advocates, geopo-
litical realists and ideologically focused neoconservatives increasingly
find common ground. There is much in this grand strategy for both
political parties to agree upon.
 In the end, domestic political or economic pressures may affect
the implementation of this ambitious US grand strategy to a much
greater degree than pressure from external actors in the international
system. The global economic crisis of 2008, combined with long-
neglected domestic financial obligations, may cause budget shortfalls
in both defense and foreign policy programming. Some analysts have
warned of the inherent unsustainability of America’s implemented
grand strategy in strategic terms. As US strategy in Central Asia dem-
onstrates, America’s grand strategy may suffer from underlying con-
flicts that may be difficult to reconcile. As the new president takes
office in 2009, adjustments will most likely affect the scope, rather
than the fundamental strategic thinking, of the grand strategy pre-
sented here.
Chapter 7
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